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Abstract 
The argument of this thesis is that H. Richard Niebuhr has produced a 
distinctive, indeed, unique theologia crucis. Although Niebuhr never made this 
motif the explicit focus of his work, his writings, nonetheless, demonstrate a 
perennial reference to, and penetrating grasp of, the crucifixion and resurrection 
of Jesus Christ, as the defining events of the Christian gospel. 
After a short introduction to Niebuhr's life and work, and a brief discussion 
of that tradition which gives prominence to the theology of the cross (theologia 
erucis), an exposition and interpretation ofNiebuhr's theologia erucis is carried 
out by means of six distinct, though interrelated perspectives: existential; 
evangelical; ethical; ecclesiological; ecumenical and eschatological. Despite his 
reluctance to present a full-blown dogmatics or systematics, I use these six 
perspectives to trace the contours of the coherent, yet largely, implicit theologia 
erucis that lies just below the surface of his corpus, so that my thesis may allow 
its form and content to crystallise more clearly in the mind's eye. 
Beginning with an existential exploration of Niebuhr's phenomenology of 
faith in terms of trust and loyalty, we are enabled to more fully apprehend the 
multi-faceted faithlessness of the social self as exposed by the theologia erueis. 
In the next chapter, written from an evangelical perspective, we see how God in 
Christ has transformed the human situation by converting the various fonns of 
faithlessness into that faithfulness which Niebuhr calls radical monotheism. 
Chapter three considers the ethical consequences of this faith-stance as depicted 
by Niebuhr in terms of response to the creative, governing and redemptive 
actions of God. Next, we analyse his ecclesiology, and see that this largely 
takes the form of a constructive critique in order to help clarify the mission of 
the eeclesia erucis. Chapters five and six are written from an ecumenical and 
eschatological perspective respectively, and seek to lay bare the kind of ethos 
that Niebuhr espoused, namely, that God's sovereignty is a mysterious yet 
6 
emergent reality with universal intent, confronting sin and suffering as an 
eschatologia crucis. 
I conclude that Niebuhr's is a distinctive, even unique theologia crucis, one 
that is, at least plausible, and, I believe, persuasive as a particular kind of ethos 
of the cross. His interpretation of what I designate 'crucial faith' in the light of 
God in Christ makes his a necessary, if not in every respect, sufficient 
exposition of the orthodox Trinitarian gospel, perhaps best described as an 
ethos of the cross or a prophetic wisdom of the cross. As such it offers a distinct 
and worthy contribution to our understanding of Christian discipleship. 
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Introduction: A Sketch of Niebuhr's Life and Work 
1. An Image of a Man 
A photograph ofH. Richard Niebuhr has long fascinated me. Taken in 1955 in 
the chapel of Yale Divinity School, it shows him standing at a lectern or 
podium looking down, presumably at those seated before him. The picture is in 
black and white with the dark shading of Niebuhr's gown and the sanctuary's 
background both lending an atmosphere of solemnity. But what arrests one's 
attention is Niebuhr's face: head tilted slightly to the side, his eyes gaze forward 
with profound intensity, suggestive of hidden depths of suffering and 
experience. His deeply lined face and forehead, a cri ss-cross of agonized 
concern; as well as the set of his closed mouth and jaw, subtly add to the 
overwhelming mood of existential contemplation that his expression evokes. 
My contention is that a proper appreciation of this photograph goes hand in 
hand with the attempt to understand Niebuhr's distinctive contribution to the 
theological task, especially as this has been articulated in the well known 
expression, 'faith seeking understanding'. As this thesis has developed, I have 
become increasingly convinced that contemplating this photograph, as well as 
pondering his life in its historical context and reading closely his corpus of 
writings, involves a kind of hermeneutical spiral where each aspect helps 
interpret the others in a process of mutual enrichment. 
James Gustafson, a close friend and colleague ofNiebuhr's, seems to concur 
with this when he writes: 'Two photographs of HRN in my possession still 
affect me . . . Photographs convey dimensions that words do not.' 1 As 
Gustafson also writes, in confirmation of my earlier suggestion about the 
existentialist strain in Niebuhr's life and work: '[Niebuhr was] a person to 
whom the reality of God was not just an idea but a power, and whose 
I James M. Gustafson, 'Faithfulness: Remembering H. Richard Niebuhr,' The Christian 
Century, October S, 1994, pp. 884-886, quoting from p. 886. 
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confidence that God could be Friend was borne out of both the Christian story 
and the struggles of personal, social and political life. ,2 
Another friend and colleague, Liston Pope writes that 'those who know him 
fairly well, including his students, are aware that his life has been etched in 
profound interior struggle, and that this life itself is a result of a simultaneous 
dependence on God and the rebellion of a human being against Him.' And in a 
backward glance to the image evoked by the photograph I have already referred 
to, Pope remarks that 'Richard Niebuhr on the podium is not acting but feeling 
- man feeling as he is thinking.,3 Finally, we may record the reflections of 
another Niebuhr scholar, Mel Keiser who writes of how as a young theology 
student he one day 'took down thefestschrift for H. Richard Niebuhr, Faith and 
Ethics. Opening to the flyleaf picture, I was struck by his face. Deeply etched, 
luminous, manifest with power, humility and suffering, it was what I would 
come late to understand as the numinosity of "a wise old man." In that 
fortuitous moment I was transfixed by a felt sense of deep meaning and mystery 
in the vital mind of this embodied self. Regaled with stories of his theological 
acumen by my undergraduate mentor and beginning to read Christ and Culture, 
I went to Yale Divinity School to study with Niebuhr in what turned out to be 
the last two years of his life.,4 
Gustafson, Pope and Kliever were writing, of course, as North Americans, 
and indeed, most if not quite all of the scholarly interaction with Niebuhr has 
been in that context. Coming from my own rather different situation, namely, 
Northern Ireland and its circumstances of conflict, suspicion and terrorism, 
especially 'the Troubles' of recent years, I have been drawn to a deep 
appreciation of Niebuhr's writings for particular reasons arising from this 
context, and am intrigued by the possibilities that may emerge from the sort of 
reinterpretation of his work that I offer here. It seems to me that Niebuhr's 
distinctive interpretation of faith is a plausible, even persuasive theology of the 
2 Ibid. 
3 Liston Pope, 'H. Richard Niebuhr: A Personal Appreciation,' pp. 3-8, here pp. 4,5 in Faith 
and Ethics: The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr, Paul Ramsey ed, New York, Harper & Row, 
1957, reprinted as Harper Torchbook paperback, 1965 . 
.. R. Melvin Keiser, Roots of Relational Ethics: Responsibility in Origin and Maturity in H. 
Richard Niebuhr, Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1996, p. v. 
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cross (theologia crucis), offering insights into the good news of Jesus Christ, in 
tenns of trust and loyalty and responsibility, which are quite literally 'crucial'. 
The word crucial is used here with deliberate double intent. In nonnal usage it 
refers to something which is necessary, vital or essential to the being or well-
being of an entity or event. This nonnal or 'common-sense' meaning of the 
word crucial is part of what I want to convey in my thesis title since it makes 
explicit my conviction that Niebuhr's work on faith as involving aspects of 
trust, loyalty and responsibility is a necessary part of understanding the true 
nature of the Christian gospel and its imperatives. But the word crucial as I use 
it here is also meant to refer to the fact that such faith is inescapably dependent 
on the good news of God's grace as demonstrated and declared in the life, 
ministry, resurrection, ascension and awaited return of Jesus, the crucified 
Christ. Niebuhr's theological and ethical work on these and other related 
matters are thus to be analysed and interpreted in this thesis under the guiding 
rubric of crucial faith as suggested by this two-fold meaning of the tenn. 
In fact, if one where to look for a suitable descriptive term for my 
interpretation of Niebuhr's work it could well be argued that his theologia 
crucis is perhaps primarily an 'ethos of the cross'. The advantage of this phrase 
is that it indicates the several interlocking dimensions that Niebuhr was keen to 
hold together in his synoptic understanding of the Christ event: not simply or 
solely a dogmatic depiction of God's being and action; nor simply or solely a 
highly detailed casuistic ethics of Christian behaviour; but rather a body of 
work that sought to explore the borderlands where biblical studies, systematic 
theology, philosophy and ethics all converged. For Niebuhr. as I will argue 
throughout this thesis, the primary point of convergence is what Douglas Hall, 
quoting Karl Barth, has called 'the environs of Golgotha'.s In some such sense 
is Niebuhr's theologia crucis thus presented as an ethos of the cross of Jesus 
Christ. As the thesis title suggests, 'crucial faith' necessarily emphasises both 
that Jesus was 'crucified' and 'raised from death' thus determining and defining 
the entire ethos of the Christian life and thus enhancing our understanding of 
what the church means by discipleship. 
5 Douglas John Hall, Christian Theology in a North American Context: Vol. 2: Professing the 
Faith, Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1996, p. 520. 
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2. Reading Between the Lines: Life and Text in Context 
Helmut Richard Niebuhr was born in 1894 in Wright City, Missouri, U.S.A. 
where his father, a German immigrant, was a distinguished pastor in the 
German Evangelical Synod. The denomination was numerically small and was 
still more rooted in its European Lutheran-Calvinist heritage than it was as yet 
willing to enter fully into its New World setting.6 A parable of things yet to 
come was that in his early years, Niebuhr was primarily called Helmut, but with 
the passage of time, and particularly with the profound challenges to his ethnic 
consciousness wrought by the First World War, he later changed his main name 
to the more 'Americanised' one of Richard. Nonetheless, the ecclesiastical 
ethos in which the young Niebuhr was nurtured continued to deeply influence 
the content and temper of his future theological life's work.' 
Helmut Richard Niebuhr followed his father, Gustav, and one of his elder 
brothers, Reinhold, into the ordained ministry of the German Evangelical 
Synod. Like both of them, he was part of the more 'progressive' wing of the 
denomination, and this restless frustration with the denomination's prevailing 
'conservative' ethos sometimes sat rather uneasily with the education he 
received in two of its teaching establishments, first at Elmhurst College (1908-
1912), and then, from 1912-1915 at Eden Theological Seminary. 
However, certain unforeseen circumstances were to have profound 
consequences upon the course of Niebuhr's life and also probably served to 
shape the spirit as well as the substance of his future calling. In 1913, during 
Niebuhr's time at Eden, his father died suddenly and unexpectedly, prompting 
the family to move back to Lincoln, Illinois where Gustav had previously been 
6 William G Chrystal, A Father's Mantle: The Legacy of Gustav Niebuhr, New York, Pilgrim 
Press, 1982; 'A Man of the Hour and the Time: The Legacy of Gustav Niebuhr,' Church 
History 49,1980, pp. 416-432. 
7 Jon Diefenthaler, H. Richard Niebuhr: A Lifetime of Reflections on the Church and the World, 
Georgia, Mercer University Press, 1986. This book offers the most extensive insights into the 
context ofNiebuhr's life and work. 
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a pastor. After his studies at Eden had ended, Niebuhr helped support his 
mother and family financially by working for a year in 1915-16 as a reporter in 
a local newspaper, during which time he took serious stock of the direction of 
his life.s 
By 1916, Niebuhr had reached some kind of resolution on the matter, and 
was ordained and called to serve as pastor of Walnut Park Evangelical Church 
in St. Louis. One incident, in particular, from his ministry there, stands out in 
shocking detail as a test of his faith in the face of extremity. Niebuhr was 
helping to lead a winter outing of the congregation's scout troop. At Creve 
Coeur Lake, three boys let curiosity overcome caution when they became aware 
of a fish splashing in a hole on the frozen surface. Drawn by the spectacle, they 
ventured onto thin ice which gave way below them. Niebuhr frantically tried to 
save them, injuring himself in the process, but sadly all three boys died and 
were buried a few days later by their distraught pastor.9 Echoing Diefenthaler's 
sentiments on the same incident, Fowler writes: 'The memory of that tragedy 
and his sense of responsibility for it may have contributed to his lifelong 
sensitivity to the presence and power of inexplicable evil in life, and to the 
suffering of innocents. ,10 
Niebuhr still felt the pull of academia strongly, and, perhaps not 
surprisingly, as a pastor with a passion for education, he returned to his old 
seminary, Eden, to lecture in theology and ethics from 1919 to 1922, during 
which time he also enrolled in numerous supplementary courses in an attempt 
to extend his knowledge and, at least partially satisfy his love of learning. 
'Academic vagabondage' was how his brother Reinhold described these years. 
Niebuhr's educational appetite, however, was only whetted by these 
experiences, and so he decided to further deepen and broaden his intellectual 
interests at Yale University. His studies there culminated in his 1924 doctoral 
dissertation entitled 'Emst Troeltsch's Philosophy of Religion' , giving evidence 
8 James W Fowler, To See the Kingdom: The Theological Vision of H. Richard Niebuhr, 
Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1974. Reprinted by University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 
1985, p. 2. All future references to Fowler's book are from this latter version. 
9 Diefenthaler, op. cit., p. 37. 
10 Fowler, op. cit., p. 2. 
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of his lifelong fascination with how theology, philosophy, ethics, history and 
sociology are all interwoven into diverse and intricate, yet potentially unified 
patterns. At the same time Niebuhr continued to work as the pastor of a small 
local congregation and was now a husband to Florence, and father to their two 
children, Cynthia and Richard. 
The Yale faculty were keen to have someone of Niebuhr's calibre on their 
staff, especially as he had given proof of his capabilities, not just through his 
research, but also because of his proven excellence as a lecturer in several 
theological disciplines. But instead, in 1924, aged thirty, Niebuhr accepted an 
invitation to become president of Elmhurst College, and for the next three years 
he laboured with great energy and imagination in the busy demands of 
overseeing the plethora of administrative duties that helped Elrnhurst receive 
full accreditation and develop into becoming a first-rate liberal arts college. 
However, Niebuhr's first love, that of theological education, perennially present 
in the background, began to reassert itself, and this, together with the strains of 
administration, led to him leaving the presidency at Elmhurst, and return to the 
faculty at Eden Theological Seminary in 1927. 
Niebuhr had been nurtured in a church background that might, with some 
caution, be called 'liberal evangelical', an ethos in which the experiential 
aspects of the gospel were at least as important as its doctrinal bases. But 
perhaps, above all, it was the ethical consequences of faith which were of 
paramount importance in his attempts to reflect upon the Christian message. 
These interests were soon to find public expression in a series of articles in 
various theological journals 11 culminating in the publication in 1929 of his first 
book, The Social Sources of Denominationalism. This was a prophetic critique 
of how churches tended to mirror the many divisions already existing within 
society. In a trenchant denunciation of ecclesiastical faithlessness he accused 
the churches of reflecting and even reinforcing the caste system of society at 
11 H. Richard Niebuhr, hereafter cited as HRN, 'What Holds Churches Together?,' The 
Christian Century, 43, 1926, pp. 346-348; 'The Relativities of Religion, t The Christian 
Century, 45,1928, pp. 1456-1458; 'Churches That Might Unite,' The Christian Century, 46, 
1929, pp. 259-261; 'Moral Relativism and the Christian Ethic,' New York, International 
Missionary Council, 1929, pp. 3-11. 
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large. In a summary critique he even went so far as to state that 
'Denominationalism thus represents the moral failure of Christianity' .12 
However, even as the ink was drying on Niebuhr's manuscript, he began to 
feel a sense of unease with some of his strictures against corrupt church 
structures. He now came to realise that whilst there was indeed a place for the 
kind of liberal indignation in which he had hitherto been engaged, there was an 
even greater need to provide a constructive alternative which, still more 
fundamentally, should draw upon the central and classical truths of the 
Church's gospel. An eight-month sabbatical from Eden in 1930, gave some 
'space' for Niebuhr to contemplate these stirrings, and also enabled him to 
experience at first hand, some of the seismic movements and events that were 
taking place in Europe. In his encounters with many of the leading intellectuals 
in Germany and Russia he gained a wealth of insight upon which his fertile 
mind was able to reflect. In particular, he found great stimulus in meeting the 
proponents of the various German theological schools, as well as some of the 
main representatives of Marxism. 
On returning to North America from this sabbatical, Niebuhr was 
approached about a possible move to the faculty at Yale Divinity School as 
associate professor of Christian Ethics. Initially he declined the request, but 
Yale were persistent in their pursuit of his services, and so, in the summer of 
1931, he and his family made the move eastwards in time for him to settle into 
his new role for the fall semester. In the stimulating yet intellectually 
demanding environment of Yale, Niebuhr made an immediate and favourable 
impression. His Alurnni Lecture at the commencement of the first term gave an 
indication of where some of his primary interests lay in that he attempted to 
conduct a rigorous dialogue between some of the main contemporary 
theological insights from both Germany and North America in the hope of 
identifying and articulating 'a third way' which would draw on the respective 
12 HRN, The Social Sources of Denominationalism, New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1929. 
Reprinted by Peter Smith, Gloucester, Mass., 1987, p. 25. 
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strengths of each tradition. I3 Implicit in this lecture is the kind of 
methodological procedure that we will see throughout this thesis as being 
typically 'Ni ebuhri an' , namely, his preference for working within, or keeping in 
dialogue, two or more distinct positions. Niebuhr gave this procedure the label 
'polar analysis' and it is akin to the more commonly used tenn of 'dialectical' 
often found in theological or philosophical discourse. 
During the course of the next few years, Niebuhr's 'reading' of the various 
crises in the national and international scenes prompted him to re-evaluate 
much that he had previously taken for granted. His liberal instincts did not 
desert him in that he continued to be fascinated by the question of how the 
Church ought to minister effectively and relevantly in the wider world, but he 
was, increasingly now, a chastened liberal, able to see that the old-style social 
gospel of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, was 
inadequate for the trying task to which the Church was called. The insights of 
what he now began to call the 'Great Tradition' in theology, such as Edwards, 
Pascal, Luther, Calvin, Thomas and Augustine became more important to him, 
as did the 'dialectical theology' exemplified above all by Karl Barth; all of 
which helped Niebuhr to formulate a powerful and timely series of suitable 
responses to such distressing events as 'The Great Depression' and the growing 
political unrest in Europe. To his mind, the Church ought to be able to offer 
something much more profound, not to say righteous, than the prevailing ethos 
of 'Culture Protestantism' which for too long had only exacerbated the 
problems which the Protestant churches had been called to address and 
transform. I 4 
Several writings from these years in the early and mid 1930's are worthy of 
mention, but perhaps the two that are most indicative of major new landmarks 
in the evolution of his thought are the 1932 piece entitled The Social Gospel 
and the Mind of Jesus which Niebuhr prepared for and read to the New York 
Theological Society, but which was never published until years after his death; 
13 HRN, 'Can German and American Christians Understand Each Other?' The Christian 
Century 47,1930, pp. 914-916. 
14 HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' The Christian Century, 77, (1960), pp. 248-
251, esp. p. 249. 
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and his 1935 collaborative enterprise culminating in the book, The Church 
Against the World co-authored with Wilhelm Pauck and Francis P. Miller. ls In 
these and other writings from the time, Niebuhr began to understand Jesus as 
primarily an 'apocalyptic revolutionary strategist' whose cosmic claims were so 
radically different from the prevailing status quo as to almost warrant a 
revolution of society rather than an easy-going accommodation or endorsement 
of its mores and concerns. Although he would later state his discomfiture with 
the comparison, and was at pains to open up considerable space between the 
two of them, there is little doubt that Niebuhr was deeply influenced by the 
profound reverberations which Barth's theology had set up after his stunning 
commentary on Romans, and then continued to articulate with such 
authoritative verve thereafter. 
As the decade unfolded, Niebuhr continued to immerse himself more 
consciously and conscientiously than ever before in the great writings of the 
Christian tradition, simultaneously deepening his knowledge of, and 
appreciation for, the history of American Christianity in the preceding three 
centuries. The major fruit of this latter labour was his 1937 book, The Kingdom 
of God in AmericaJ6 which quickly drew the admiring attention of theologians, 
historians and sociologists and has long since been acknowledged as a profound 
yet accessible summary of North American church life in terms of its shaping 
beliefs and practices. The insights of the seventeenth century Puritans and their 
emphasis on the sovereignty of God; the eighteenth century Evangelicals and 
their focus on the kingdom of Christ; as well as the nineteenth century Social 
Gospellers with their overriding concern for the coming kingdom of God were 
all creatively but not uncritically re-appropriated. Many Niebuhr scholars, 
notably James Fowler, have seen in this book, and the reflections which 
Niebuhr was busy interpreting and articulating at this time, the coming together 
of all or most of the main convictions which he was to hold, even if he was to 
express these in various distinct ways in the shifting circumstances of the 
IS HRN, Wilhelm Pauck and Francis P. Miller, The Church Against the World, Chicago, Willett, 
Clark & Co., 1935. 
16 HRN, The Kingdom of God in America, New York, Harper and Row, Torchbooks. 1937. 
Reprinted 1959. Reprinted Middletown, Connecticut, Wesleyan University Press, 1988. 
17 
ensuing years. I7 This was also the work in which Niebuhr described American 
liberal religiosity in what is, perhaps, the most oft-quoted sentence of his career. 
'A God without wrath brought men without sin into a kingdom without 
judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross.' 18 
Niebuhr's next major essay was his 1941 book The Meaning of RevelationJ9 
in which he tried to articulate a third way by which the distinctive, or perhaps 
more accurately, divergent, perspectives of Emst Troeltsch and Karl Barth 
might be brought into some kind of tolerable or even helpful tension. Whilst 
acknowledging the difficulty of doing so, Niebuhr felt that somehow the 
contextual relativity of Troeltsch's methodology could and should be brought 
into genuine engagement with Barth's Christologically-determined theocentric 
approach. This 'double wrestle' might seem to many observers to have 
demanded too much of Niebuhr but for others it provided hope that two such 
opposing methodologies, even from within the ranks of modem Protestant 
theology, could at least be brought into some sort of meaningful dialogue. At 
this stage, Niebuhr was content to call his methodological approach that of 
'historical relativism' or 'theocentric relativism' but he later came to regret the 
label 'relativism' and later spoke of 'historical relationism' in an attempt to put 
some distance between his position and the charge of his critics who felt that he 
was in danger of falling into an untenable form of 'subjectivism' .20 
The years that followed the publication of The Meaning of Revelation were 
difficult ones for Niebuhr. In fact, a combination of factors led to him being 
hospitalised in 1944 suffering from exhaustion and depression. A sensitive man, 
he felt with great existential depth the horrors of the second world war; the 
coinciding of his own fiftieth birthday with the earlier death at the same age of 
his father; and the breakdown of his handicapped daughter's troubled 
marriage.21 
17 Fowler, op cit., pp. 253ff. 
\8 HRN, The Kingdom of God in America, op. cit., p. 193. 
19 HRN, The Meaning of Revelation, New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1941. Reprinted in 
~aperback in 1960. 
o See HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' op. cit., p. 249. 
21 Diefenthaler, op. cit., p. 56. 
18 
However, one lasting legacy of this difficult period in Niebuhr's life is that it 
became the occasion for a profound series of articles in which he reflected with 
penetrating and poignant insight upon the 'crucifying' but ultimately 
'redemptive' events and experiences which God was making people confront 
but also helping them through.22 The hermeneutical key or interpretive lens here 
for Niebuhr was the grace and righteousness of God demonstrated in the cross 
of Jesus Christ, which in the face of human suffering and sin worked its 
transfonning effect through such powerful weakness and foolish wisdom. A 
nascent theologia crucis, very much akin to Paul, Luther, and other more recent 
theologians, is apparent here, and is central to my thesis. 
In the post-war era, Niebuhr, who, as we have seen, was always fascinated 
by the diverse ways in which the churches related to their surrounding society, 
brought the research and teaching materials from his work at Yale, more 
explicitly into the public domain. His 1951 book Christ and Culture presented a 
five-fold typology in which Christ was interpreted as being 'against'; 'of; 
'above'; 'in paradox with'; and 'the transformer or converter of culture. 
Niebuhr's actual assessment of some historical figures within each paradigm 
has been questioned, and recently his whole enterprise in this book has come in 
for some heavy criticism. Some of these criticisms will be addressed later on in 
this thesis. 
In 1954 to 1956 Niebuhr was made Director of an American Association of 
Theological Schools study of theological education in the United States and 
Canada. Several publications came out of this team effort but the most 
influential was undoubtedly Niebuhr's own 1956 essay The Purpose of the 
Church and Its Ministry.23 In this, he highlighted, in particular, the distortions 
and perversions introduced into church life by 'confusing proximate with 
22 See esp. 'The Christian Church in the World's Crisis,' Christianity and Crisis 6, 1941, pp. 
11-17; 'I Believe in the Kingdom of God,' Youth 4,1941, pp. 3-4'; 'War as the Judgement of 
God,' The Christian Century 59,1942, pp. 630-633; 'Is God in the War?' The Christian 
Century, 59, 1942, pp. 953-955; 'War as Crucifixion,' The Christian Century 60,1943. pp. 513-
515. 
23 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, New Yorle, Harper and Row, 1956. See 
also HRN and D. D. Williams, eds., The Ministry in Historical Perspectives, New York, Harper 
and Bros., 1956; HRN, D. D. Williams and 1. M. Gustafson, eds., The Advancement of 
Theological Education, New York, Harper and Bros., 1957. 
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ultimate goals'. In a passage programmatic to both his book, and also to my 
thesis, he wrote: 
'Denominationalism not the denominations; ecclesiasticism not the churches; 
Biblicism not the Bible; Christism not Jesus Christ; these represent the chief 
present perversions and confusions in Church and theology. There are many 
other less deceptive, cruder substitutions of the proximate for the ultimate. But 
the ones described above seem to set the great problems to faith and theology in 
our time. In them the need for a constant process of a radically monotheistic 
reformation comes to appearance. ,24 If and when the Church does undergo this 
refonnation then, says Niebuhr, it becomes more faithful to its true goal, which 
he defines, in light of the life and teaching of Jesus, as 'the increase among men 
of the love of God and neighbor,.2s 
Embedded in these reflections about the nature and purpose of the Church 
and its ministry, are also some of Niebuhr's deepest convictions about the 
practice of theological education. For him, theology in its broad sense is not so 
much 'a particularist discipline' in tenns of a highly doctrinal or technical 
approach, rather it is 'the search for human wisdom about the wisdom of God in 
the creation and redemption of man,26 in which the inter-relations between 
knowledge of God, self and our other human companions finds its definitive 
demonstration in Jesus Christ. Niebuhr would thus seem to view the theological 
task more in tenns of 'sapienta' than 'scientia'. The contrast, or distinction, or 
at least relative weight of emphasis here between Niebuhr, and say Barth, may 
be worth further exploration.27 
24 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, op. cit., p. 46. Italics mine for emphasis. 
2S Ibid., p. 31. 
26 Ibid., pp. 105, 113. 
27 See George Hunsinger, personal correspondence with myself, 12 October 2001; Douglas 
John Hall, personal correspondence with myself, 7 March 2003. In brief, Hunsinger's model for 
theology leans more towards 'scientia' and Hall tends more to a notion of ' sa pi entia'. For a not 
dissimilar exchange of views on vocational preference or emphasis in the area of constructive 
theology see John B. Webster, 'Article Review of David F. Ford, Self and Salvation: Being 
Transformed,' Scottish Journal of Theology, 54, 4 (200}), pp. 548-559 and David F. Ford, 
'Salvation and the Nature of Theology: A Response to John Webster's Review of Self and 
Salvation: Being Transformed,' Scottish Journal ofTheo}ogy, 54,4 (2001), pp. 560-575. 
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Niebuhr always considered the refonnation of the Church as his own most 
important calling.28 He was convinced that this required of certain people, 
including himself, that they attempt to minister to the Church, and thus, through 
the Church, to the wider world, by means of the search for a better theology. 
Niebuhr believed that this was to be the complementary task of many different 
thinkers, and so within the field of theology he consciously staked out his own 
concerns and charted a distinct, even unique, course. In particular, throughout 
the 1950's, as a perennial project, he carried out a programme of research and 
teaching whose main focus was the subject of human faith. He intended his 
reflections to come out in written form as a large manuscript called Faith on 
Earth: Essays on Human Confidence and Loyalty, but much of this material, 
dealing with the phenomenological study of faith was rejected by the potential 
publisher, and so only part of his work on faith came out in 1960 under the title 
Radical Monotheism and Western Culture.29 The rejected parts of the overall 
manuscript were only published in 1989, nearly thirty years after their 
originally intended date, so, at long last, letting the theological world gain a 
better grasp of what Niebuhr was working on in his faith explorations of the 
1950's.30 
According to Niebuhr, it seems to be a general, perhaps even universal 
phenomenon that people live by faith. Faith may be defined as our relating to 
one or more objective realities which we believe to be trustworthy value centres 
and worthwhile common causes. Later on in this thesis we shall explore 
Niebuhr's profound distinctions between the three main types of faith that he 
identifies: namely, the two false forms of faith called polytheism and 
henotheism, and also, that true form of faith, radical monotheism, which Jesus 
Christ incarnates and mediates. As well as this, we shall consider Niebuhr's 
acute analysis of how human faithfulness often turns into faithlessness, 
expressed variously as fear, anger and evasion in relation to God. 
28 HRN, Reformation: Continuing Imperative, op. cit., pp. 249, 250, 251. 
29 HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture with Supplementary Essays, New YorIc, 
Harper and Row, 1960. 
30 HRN, Faith on Earth: An Inquiry into the Structure of Human Faith. ed., Richard R. Niebuhr, 
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989. 
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For most of his working life, Niebuhr was a professor of Christian Ethics in 
the Divinity School of Yale University. Over the years his distinctive approach 
in this field was sharpened and clarified through research and lecturing. 
Niebuhr's penchant for articulating 'a third way' between other prevailing 
options also becomes apparent when we consider his procedure for the study of 
ethics through the use of 'root metaphors' or 'symbolic forms'. The two main 
types of ethics understood the human person either in terms of what Niebuhr 
called 'man-the-maker' whose 'teleological' disposition was to strive to achieve 
what he thought was a 'good' future goal; or 'man-the-citizen', who 
apprehended life primarily in terms of the law or obligation which ought to be 
obeyed so as to do what was 'right' on the basis of powers or authorities whose 
past eminence was to be accepted rather than questioned or challenged. 
Whilst not denying the usefulness of both of these types of ethics, Niebuhr 
felt that both of them contained certain limitations, inconsistencies and even 
contradictions. Furthermore, there was a disturbing tendency for polarisation in 
societies in which no genuine agreement could be found for whether future 
goals or existing laws were more important, let alone which goals and which 
laws could or should have precedence. Niebuhr's proposal was to introduce a 
third root metaphor, 'man-the-responder' who existed as a personal agent living 
in the midst of a force-field of other agents or powers which impinged upon 
him, and to which he was inescapably called to respond. His conviction was 
that in and through and beyond all the limited, finite, and often conflicting 
actions which were happening to the person in question, there was the being 
and action of God, calling for the human agent to discern what was happening 
and thus to do what was 'fitting' in response to the divine pattern of meaning in 
that context. As Niebuhr put it in a summary statement: 
'The idea or pattern of responsibility, then, may summarily and abstractly be 
defined as an agent's action as response to an action upon him in accordance 
with his interpretation of the latter action and with his expectation of response; 
and all of this in a continuing community ofagents,.31 
31 HRN, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy, New York, Harper and 
Row, 1963. Republished in 1978, p. 65. 
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Sadly, Niebuhr died on the 5th July 1962, less than a year before he was due 
to retire from full-time teaching in Yale. It is believed that he was just about to 
begin bringing together his many years of research, reflections and lecture notes 
on Christian Ethics into an orderly fonn fit for eventual publication. However, 
he died before this major job of planning and appraisal had begun. What did 
emerge in book fonn posthumously in 1963 was a sort of ethical prolegomena, 
The Responsible Self based upon the principles that Niebuhr had long been 
teaching. Unfortunately, useful as this is in some ways in exploring the concept 
and place of responsibility in moral discourse, it does not include the 
substantive material content that Niebuhr had lectured on for years in Yale. 
However, some compensation has come for those engaged in research on 
Niebuhr in the fonn of transcribed 'lecture notes,32 taken by various students 
who attended his classes. Whilst obviously not in the final polished fonn that 
was typical of Niebuhr's publications, these lecture notes do give us a real 
flavour of Niebuhr at work at the lectern, and, arguably, more importantly, give 
us much crucial material in tenns of what he understands by the imperatives 
involved in human beings responding to God's creative, governing and 
redemptive actions. 
Another posthumous Niebuhr book, entitled Theology, History and 
Culture33was published in 1996. This was a kind of 'gather up exercise' which 
brought into the public domain some of his major addresses, lectures and 
sermons. Whilst they are fascinating in their own right, and help to illuminate, 
clarify or confinn certain features ofNiebuhr's existing work, they do not seem 
to contradict in any significant way the insights he expounded in his earlier 
writings. He does, however, give quite strong hints that where he to be allowed 
to begin his theological career again, he would wish to follow more in some of 
Jonathan Edwards's footsteps, and explore the realm of the emotions, perhaps 
32 HRN, Christian Ethics Lecture Notes, transcribed in Spring 1952 by Robert Yetter, Gene 
Canestrari, and Ed Elliot, typed and mimeographed 182 pages; Mel Keiser, 1961, handwritten; 
Elizabeth Keiser, 1961, handwritten. Most of my citations later on in the thesis will come from 
the typed 1952 lectures since the handwritten ones from 1961 are more difficult to read and thus 
~uote accurately. 
3 HRN, Theology, History and Culture: Major Unpublished Writings, edited by William Stacy 
Johnson, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996. 
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because he felt that Barth, the towering theological figure during Niebuhr's 
career, had neglected or side lined such notions.34 
3. A Strange Tradition: 'Theologia Crucis' 
A central conviction of this thesis is that Niebuhr's life's work is a particularly 
interesting, innovative, and indeed, unique example of what sometimes goes by 
the name of theologia crucis, or in its English equivalent, the 'theology of the 
cross.' As one modem exponent of this tradition puts it: 'Contrary to the way in 
which the term is frequently heard in the English-speaking world, the "theology 
of the cross" is not a synonym for the doctrine of the atonement. It designates 
rather a whole theological and faith posture. ,35 In similar vein, Jurgen 
Moltmann writes that it 'is not a single chapter in theology, but the key-
signature for all Christian theology. ,36 
The pervasive thrust of the tradition called theologia crucis is to construe 
'God's abiding commitment to the world,37 by a persistent focus on the unique 
locus where God's loving concern for his creation is decisively made known, 
the cross of Jesus Christ. A marked feature of this tradition is to rid theology of 
the perennial temptation to fall into the many and varied expressions of 
'triumphalism' or theologia gloriae. These tend to distort the gospel by their 
inability to probe the negativities encountered and exposed by the theologia 
crucis. The result, too often, is a shallow message or pseudo-gospel of what 
34 Ibid., p. 48. For more on Niebuhr's compatibility to, or kinship with, Edwards, see Leo 
Sandon, Jr., 'Jonathan Edwards and H. Richard Niebuhr,' Religious Studies, 12 (1976) pp. 101-
115; Gerald P. McKenny, 'God the Center: Moral Objectivity in Jonathan Edwards and H. 
Richard Niebuhr,' Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1989. A detailed comparison 
of Edwards and Niebuhr is beyond the scope of this thesis but would appear to open up some 
~romising lines of research for others to pursue. 
S Douglas John Hall, Thinking the Faith: Christian Theology in a North American Context, 
(Volume I), Minneapolis, Augsburg Fortress, 1989, p. 24. 
36 Jurgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross o/Christ as the Foundation and Criticism 
o/Christian Theology, trans. R. W. Wilson and John Bowden, London: SeM, 1973, p. 72. See 
also Ernst Kasemann, 'The Pauline Theology of the Cross,' in Interpretation, Vot. 24, No. 2, 
April, 1970, p. 227. 
37 Hall, Thinking the Faith, op. cit, p. 25. The italics are Hall's for emphasis. 
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Bonhoeffer called 'cheap grace', failing to do justice to the pathos and 
profundity of the really radical, indeed, scandalous nature of what God has done 
by means of the crucified ChriSt.38 The rich mystery of this saving but strange 
event has issued in a tradition of interpretation that we are here calling 
theologia crucis, whose representatives all display a similar sort of discerning 
spirit, if not an exact exposition of content in their reflections on what is at 
stake. In rough chronological terms, this tradition has as some of its chief 
modem exponents Douglas John Hall, Alan Lewis, Jurgen Moltmann, Eberhard 
Jungel, and Ernst Kasemann to name but a few. It stretches back through Karl 
Barth, Rudolf Bultmann, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, P.T. Forsyth, Martin Kahler, 
Soren Kierkegaard, Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf and others to the 
Reformation era, particularly the work of Martin Luther.39 Luther, in turn, had 
his understanding of the matter decisively shaped by some of the medieval 
mystics, and more particularly, through his Augustinian heritage, the writings 
of the apostle Pau1.40 Further back still, the same tradition has some of its most 
important roots in the prophetic literature of the Old Testament, a diverse body 
of literature which reflects with profound insight upon the pathos of God's 
covenant relationship with Israel, a history often marked by extreme and 
excruciating experiences.41 
It is my strong conviction that the work of H. Richard Niebuhr belongs 
within this same tradition of theologia crucis, as does that of his brother 
Reinhold.42 Both of them had a sensitive grasp of, and feel for, the peculiar 
spirit that marked that strange hermeneutic of the crucified Jesus Christ found 
in both Paul the apostle and Luther the reformer. Niebuhr emerges, I shall 
38 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of DiSCipleship, London, SCM Press, 1964, p. 35. 
39 See, for example, Waiter von Loewenich, Luther's Theology of the Cross, Belfast, Christian 
Journals, 1976; Alister E. McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross, Oxford, Blackwell, 1984. 
40 Graham Tomlin, The Power of the Cross: Theology and the Death of Christ in Paul, Luther 
and Pascal, Carlisle, Paternoster Press, 1999. The question of 'power' and its abuse is a major 
part of Tomlin's excellent interpretation. This theme, a crucial aspect of the particular genius of 
the theologis crucis, will be seen as a pervasive element in Niebuhr's work too. 
41 Abraham J. Hesche1, The Prophets, New York, HarperCollins, 2001. The bibliography will 
give much more extensive references to the relevant works of some of the thinkers cited in this 
tradition oftheologia crucis. Some of them will be quoted at various places within the 
unfolding argument of this thesis. 
42 For keen insights into Reinhold's theologia crucis in particular, see Douglas John Hall, 'The 
Cross and Contemporary Culture,' in Richard Harries, ed., Reinhold Niebuhr and the Issues of 
our Time, Oxford, Mowbray, 1986, pp. 183-204. 
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argue, as a faithful yet innovative exemplar of this tradition, whose legacy to 
the ongoing work of Christian theology and ethics holds considerable and 
perhaps as yet, untapped potential. The various perspectives through which we 
shall study this legacy should help to show more clearly the ways in which his 
distinctive themes of 'radical monotheism' and 'responsibility' are, in fact, vital 
demonstrations of what we shall call 'crucial faith': that is, a true and necessary 
understanding of the so-called theologia crucis. 
It must be said, however, that this tradition, has always been, and continues 
to be, a strangely neglected and misunderstood one, even within the Christian 
household of faith where it is meant to belong. As Rowan Williams writes: 'It is 
the intractable strangeness of the ground of belief that must constantly be 
allowed to challenge the fixed assumptions of religiosity; it is a given, whose 
question to each succeeding age is fundamentally one and the same. ,43 The 
theologia crucis, which is not just a theology but also its attendant ethics and 
spirituality too, well knows, that the 'final control and measure and irritant in 
Christian speech remains the cross: the execution of Jesus of Nazareth. ,44 In 
Luther's lapidary statement: crux probat omnia: 'all things are to be measured 
by the cross of Christ alone', a motif that Niebuhr continuously explores, and 
rarely, if ever, leaves, throughout the length and breadth of his life's work. 
However to really appreciate Niebuhr's theologia crucis it will be necessary to 
quote him extensively, since the style of his prose, almost as much as its 
substance, is a crucial aspect of the whole that he seeks to communicate. As is 
also the case with Barth, to dissect such writing too much into its constituent 
parts is to diminish or even distort its distinctive dynamic. Niebuhr once spoke 
of his theological reflections as being 'these verbal gestures in the direction of a 
truth that lies beyond my powers of thought and expression. ,45 This is entirely 
in keeping with the modesty of a genuine theologia crucis which knows full 
well the broken and fragmentary nature of all human reason, and whose spirit is 
therefore that of a crucified mind, not a crusading mind. 
43 Rowan Williams, The Wound of Knowledge: Christian Spirituality from the New Testament 
to St John of the Cross, London, Darton, Longrnan and Todd, 1990, p. 1. 
44 Ibid., p. 3. 
45 HRN, The Kingdom of God in America, op. cit., p. xxvii. 
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4. An Overview of this Thesis 
There has been some debate as to just how systematic Niebuhr's work is given 
the highly existential nature of his reflections and writings.46 This has been 
exacerbated by the fact that Niebuhr's main teaching course, Christian ethics, 
remained only in manuscript form, and was to have been extensively revised for 
eventual publication in his retirement. As we noted earlier in this introduction, 
Niebuhr died suddenly and unexpectedly, and thus his major 'system' of 
thOUght never reached the wider intellectual public beyond his own students 
and close colleagues. If we were to make our judgement about the systematic 
extent of Niebuhr's work solely on the basis of his published books and articles, 
then such doubts would appear well founded. But if and when one takes into 
careful consideration the importance which Niebuhr had perennially attached to 
his three-fold analysis of Christian ethics as response to God's creative, 
governing and redemptive actions, then there is much less doubt as to the 
coherence of his 'system' and to the effectiveness of his ability to 'get it all 
together' in a unified and internally consistent manner. 
The outline of my thesis will therefore attempt to make rather more explicit 
this 'systematic' or 'coherent' or 'consistently constructive' nature ofNiebuhr's 
work than perhaps has been the case in other studies.47 Following as it does, 
most of the major doctrinal loci of classical Protestant theologies, this project is, 
I believe, less an attempt to force Niebuhr's work into a Procrustean bed, and 
more an attempt to see if his prominent and pervasive themes of 'radical 
monotheism' and 'responsibility', as aspects of the theologia crucis, have the 
sort of systematic coherence and practical applicability that prove to be, at least 
plausible, or perhaps even persuasive. The loci of this doctrinal scheme may 
thus be thought of as a series of ways in which Niebuhr's work can be 
46 Fowler, op. cit., p. 199. 
47 Perhaps the works that are most akin to my project are John D. Godsey, The Promise of H. 
Richard Niebuhr, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1970; James W. Fowler, To See the Kingdom: 
The Theological Vision ofH. Richard Niebuhr, Nashville, Ahingdon Press, 1974; and Jerry A. 
Irish, The Religious Thought of H. Richard Niebuhr, Atlanta, John Knox Press, 1983, hut none 
of them proposes the theologia crucis as their guiding motif or rubric. 
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questioned and quarried to test whether it might yield something, which in its 
faithfulness to the good news of Jesus Christ, is found to be fruitful for others to 
pursue as well. Amongst recent or contemporary projects, this thesis on 
Niebuhr has perhaps its closest affinities with Douglas John Hall's three-
volume systematics, which attempts to present Christian theology in a North 
American context. 48 
In chapter one of this thesis we will consider Niebuhr's distinctive 
interpretation of the Christian life and message, or as he called it 'radical 
monotheism' from an existential perspective. This reflects the normal strategy 
that he employed in his writings where the initial focus of his attention was on 
the existential situation of the human self as embedded in a particular social 
situation with all its attendant dynamics and demands. Niebuhr coined the 
word, 'pistology'. derived from the Greek New Testament word 'pistis' 
meaning 'faith', to indicate that his field of study here was the analysis of the 
faith structure of the human being as a social self. As social selves we are 
inescapably involved in numerous interpersonal interactions with other social 
selves. In this web of mutuality we relate to the 'other' in terms of tacit 
covenants based on trust and loyalty. An empirical assessment, however, 
reveals that the faithfulness that God intends, and we aspire to, is distorted into 
patterns of wrong relationship or faithlessness. We will explore Niebuhr's acute 
analysis of this fallen human condition in which issues of epistemology and 
anthropology are prominent, and take careful note of how he movingly renders 
this existential situation with great experiential power. Included in this chapter 
will be an analysis ofNiebuhr's concept of sin. 
In chapter two, the evangelical turning point becomes the focus of attention. 
The procedure followed in this perspective reflects Niebuhr's own methodology 
in that the issue of soteriology is given relatively greater precedence over 
Christology. In other words, the 'work' of God in Jesus Christ is treated at 
48 Douglas John Hall, Volume 1: Thinking the Faith, Augsburg Fortress, Minneapolis, 1989; 
Volume 2: Professing the Faith, Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 1996; Volume 3: Confessing the 
Faith, Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 1998. There are also close affinities, I believe, with, for 
example Alan E. Lewis, Between Cross and Resu"ection: A Theology of Holy Saturday, Grand 
Rapids, Eerdmans, 2001; Nicholas Lash, Believing Three Ways in One God, op. cit., London, 
SCM Press, 1992, though the latter two works are more explicitly Trinitarian than Niebuhr's. 
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much greater depth than are questions of the identity or ontology of his 
'person'. The latter questions are not entirely neglected, but unlike certain other 
theologians for whom they loomed large, Niebuhr concentrated his energies 
more on understanding and articulating the fact that Jesus is the 'mediator' who 
reforms or transforms our ambiguous faithlessness into faithfulness once more. 
Since Niebuhr's theological work did not normally evince the sort of self-
consciously doctrinal or technical mode of other practitioners in the same field, 
but nonetheless has things of interest and significance to say regarding core 
subjects such as soteriology, Christology and Theology (as the doctrine of God 
proper), it is all the more important to assess what he does offer in these crucial 
loci. What emerges is a particular theologia crucis, here understood as a 
distinctive contribution to expounding God's reconciling work in Jesus Christ.49 
In chapter three, we will offer an interpretation of the ethical perspective in 
Niebuhr's work on responsibility, a concept that is based on, and the 
counterpart of, the theology of radical monotheism previously considered. In 
fact, Niebuhr's teaching career was predominantly in the field of Christian 
ethics, and here, in keeping with an already recognized characteristic of his 
work in theology, he seeks to explore or pursue 'a third way' in distinction from 
two other prevailing ethical types, namely deontological and teleological, with 
their emphasis on laws and ends respectively. Niebuhr argues for, and 
articulates his own preferred 'root metaphor' called the 'ethics of response' or 
'responsibility', in which we are called to be responsible to God for the world 
in terms of what we interpret to be the 'fitting' action in any given situation. 
This is far from being an abstract 'situation ethics' in which a generalized 
notion of 'love' or where contextual expediency has pride of place. Instead, our 
response as human agents is shaped by God's prior and sovereign action in 
creating, governing and redeeming, and these are not thought of as separate, 
successive or antagonistic, but rather having a perichoretic pattern. The human 
being as a 'social self may thus also be understood as a 'responsible self. In a 
Christian context this may also allow us to designate the human creature as a 
'Christo-morphic' being, in which Jesus Christ is the pioneer and mediator of 
49 HRN, The Responsible Self, op. cit., pp. 43-44 where Niebuhr says that such reconciliation 
through Jesus Christ is the 'key' issue in human existence. 
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faithful response to God's differentiated actions upon the self, in and for the 
world. 
In chapter four, Niebuhr's radical monotheism is considered from an 
ecclesiological perspective, an especially important theme for him since he felt 
that his main calling in life was to contribute theologically to the well being of 
the Church. Numerous articles flowed from his pen over the years on this 
particular subject, as well as the three-year project which culminated in the 
publication of his widely acclaimed book, The Purpose of the Church and Its 
Ministry. For Niebuhr, the Church was that community of faith which centred 
on Jesus Christ and which was continually being called, equipped and reformed 
so as to more faithfully and imaginatively embody for the world 'the increase of 
the love of God and [humanity], as its specific yet multi-faceted mission. Of 
special note here, is Niebuhr's acute insight into the various distortions or 
'deformations' that the Church falls prey to, and which thus calls for what he 
describes as 'a radically monotheistic reformation'. Niebuhr's critique of the 
Christian community is arguably one of the most penetrating yet potentially 
wholesome offered by any theologian, and yields a very incisive, yet 
profoundly necessary, 'negative ecc1esiology' in which various destructive 
ideologies and idolatries are exposed to the gospel's cleansing and healing. In a 
similar line of thought to the previous ethical chapter we will also see Niebuhr's 
suggestions for how the Christian community may be reformed or positively 
reorientated towards its true calling as 'the responsible church'. As such it is a 
'Christo-morphic' community which is corporately responsible to God for the 
world as 'apostle, pastor and pioneer'. The spirituality of Niebuhr's 
understanding of the ecclesia crucis is then more fully explored under the rubric 
'Participation in the Present Passion. ' 
In chapter five, Niebuhr's work is mined for, and considered from, an 
ecumenical perspective. The various shades of meaning associated with the 
admittedly equivocal term 'ecumenical' will inform the structure of our 
analysis. Working form within outwards, so to speak, we will first of all take a 
look at Niebuhr's involvement in what many people take to be the only or 
predominant meaning of the term: the work of church-union. Niebuhr was 
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initially much involved in enterprises of this kind, helping to bring about 
several unions of smaller denominations, but over the years this impulse 
seemed to wane. Next we will look at how much potential Niebuhr's 'radical 
monotheism' may have as a reconciling resource between the, at least, 
'officially monotheistic' religions, namely, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. A 
further feature of this chapter is to bring Niebuhr's work on 'henotheism' into 
dialogue with a recent project in Northern Ireland called 'Moving Beyond 
Sectarianism', a project which I was personally involved in, and a subject to 
which, I am convinced, Niebuhr has much to offer. Finally, we will consider 
what is here called 'a larger ecumenism', that is, the ways in which Niebuhr has 
something to contribute in tenns of the 'ecological' and 'economic' realities of 
contemporary globalisation. His call from within the logic of radical 
monotheism for 'the love of all that participates in being' gives his work a 
universal sensibility that puts him in company with several leading 
contemporary ethicists, whose work we will touch on. 
In chapter six, we will consider Niebuhr's work from an eschatological 
perspective. Although, as was typical of his doctrinal or dogmatic reticence, he 
never developed a detailed or full-blown eschatology, nonetheless, there are 
sufficient materials scattered throughout his corpus to allow at least a 
suggestive, if not exhaustive, eschatologia crucis to emerge. First, we will 
analyse his brief reflections on the parousia of Jesus Christ, in which the fonn 
or fonns of the coming of Jesus Christ is more closely akin to Barth's position, 
rather than to someone for whom Niebuhr felt great affinity on many matters, 
namely, his brother Reinhold. Next, we will look at his view on a central theme 
throughout his writings, the 'kingdom' or 'sovereignty' of God. For Niebuhr, 
this was a rich and nuanced reality, but what will be of chief interest at this 
point of the thesis will be its eschatological dimension. To paraphrase the thrust 
of his reflections, the kingdom is 'an emergent reality with universal intent.' 
Finally, we will consider his reflections on the so-called 'theological' virtues of 
faith, love and hope. Throughout the thesis, most of our attention has focussed 
on faith since this was the predominant concern of Niebuhr's work. But there 
are also important things that he says about the two other virtues, or as he 
prefers to them 'relations', and here we will concentrate especially on hope. 
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Finally, in the concluding chapter, a summation of Niebuhr's work will be 
offered, making use of the six perspectives or loci which constitute the main 
chapters of this thesis. From each locus our attention will focus especially on 
the way in which his distinctive theologia crucis is of crucial importance to his 
central 'Christo-morphic' motifs of radical monotheism and responsibility. His 
legacy is that of a worthy and distinct contribution to our understanding of 
Christian discipleship presented primarily as an ethos of the cross. 
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Chapter One: An Existential Perspective 
1. 'Pistology': Analysing the Faith of the Social Self 
The task of the discipline of theology, broadly defined, has been given 
classic expression in the well-known formula 'faith seeking understanding' . 
Different theologians have, of course, treated this subj ect matter in their 
own distinct ways, and in this thesis I shall offer an exposition and 
reinterpretation ofH. Richard Niebuhr's work in this field, since it unearths 
much rich material for further consideration as a theologia crucis.50 
Before we begin to ponder his analysis, however, some comments are in 
order regarding the terminology in this first section of chapter one. The 
word 'pistology' is one which Niebuhr himself coined, and is formed from 
the base, pistis, the Greek New Testament word for faith, or sometimes, 
faithfulness. As Niebuhr's son writes, this 'is structurally analogous to the 
familiar term epistemological, formed on the base epistme, that is, 
knowledge,.51 As his son also writes in the preface to the same book, the 
chief aim ofNiebuhr's essay was 'to inquire into the forms and structure of 
human faith as we experience faith in our times and thus into the nature of 
our social seljhood,.S2 Similarly, Diane Yeager entitles an important essay 
on Niebuhr, The Social Self in the Pilgrim Church, in the process putting 
her finger very accurately on the pulse of his life and work. S3 We shall 
shortly see, I believe, as our exposition and interpretation unfolds in this 
50 Much of my thesis will involve close readings and extensive quotations from Niebuhr's 
corpus but only so can we get to the point of carrying out any meaningful interpretation of his 
work. On the necessity of such careful expositions of 'classic' theological texts, what he calls 'a 
rather neglected art', see the comments of John Webster, Barth 's Moral Theology: Human 
Action in Barth's Thought, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1998, p.7. For example, Webster writes: 
'Sometimes dismissed as scholasticism, it is in fact a much more engaged and vital art. ' 
51 HRN, Faith on Earth: An Inquiry into the Structure of Human Faith, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1989, p. 64. [Editor's note by Richard R. Niebuhr]. It should be noted, 
however, that Barth had already anticipated, and largely repudiated, this type of enquiry, one to 
which he gives the label 'pisteology': see Kart Barth, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction, 
trans. Grover Foley, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1963, p. 99. 
52 ibid., p.ix. My italics added for emphasis. 
53 D. M. Yeager, 'The Social Self in the Pilgrim Church,' pp. 91-126, in Glenn H. Stassen ed., 
Authentic Transformation: A New Vision of Christ and Culture, Nashville, Abingdon Press, 
1996. 
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chapter, that the 'social self is a helpful and accurate designation of 
Niebuhr's anthropological approach to the question offaith.54 
One of the noteworthy features ofNiebuhr's work was his willingness to 
reach beyond the sometimes narrow or restricted circle of fellow theological 
practitioners in an attempt to consider the nature of faith and ethics from 
other possibly fruitful or helpful perspectives. A particularly important 
example of this procedure was his abiding interest in the fields of 
philosophl5 and the social sciences, the latter of which was only beginning 
to emerge with any great prominence when Niebuhr was starting out on his 
professional academic career. His persistent concern with what we are here 
designating the 'social self is not only indebted to his understanding of the 
biblical and theological traditions in which he was well versed, but also 
influenced by the insights of various thinkers in the field of social 
psychology and other related disciplines.56 
To quote just one of these thinkers whose influence upon his own work 
Niebuhr was glad to acknowledge, George Herbert Mead writes that '[t]he 
self, as that which can be an object to itself is essentially a social structure, 
54 For an interesting anthropological analysis in which the 'selr is construed through numerous 
historical paradigms see Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian 
Theology of the Imago Dei, Louisville, Westminster John Knox Press, 2001. It is Grenz's 
anthropology, especially in chapters 2 and 3 of his study, which is of more relevance to my 
thesis than his 'social' model of the Trinity. 
ss The philosopher who probably did most to shape Niebuhr's thought was Immanuel Kant. In 
response to a query entitled: 'What books did most to shape your vocational attitude and your 
philosophy of life?' Niebuhr included both Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of 
Practical Reason. HRN, 'Ex Libris,' The Christian Century 79 (1961). p. 574. Niebuhr also 
used the term 'neo-Kantian epistemology' to help describe his own intellectual approach, HRN, 
'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' The Christian Century 77 {l960}, p. 249. See also 
Joseph S. Pagano, 'The Origins and Development of the Triadic Structure of Faith in H. 
Richard Niebuhr: A Study of the Kantian and Pragmatic Background of Niebuhr's Thought,' 
Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University, 2001. 
S6 G. H. Mead, Mind. Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, edited and 
introduced by Charles W. Morris, Chicago, University Press of Chicago, 1934; G. H. Mead, 
The Philosophy of the Present, edited by Arthur E. Murphy, Chicago, Open Court, 1932; A. 
Strauss, ed., The Social Psychology ofGeorge Herbert Mead, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1956; Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity, 2 volumes, New York, The Macmillan 
Company, 1912; Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, New York, Macmillan, 1924; Martin 
Buber, I and Thou, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith, New York, Scribner, 1958; Paul 
Pfuetze, The Social Self, New York, Bookrnan Associates, 1954. See also Niebuhr's own 
important reflections on the nature of our social seltbood in HRN, 'Responsibility in Society,' 
chapter 2 of The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy, New York, Harper 
and Row, 1963, pp. 69-89. 
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and it arises in social experience. After a self has arisen, it in a certain sense 
provides for itself its social experiences, and so we can conceive of an 
absolutely solitary self. But it is impossible to conceive of a self arising 
outside of social experience. ,57 Mead, like Niebuhr after him, was reluctant 
to engage very much in the way of metaphysical speculation. Instead, his 
interests centred on the more functional nature of human behaviour, 
particularly the ways in which selves were inescapably social, shaping each 
other fundamentally through various interactions, among which language or 
'vocal gestures' were especially important in helping to form characteristic 
patterns of mutual response. As Niebuhr himself puts it: 
The fundamental form of human association . . . is not that contract society into 
which men enter as atomic individuals, making partial commitments to each other 
for the sake of gaining limited common ends or of maintaining certain laws; it is 
rather the face-to-face community in which unlimited commitments are the rule 
and in which every aspect of every selfs existence is conditioned by membership 
in the interpersonal group .... To say the self is social is not to say that it finds 
itself in need of fellow men in order to achieve its purposes, but that it is born in 
the womb of society as a sentient, thinking, needful being with certain definitions 
of its needs and with the possibility of experience of a common world. It is born in 
society as mind and as moral being, but above all it is born in society as self.58 
We are now in a better position therefore, to begin our exposition of 
Niebuhr's distinctive analysis of the faith structure of social selfhood. His 
proposal is that '[f1aith seeks understanding in a double way. It seeks to 
understand what it believes but also how it believes. ,59 This claim is based 
upon similar insights into two other activities: namely, knowing and 
valuing. In our role as those who pursue knowledge, we seek clarity about 
our knowing activities as well as about known realities; and in our role as 
those who evaluate, we find ourselves impelled to inquire into our choosing 
no less than into the nature of chosen and rejected values. Therefore, argues 
57 A. Strauss, ed., The Social Psychology ofGeorge Herbert Mead, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1956, p. 217. 
58 HRN, The Responsible Self, p. 73. 
59 HRN, Faith on Earth, p. 23 
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Niebuhr, as believing beings, we want to know how we believe as well as 
what we believe. 
Niebuhr calls his approach here 'the method ofreflection,.6o He suggests 
that 'It is only by looking within ourselves and catching as it were the 
reflections of ourselves in act that we are able to achieve some degree of 
critical self-awareness. ,61 Niebuhr acknowledges that this method is 
subjective, but he argues that, properly pursued, it need not fall prey to 'the 
error of a subjectivism that abstracts SUbjective activity from its objects. ,62 
Its aim is primarily self-knowledge but not in tenns of the isolated 
'Cartesian-I', but rather in a way that 'is always interpersonal, dependent on 
communication, seeking verification, correction and guidance from the 
reflections of others as these are mediated through statements about faith 
and definitions of the idea of faith. ,63 In short, it is a methodology of, and 
for, human beings as social selves. 
In a line of argument, similar to that employed more recently by others, 
among whom we identify two, namely, Nicholas Lash and Rowan 
Williams,64 Niebuhr contends that 'Reflection on faith, like every other 
reflective inquiry, must begin . . . right in the middle of things. It cannot 
"begin at the beginning" of the dialogue between subject and object or of 
the dialogue between self and other selves. Nor can it begin at some point in 
the self outside of the activity that is the object of reflection. It must 
perforce accept not only the activity of its object but of the presence in the 
reflecting self of the very activity that is being objectified. ,65 
To those who are familiar with the debate in modem Protestant theology, 
Niebuhr can be said to be consciously choosing a third option which is 
distinct from, yet deliberately placed between, methodologies which are 
60 Ibid., pp. 23ff. 
61 Ibid., p. 23. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., p. 24. 
64 Nicholas Lash. Believing Three Ways in One God: A Reading o/the Apostles' Creed, 
London, SeM, 1992, p.2; Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, 
E· xii 
5 HRN, Faith on Earth, pp. 24-25 
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predominantly subjective or objective. 'Between Barth, the great objectivist 
in theology who proposes to begin and remain with the object of faith and 
theology, and Schleiermacher, the great subjectivist who undertook to 
understand the subject with his attitudes and commitments, I cannot judge 
so as to say that the one is right and the other wrong. Nor do I know of a 
human court which can make the judgment. Insofar as I am unable to 
abstract object from subject I can and do take exception to Barth's special 
dogmatism which requires me to begin with no other object than God as 
speaking in and proclaimed in the Scriptures .... I can only say that Barth's 
problem is not mine, while Schleiermacher's is, and I see no reason why I 
should give up my problem because some folk say it is a pseudo-problem 
and call my statements nonsense because they cannot translate them into 
their objectivist language. ,66 But lest it be thought that he leans too far in his 
epistemology towards the subjectivist or pragmatist poles, it should be 
borne in mind that Niebuhr considers that 'objectivism rather than 
pragmatism is the first law of knowledge. ,67 Whilst aware of the difficulties 
involved in his own methodology, Niebuhr reckons that some otherwise 
neglected, yet crucial insights, will emerge from this procedure. To some of 
these we now turn. 
In guiding these reflections on the phenomenology of belief, Niebuhr 
helpfully draws upon the three Latin words that lie behind our English 
words. These Latin words all share the one common root ('fid·') in a way 
which the equivalent English words do not, and in doing so they open up the 
prospect of understanding 'faith' as a complex, yet interrelated structure or 
action. The Latin word fides is rendered in English as believing, this is 'the 
66 HRN, Handwritten manuscript entitled Between Barth and Schleiermacher, undated, p. 2. For 
more on the issue ofBarth and Schleiermacher, and how their respective methodologies and 
legacies may be related see James O. Duke and Robert F. Streetman eds., Barth and 
Schleiermacher: Beyond the Impasse? Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1988; Bruce L. 
McCormack, 'What Has Basel to Do with Berlin? Continuities in the Theologies ofBarth and 
Schleiermacher,' The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, 23, 2, (2002), pp. 146-173. 
67 HRN, The Kingdom o/God in America, op. cit., p. 12. 
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phenomenal element which is largely based on the fundamental interaction 
ofjiducia (trust) andjidelitas (loyalty or faithfulness). ,68 
For example, the faith that one finds in a significant relationship between 
two people is expressed in mutual form. On the basis of their many and 
diverse experiences of each other, these two people relate to each other in 
terms of reciprocal trust and fidelity. 'Trust is a response to and an 
acknowledgement of fidelity. The two are so interrelated in the reciprocal 
action of selves that one cannot speak of faith simply as the trust which 
appears but must speak of it also as the fidelity to which trust is the 
response.'69 One person's faithfulness to the other is the gift that calls forth 
the response of trust, which is faith in its more passive sense; yet it also 
evokes fidelity, which is faith in its more active sense. Each person trusts, 
and therefore seeks to be faithful to the other, in that ongoing interpersonal 
interaction which we are here calling 'faith'. 
Taking this analysis a stage further, Niebuhr states that faith is thus 'the 
attitude and action of confidence in, and fidelity to, certain realities as the 
sources of value and the objects of loyalty. This personal attitude or action 
is ambivalent; it involves reference to the value that attaches to the self and 
to the value toward which the self is directed. On the one hand it is trust in 
that which gives value to the self; on the other hand it is loyalty to what the 
self values. Friendship may be taken as a simple example of such an 
ambivalent relation. In friendship I believe in my friend as one who values 
me; I have confidence in him that he will continue to regard me as valuable; 
I also value him and am loyal to him. Insofar as faith is present in friendship 
it is a double movement of trust in the friend who is a source of my value 
and of loyalty to him as value objective to me.' 70 
68 Ibid., pp. 47-48. See also HRN, 'The Triad of Faith,' Andover Newton Bulletin 47 (1954), pp. 
3-12, esp. p. 6; HRN, 'On the Nature of Faith,' In S. Hook, ed., Religious Experience and 
Truth: A Symposium. New York, New York University Press, 1961, pp. 93-102, esp. 98-100. 
69 HRN, Faith on Earth, op. cit., p. 47. 
70 HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture with Supplementary Essays, New York, 
Harper and Row, 1957,pp.16-17. 
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A further, helpful example of this kind of relationship, and one which 
Niebuhr also expounds, is that of a healthy marriage between husband and 
wife.71 But as soon as we begin to reflect further on this specific example, 
we become aware of the fact that husband and wife do not simply desire to 
be faithful to each other, but also seek to be loyal to a third entity. Niebuhr 
calls this third thing an "It". This "It" is related to, but distinct from, the "I 
and Thou" who are the marriage partners, and is perhaps better named "the 
Cause". In terms of a marriage, this "cause" may be understood in various 
ways: perhaps as the marriage relationship itself; or perhaps as the basis and 
context for nurturing children; or even as the attempt to create an 'ideal 
home'. Whatever the specific variables may be in any particular instance, 
however, Niebuhr maintains that faith always has this 'triadic' character, 
where the three elements of the triad can be designated as "I, Thou and It"; 
or better still, "I, Thou and the Cause". 
An obvious, and indeed, attested source for some of Niebuhr's 
reflections here, is the work of Josiah Royce. Royce had developed a theory 
of knowledge in which interpretation had a triadic structure always 
involving self, other and object in a community of mutual involvement.72 
But perhaps the heart of Royce's thought, and the point of his greatest 
influence on Niebuhr, lies in the concept of loyalty. 'A man is loyal when, 
first, he has some cause to which he is loyal; when, second, he willingly and 
thoroughly devotes himself to this cause; and when, third, he expresses his 
devotion to some sustained and practical way, by acting steadily in the 
service of his cause. ,73 One important qualification that Niebuhr however 
makes of Royce's proposal, is that, whereas Royce regarded loyalty itself as 
the highest or greatest or most inclusive cause, Niebuhr proposes that 
loyalty properly exists only to serve the cause of something other or 
transcendent to itself.74 
71 HRN, Faith on Earth, pp. 55-57. 
72 losiah Royce, The Problem o/Christianity. Vol. 2: The Real World and the Christian Ideas, 
New York, Macmillan, 1913, pp. 140-144; 208-211. 
73 losiah Royce, The Philosophy 0/ Loyalty, op. cit., p. 17. 
74 HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, pp. 33-34. 
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Another example of such a triadic relationship, and one which takes us 
further into the heart of Niebuhr's distinctive analysis of the faith of the 
social self, is that of the patriotic nationalist. Such a person relates to his 
country by relying upon it, often uncritically and unreflectively, as his 
'enduring value-center,75. However, although the continued existence of the 
nation does, to some extent, depend upon the faithful allegiance of each of 
its citizens, it functions as far more of a transcendent entity than do any of 
the individual people who together make it a consciously collective 
community. Strictly speaking then, the nationalist depends upon, or trusts 
his country for a sense of worth, significance, value, purpose and meaning 
much more than it does upon him.76 
Faith, therefore, in this Niebuhrian sense, can be described as trusting in 
a 'value-center' and being loyal to this same value-center's 'cause', for, 
according to Niebuhr, '[c]enters of value and causes may .. be .. two names 
for the same objective realities from which and for which selves live as 
valued and valuing beings. ,77 My own slight modification to this, is to speak 
of faith as involving interpersonal interaction with objective realities that 
are held to be 'trustworthy value centres' and 'worthwhile common causes'. 
In each instance, the use of the root '-worth-' is an attempt to make more 
explicit the sense of devotion, as well as valuation, to which Niebuhr's faith 
analysis implicitly points. 
It does not seem to be too much of an assumption to suggest that the 
thrust ofNiebuhr's argument is that this interpersonal interaction of faith, as 
confidence in a trustworthy value centre and loyalty to a worthwhile 
common cause, is a general or even universal feature of human nature. It is 
therefore, not only, or even especially, in what might be called 'official 
religious contexts' that people seek to live by faith. We all live, it seems, by 
trust in some value centre or centres, and by loyalty to some cause or 
causes. Several questions loom large at this point and these will need to be 
7S Note Niebuhr's Americanised spelling ·center'. Whenever Niebuhr is directly quoted this 
Americanised spelling will be used, but in my own text I will use the English ·centre'. 
76 HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, op. cit., pp. 17-18. 
77 Ibid., p. 22. 
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addressed if Niebuhr's 'pistology' is to prove plausible. For instance, does 
Niebuhr provide a sufficiently recognizable or compelling description of the 
social self in its web of interpersonal interactions? Does his proposed 'faith-
analysis' really work as a means of identifying characteristic traits that are 
truly representative of the everyday lives of human beings? What objective 
realities, if any, are we living by and for, as trusting and would-be faithful 
selves? To these, and other related questions, we now turn in the remainder 
of this chapter. 
2. The Faithlessness of the Social Self 
According to Niebuhr, the apparently simple word 'faith' has, in fact, 
several interlocking dimensions or aspects, none of which alone can give a 
full and comprehensive definition of what is involved. Faith is far more 
complex and nuanced than popular usage tends to think. Depending on the 
specific circumstance in question, 'trust' may be of foremost importance, at 
another stage 'loyalty' might become most prominent, or there again 
'belief will, on occasion, occupy our concerns. However, whilst one or 
more of these aspects of faith will predominate, the others can always 
assumed to be present, even if only in implicit form in any particular 
instance. 
By the same Niebuhrian logic, the converse is also true. Where 'faith' is 
called into question, undermined, or otherwise distorted, one can posit that 
all three aspects (belief, trust and loyalty) will be radically affected. For 
example, if you were to say that some recent incident led you to the belief 
that I was no longer the kind of person who was trustworthy, it would likely 
lead to you no longer trusting me with anything of great significance, with 
the probable consequence that you doubted my loyalty to you, and the 
further quite understandable strategy that you no longer felt able to be loyal 
to me or our former friendship. Your interpretation of some unworthy 
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action, perhaps taking the form of some real or perceived faithlessness on 
my behalf, can possibly and quite easily, though not inevitably, lead to a 
state of affairs in which our former friendship, based on mutual beliefs 
about each other, and thus involving reciprocal trust and loyalty, now 
changes into mutual faithlessness. Since we live inextricably in a web of 
interpersonal interaction as social selves, one person's faithlessness, 
whether it initially be in the form of distrust, disloyalty or disbelief, can 
have devastating and pervasive consequences for whoever is caught up in 
the 'force-field' of that particular communal context.'8 
The interpretation that I now present in the next two sections of this 
chapter, will involve an exposition of how Niebuhr understands the 
faithlessness of the social self. Two lines of analysis will be opened up and 
explored, but this is only for the purpose of clarifying each one in greater 
depth. What should be borne in mind is that these are not entirely separate 
or unrelated issues, but rather two distinct aspects of one comprehensive 
whole, which, for the purpose of better understanding, need to be analysed 
successively, one at a time. Like any effort in analysis, such a procedure 
necessarily abstracts from real life, but only with the aim of furthering our 
knowledge of the object of enquiry. 
The first aspect we will explore is that of 'the broken faith of the social 
self'. There is a relative emphasis here on the personal disposition of the 
human self whose faith, as a sense of primordial sense of trust in some 
'other', is called into such radical question that the result is an underlying 
distrust of other selves, whether that be 'life' or 'other people' or even 
'God'. The tendency here, as we shall see, is for various forms of 
faithlessness to occur in relation to some objective realities which are no 
longer regarded as trustworthy. Niebuhr calls this 'broken faith' and we 
shall explore his agonised analysis of this multi-faceted condition. 
78 For a perceptive and illuminating treatment of these themes see Onora O'Neill, A Question of 
Trust: The BBC Reith Lectures 2002, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
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The second aspect to be considered is that of 'the misplaced faith of the 
social self. Here the emphasis falls more upon the social connections of the 
self as it engages with the realities and relations of whatever communal 
context it finds itself in. Various objective realities are responded to, or 
posited by, the social self, and in this part of our analysis we shall consider 
more carefully the nature and obligations of the value centres which we 
humans reckon to be trustworthy, and which also thus demand of us that we 
be loyal or committed to the supposedly worthwhile common causes that 
they embody and espouse. We will focus here on the destructive pathos of 
misplacing one's faith in relation to any objective reality other than God, 
the One whom the biblical witness renders as creator and redeemer. 
3. The Broken Faith of the Social Self 
Niebuhr clearly wants us to consider the phenomenon of interpersonal faith as a 
universal feature that we may assume or posit in human nature per se. In an 
important paragraph that warrants full citation, Niebuhr begins to suggest some 
of the connections that lie at the very heart of his 'pistology'. He writes: 
When we have inquired thus far into the structure of faith there appears on the 
horizon the mystery of the Transcendent. It seems that even when we deal with the 
structures of faith as we find them in our ordinary experience we are dealing with 
realities that point beyond themselves to a cause beyond all causes, to an object of 
loyalty beyond all concrete persons and abstract values, to the Being or the Ground of 
Being which obligates and demands trust, which unites us in universal community. In 
the light of Christian faith this is evidently so. The structures of faith which we find in 
our world are not only shadows and images of divine things but participate in the 
ultimate structure. Behind the faiths and communities of faith in which we are united in 
family and nation and company of scholars there looms the grand structure of a 
community of faith which is universal, in which all selves are involved as companions 
and in which the third, the cause and object of trust, is the transcendent reality, present 
wherever two or three are present to each other or anyone is present to himself. This 
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structure, to be sure, rises into view only in broken form; as a structure in which faith 
in its negative aspects as disloyalty and distrust comes to appearance more frequently 
than in its positive form. But though in ruined form yet there are evidences of its 
presence in all our existences as faithful-unfaithful selves.79 
What one notices here is the way in which Niebuhr takes the interpersonal 
interactions between human beings, understood in terms of reciprocal trust and 
loyalty, and follows the trajectory that is, he thinks, plausibly implicit within 
them, so as to bring into view that larger or universal community of beings 
whose source and centre is transcendent to them all; the One who in the 
theocentric traditions of Judaeo-Christian discourse is called 'God'. Niebuhr is 
well aware of the suggestions or criticisms that can be aimed at his 
methodology, especially the allegation that what he is presenting is just another 
form of self-deceiving subjectivism, a sort of 'projectionism'. Anticipating such 
objections he thus writes: 
As we have reflected on faith we have come to see that it is no merely subjective 
experience. When it appears in the subject it appears as the response to and 
acknowledgement of another person who like the self exists in trust and loyalty. Faith, 
selfhood and other-self are inseparable. Moreover the presence of faith in life, whether 
in its positive or negative form, always represents the acknowledgment of something 
personal in the Transcendent. The reality of selfhood or, to use the good old fashioned 
term, of the soul, comes to appearance in the activity of trusting and distrusting, being 
loyal and deceiving. The reality of an other self is acknowledged, depended upon in the 
act of trusting and distrusting, being faithful to him and deceiving him. The reality of 
God, of the Transcendent One, is obscurely acknowledged in life's distrust and anxiety 
and openly so in trust in Him, loyalty to Him and loyalty to the objects of his loyalty. 
The certainty of faith may be stated in a somewhat Cartesian fashion: I believe (Le. 
trust-distrust, swear allegiance and betray) therefore I know that I am, but also I trust 
you and therefore I am certain that you are, and I trust and distrust the Ultimate 
Environment, the Absolute Source of my being, therefore I acknowledge that He is. 
There are three realities of which I am certain, self, companions and the 
Transcendent. 80 
79 HRN, Faith on Earth, pp. 60-61. 
80 Ibid., p. 61. 
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At this stage in his exposition, Niebuhr briefly alludes to the fact that he 
could pursue the option of pressing his 'pistological' method further, in the 
interests of an apologetic or even ontological argument for the existence of 
God. But he declines to do so since he feels that he would thus be confusing the 
role of the theologian with that of the philosopher, and would be expecting 
people to make an epistemological leap that the available evidence could not 
necessarily prove or sustain. 'His method therefore,' he writes, 'must always be 
the method of confession and demonstration.sl Theology is an effort to 
understand a faith that has been given, not an effort to understand in order that 
we may believe. ,82 
'Our procedure therefore must be this,' Niebuhr writes, 'that we now use the 
understanding we have gained of the general structure of faith in interpersonal 
life for the sake of analysing, as best we may, that faith in God of which we are 
conscious in ourselves in the company of the faithful. ,83 It would seem, 
therefore, that Niebuhr has indeed opted for a more Schleiermachean than 
Barthian approach, in that relatively more attention is being paid to the 
subjective, or better still, inter-subjective or interpersonal dynamics of the faith 
disposition of the social self. The objective pole of Barthian methodology will 
not be dispensed with altogether, but rather will be approached inductively 
through an analysis of the existential phenomenology of the believing subject. 
So what is it that Niebuhr suggests we find as we so engage in self-reflection 
upon the interpersonal faith-structure that is seemingly given, simply by 
existing as a human being? 'What we become aware of first of all when we 
81 Ibid., p. 64. See Martin L. Cook, The Open Circle: Confessional Method in Theology, 
Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1991, pp. 67ff. for an appreciative analysis ofNiebuhr's 
'confessionalism'. Quite how to classify Niebuhr's methodology here according to the 
conventional labels of'foundationalism' as opposed to 'confessionalism' is an intriguing 
question. As is often the case with Niebuhr, he seems to somehow defy or transcend 
straightforward typologies. Cook defines foundationalism as 'the belief that the meaning and 
truth of religious intellectual schemes must be supported and warranted by showing their 
coherence with perspectives and information that are not distinctively religious or tied to a 
particular religious community. In contrast, confessionalism argues that theology derives its 
core insights and starting point from the perspective unique to the Christian religious 
community. On the basis of this claim, confessional thinkers reject the belief that some 
allegedly common human experience authorizes or justifies distinctively Christian discourse.' 
Cook, op. cit., p. 2. 
82 HRN, Faith on Earth, p. 64. 
83 Ibid. 
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direct our attention to it is that it has always been present to us in a negative 
form and is now so present to us. Faith in God is the accompaniment of our 
existence as selves but first of all it is a dark background; it is present 
negatively as distrust and fear and hostility. ,84 
A little later he states that this, '[our] natural faith, our ordinary human 
attitude toward the transcendent source of our existence, is one of 
disappointment, of distrust, and of disbelief.,8s But '[in] seeking to understand 
it we are not only trying to reconstruct man's relation to the Transcendent prior 
to the advent of Jesus Christ or to remember our own relation to God prior to 
the slow or sudden communication of the faith of Jesus Christ to us in our new 
self-aware selfhood. We are trying to understand something in our present life, 
an old relation that may be passing away but which is nevertheless present. If 
such a venture seems highly confessional it is so not only in an individualistic 
but also in a communal sense since the evidences of the presence of this natural 
religion of negative faith are to be discovered not only in ourselves but in our 
companions, in their express statements as well as in their symbolic behavior. ,86 
What Niebuhr's argument here seems to amount to, is that he, as a Christian 
believer and theologian, already lives by, and knows of, God's redeeming and 
reconciling work in Jesus Christ; so it could be argued, that both 
chronologically and logically, his argument and my thesis should begin with an 
explication or unfolding of faith's positive or evangelical content. However 
while this faith-knowledge is indeed presupposed and acknowledged, 
nonetheless, in terms of the force and persuasiveness of his essay, Niebuhr 
prefers to begin, at least descriptively, with a phenomenological analysis of our 
faithless existential condition, in all its tragedy, drama and pain. He begins, 
therefore, to detail these features of negative or broken faith thus: 
"The mind of the flesh," says Paul, "is enmity to God" (Rom. 8:7). We may state the 
thought more abstractly for the moment by saying that our natural, though not our 
fundamental, human relation to the Transcendent is one of distrust toward what is 
84 Ibid., p. 64. 
8S Ibid., p. 67. 
86 Ibid., p. 68. 
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conceived to be deceptive, a distrust which appears in hostility, fear and isolation. 
These three forms are not wholly separable though in certain instances one or the other 
seems to prevail and to give a dominant tone to life in faithlessness. Sometimes 
defiance marks the human attitude in man's encounter with the ultimate antagonist; 
more frequently the sense of antagonism appears in the form of human fear before the 
powerful enemy and perhaps still more frequently the effort is made to put all thought 
of the Other out of the mind while the self devotes itself to the little struggles and 
victories of life. All three attitudes may be present in each individual, though publicly 
they are usually expressed by different individuals.87 
Niebuhr then undertakes a rich descriptive analysis of these three forms of 
broken or perverted faith88in which his ability to enter into the labyrinths of the 
rebellious self or sinful soul is quite remarkable. Speaking first of the selfs 
'hostility' toward 'the Transcendent, the Determiner of Destiny', he suggests 
that overt expression of this 'is relatively rare' lest the Deity be aroused to even 
greater wrath against his creatures. However, when defiance does, on occasion 
prevail over repression, such hostility as is expressed is basically due to 'the 
sense of profound disillusionment, of broken promise' that somehow God has 
failed to live up to what we had hoped or expected from him.89 In its wiser and 
tragic forms, this 'Promethean motif in natural religion does not arise out of the 
simple confrontation of the self with Transcendence, with the Unconditioned, 
with the determination of destiny. It arises rather out of the triadic situation in 
which a self bound to other human selves in loyalty raises its voice against 
Omnipotence on behalf of others.'9O Indeed, what seems to be most 
characteristic about this existential stance is that 'if the nature of things is the 
creation of a transcendent God, then that God is our enemy, and if it is not then 
the world itself is our enemy, and must be resisted though the fight may be 
carried on without personal hatred. What man is up against is not something 
neutral but something that is against him. Hence the proper attitude of man 
toward the Transcendent is defiance in the name of humane feeling or spiritual 
values. ,91 
87 Ibid., p. 68. 
88 Ibid., pp. 68-77. 
89 Ibid., pp. 68-69. Niebuhr cites several pertinent quotes from literature to illustrate his point. 
90 Ibid., p. 70. 
91 Ibid., p. 72. 
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The second fonn that Niebuhr sees human faithlessness take in relation to 
God is 'the natural religion of fear which is only the counterpart of hostility .... 
In either case, whether aggressiveness or fear prevails, the situation between the 
Transcendent and the distrusting self among selves is felt as an antagonism. ,92 
When it comes to the 'natural religion of anxiety and fear, ' it would seem, 
therefore, that it is 'either more aware of the all-powerful character of what man 
confronts than Promethean defiance is, or it is less confident of human power to 
contend with the "Omnificent," or it is less loyal to fellowmen and simply more 
self-centred. In any case it seeks to deal with the same situation of enmity 
between the Ultimate and man which Prometheanism has in view; only its 
approach is one of appeasement. ,93 
In Niebuhr's exposition, appreciative reference is made to those who have 
traced this phenomenon in, for instance, ancient Greek religion, but he also 
states his unease with the 'subjectivist prejudice of social psychology' of these 
studies with their tendency to interpret such behaviour as 'the mere projection 
of the emotion of the ritual.' 94 Rather, we would do better, he believes, 'to 
think of these shadowy figures, the wraithlike, insubstantial gods of 
appeasement, as symbols of that Transcendent, that Nature of Things, before 
which man is afraid. What men have done to appease ''the unknown wraths of 
the surrounding darkness" by means of human and animal sacrifices, by their 
rituals of placation through burnt offerings and sin-offerings, by physical and 
mental ablutions, self-castigations, by pilgrimages and prayers, represents a 
large part of the story of religion in the world .• 95 In its most extreme fonns, this 
natural religion of distrust and fear is communicated in such a coercive or 
controlling fashion that people 'are brought up from infancy with the idea that 
they are being watched by a vindictive supernatural reality which inflicts 
punishment here and hereafter on those who infringe upon the laws. The 
imagery of hell and heaven, particularly of the fonner, is introduced into the 
minds in many subtle ways. Over all life there lies the fear of a strange justice 
92 Ibid., p. 72 
93 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
94 Ibid., p. 73. 
95 Ibid. 
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which upholds laws that are supernaturally established and unintelligible in 
rational terms. Life is lived amidst strange taboos; the threat of disaster hangs 
over it as it touches, tastes and handles the precarious objects of daily life. ,96 In 
short, '[I]f defiance says, "I am against God," fear says, "God is against me"; if 
the former is animated toward defiance by love of its fellowmen, the latter is 
frightened by the threat of disaster not only to the self but to those whom it 
loves.,97 
In addition to these two forms of natural distrust of the Transcendent, 
Niebuhr identifies 'a third form - the form of isolation and forgetfulness. If the 
dark rites of primitive religion give evidence of the distrust that appears in fear, 
the bright and speciously happy converse with the deities of Olympus illustrates 
the turning of distrust into the defensive mechanism whereby men try to forget 
the presence of an ultimate reality while they construct for themselves an 
imaginary world in which they can pretend to be at peace. ,98 Furthermore, it 
would appear that the 'denial of transcendent unity has its counterpart in the 
denial of the unity of the self. The flight from the other is accompanied by the 
flight from the self while the effort is made to interpret the world as superficial, 
without depth or meaning, without foundation or superstructure. One flees from 
the ultimate to the near and tries to live among the things that are close at hand 
with such peace of mind and such pleasure as one can extract from them. ,99 The 
success of such efforts is, of course, deeply questionable, for whatever 
satisfaction might be attained in the short term, is seemingly and ultimately 
haunted by 'an expression of despair', all the sadder, perhaps, 'because it is not 
aware of itself as despair.' 100 
Having thus provided a detailed description of these three forms of broken 
faith as distrust of God, Niebuhr then poses a further fundamental question 
which enables him to say a bit more about why these phenomenological 
features of false faith forms should occur: 
96 Ibid., p. 75. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid., p. 76. 
99 Ibid., pp. 76-77. 
100 Ibid., p. 77. 
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What is the source of this deep distrust of that One from which we all proceed? It is a 
strange fact that the explanations of its presence reduplicate the ideas connected with 
its various forms of expression. In mythologies and theologies we undertake to account 
for the fact that our relation as selves to the Transcendent appears in our lives in the 
perverted form of disappointment. And our explanations seem to follow the three main 
lines of our effort to deal with the distrusted One. (1) In our defiance we say that we 
were thus created, thus formed as selves, that anxiety is the natural form of our finite 
existence. (2) In our fear we blame ourselves, saying that we have fallen by self-will 
from our original right relation of faith in the Transcendent and that our anxiety is the 
punishment for our pride in wanting to be independent of the transcendent God or to be 
like him, living by our own power. (3) In our effort to escape into the imaginary world 
of the bright gods, into the little cities where we may be faithful to our little loyalties, 
we say that the whole dread of the Transcendent One is an invention and an illusion, 
that we may have been betrayed into this situation of fear and distrust by untrustworthy 
fellowmen. In the first case our creation is our fall; in the second, we tempt ourselves 
to our own undoing; in the third, we are the victims of our companions. lol 
Niebuhr is providing us here with an acute exploration of the terrain of the 
troubled soul, but it is crucial to remember that this exposition is only possible 
because of the presupposition that this is neither the first nor the last word about 
us. God's original intention for us is that we live by faith; even given that sin 
has entered into each and every dimension of our existence, the message of the 
Christian gospel is that God has, does and will reconcile us, thus reconstructing 
and restoring our broken and perverted faith relations. t02 As Niebuhr himself 
puts it: 'Our starting point is not the doctrine of the fall but the knowledge or 
hope of salvation. Yet there are two points about the fall that are noteworthy: 
first it is a genuine fall and cannot be the absolute beginning of our personal 
existence; and, second, that it is a complex interpersonal event in which the 
whole structure of faith is involved.' 103 
101 Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
102 Niebuhr was fond of paraphrasing A. N. Whitehead's notion that salvation enabled people to 
move from relating to God as 'Void' and then 'Enemy' to 'Companion' or 'Friend'. See HRN, 
The Kingdom o/God in America, op. cit., p. 192; Fowler, op, cit., p. 59. 
103 HRN, Faith on Earth, op. cit., p. 78. 
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According to Niebuhr, it is important to remember that sin, here being 
described in terms of faithlessness in its various forms, is not the be all and end 
all of our lives. Such sin as faithlessness is only the penultimate, though 
granted, powerful and miserable, fact about our human condition. But because 
of God's act of revelation and reconciliation in Jesus Christ, we now have a 
greater, indeed, ultimate perspective on ourselves, namely, that there is 
salvation from sin, and, in particular, in Niebuhr's exposition, the restoration of 
our former faithlessness into the fullness and freedom of unqualified trust and 
loyalty in our relations to God and to other human selves. Niebuhr expounds 
this retrospective perspective, the first of the two points which he made above, 
from the standpoint of reconciled faith as follows, taking his cue from the 
biblical saga about Adam: 
So far as the first point is concerned, there is wisdom in the saga of the first man 
and in the theological elaboration of that saga which posits a state of innocence before 
the fall. If faith is a dimension of personal existence, then it seems clear that distrust or 
disloyalty cannot be the first act. Distrust is only possible where the conditions for trust 
have first been established. One cannot suspect another of lying and deceiving except 
in a situation where loyalty is expected. A promise must be made before it can be 
broken. The negative relations of distrust, disloyalty and disbelief all presuppose the 
previous establishment of trust, loyalty and belieffulness. Lies are an impossibility in a 
world where there is no truth, whereas the opposite is not true. Faithlessness does not 
eliminate the order of faith but perverts it. The order still exists; if it did not, not even 
distrust would be possible. If "fall" means distrust of God and disloyalty to Him it 
cannot mean the total destruction of our relation to God; it must rather mean that an 
ambivalence has entered into our personal relations which poisons and corrupts them. 
Hence distrust cannot be the fundamental element in our relations as selves to selves, 
above all to the Transcendent. 104 
We now take up the second aspect of his exposition where he says that our 
fall 'is a complex interpersonal event in which the whole structure of faith is 
involved.' Again it will be necessary to quote him at length, so that the full 
richness and power of his insights about the social self can be appreciated. 
Niebuhr writes: 
104 Ibid. 
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In the second place, since the structure of our faith is so complex it seems evident 
that the perversion of the relationship which is involved cannot easily be blamed in a 
mechanical or an individualistic manner on an isolated act or person. Is the first act of 
faithlessness distrust or disloyalty? Is it disloyalty to God or to companions ? Is it an 
act of disloyalty toward the self by a companion or by the self toward him ? In our 
distrust we seek to place the blame. It is, we say, the woman who tempts the man with 
her distrust; it is the serpent who distrusts God; it is the giving of a commandment, the 
demand for loyalty, to one who is unable to bear the responsibility, which is 
responsible for the great debacle. But the fall of man precisely because it is an event in 
the faith relations of persons is an event in which no mechanical relations of cause and 
effect are present. Here disloyalty and distrust, self and neighbor, are so involved that 
the distrust of God is a response to the companion's deception or disloyalty and the 
selfs disloyalty in the breaking of its own promise is another source of its distrust. For 
Luther the first sin is distrust which tempts man to break the law or his promise. But 
this distrust in God, this belief that he will not keep his promises, presupposes a desire 
or a will to break faith, since one does not suspect another of promise breaking if one 
has had no experience of it in oneself. When we look at the disorder of faith, at distrust 
and disloyalty in their manifold interrelations from the point of view of reconciliation, 
then the effort to place the blame on one criminal, whether the self or companion, 
whether the ancestor or the contemporary, evaporates in the recognition that all have 
sinned and that this does not mean that each one has sinned by himself but that all have 
sinned together. IOS 
We have had to quote so extensively from Niebuhr's exposition so that its 
subtle and powerful insights can be appreciated. This particular part of his essay 
is of vital importance to his whole argument. Only by stressing how pervasive 
and interpersonal are the skewed structures of human faith as distrust and 
disloyalty, can Niebuhr's later talk of reconciliation in Christ be seen in 
something more of its full glory. The evangelical turning point is already 
presupposed here, and its fuller exposition will follow in due course, but first 
Niebuhr wants us to feel something of the force of the vicious circle of false 
faith in which we are all caught. He continues what he elsewhere calls his 
10' Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
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distinctive 'social existentialist' 106 approach by making the following 
comments, in the process offering insights which run contrary to much of what 
has passed, and still passes, for a very questionable form of so-called or would-
be theological orthodoxy. He writes: 
This sin is personal; it is the sin of the self in interpersonal relations, but it is not 
individual. There is no way of carving an individual self out of the web of responsible 
relations and setting it before the bar of justice as alone responsible. Before God it is 
man who finds himself in the wrong, but not man as distinguished from fellowmen. In 
the history of our faithlessness every man is his own Adam but no Adam is alone in his 
sinfulness; none falls in solitude. His solitude is a consequence of fallenness, not the 
cause of it. This is not to say to say that the fall of man into distrust is a social event 
over which the individual has no control. It is an interpersonal event which is 
something quite different from the sort of social event which we encounter in our 
institutions. In an interpersonal event every person participates with loyalty and 
disloyalty, trust and distrust; but none is in it alone and no decisions are purely 
individual decisions. Each act calls forth the moral reaction of others and is itself a 
reaction to the anticipated or remembered moral action of companions. I07 
This is Niebuhr's response to the individualism and atomism which plagues 
so much thinking about the nature of human sin. The interesting use of the 
courtroom metaphor in the above paragraph is part of Niebuhr's subtle 
subversion of the kind of unreflective moralistic attitude which forms a great 
deal of society's views on wrongdoing and responsibility. Such judgmental 
moralising often stems from populist and shallow interpretations of 
Christianity, understood here more as a 'religion' in the Barthian sense of 
deserving radical critique, in contrast to the genuinely 'interpersonal faith 
relationship' that God intends it to be, and which Niebuhr is working so hard to 
demonstrate here in his essay. Extensive quoting from the next paragraph in 
106 HRN, Christ and Culture. New York, Harper & Row, 1951, pp. 241 fr. Niebuhr said that he 
felt 'great kinship' with Bultmann 'in his intentions'. This would seem to be, in large measure, 
because of the 'empirical and ethical strain' in their existentialist approaches. Bultmann's 
emphasis on individualsm, however, seems abstract and reductionist, compared to Niebuhr's 
more social, communal and interpersonal emphases; see HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing 
Imperative,' op. cit., p. 250. 
107 HRN, Faith on Earth. p. 79. 
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Faith on Earth should help to drive home Niebuhr's point in tenns of his 
distinctive social existentialism: 
The story of each personal life makes clear how interpersonal the fall is. The self 
comes to awareness of itself, of its companions and of the common life with a sense of 
promise. The "promises of God" to us do not designate certain statements which are 
said to have been made to Abraham and his children. They designate that sense of 
meaningfulness and splendor with which personal being awakes to existence. There is 
in the background of existence, whether as memory of childhood, or as Platonic 
recollection of something heard in another existence, or as the echo of an inner voice, 
the sense of something glorious, splendid, clean and joyous for which this being and all 
being is intended. It is not a selfish or individualistic sense of promise, as though one 
felt oneself preferred to others or as though the promise would not be kept unless 
others were granted a smaller share of everlasting vitality. That mean and narrow mode 
of thinking comes later. The promise of life is the promise of glory and splendor, not 
for me, but for existence and for me as a part of this world of being. But to our 
personal life which begins with such a sense of promised brightness there comes, 
whether in childhood or adolescence or later, the great disillusionment. Things are not 
what they seem. The great tragic note which runs through all human literature and 
philosophy - the distance between appearance and reality - is sounded. Behind the 
splendor of life there is the putrescence of death. The virtues of our families and our 
friends cover deep shamefulness. There is a shame within ourselves. We also are not 
what we seem. Behind the pleasure and kindness about us there is wretchedness and 
cruelty. The odor of death, the feeling of betrayal, the sense of pollution, invades all 
existence. That things are not what they seem and that what they are is infinitely 
sadder, darker and more disappointing than what they appear to be - this is the theme 
which runs through Greek and modem tragedy, through Eastern and Western 
philosophy. 108 
Niebuhr has spared us little in his penetrating and poignant description of 
some central features of our fallen faithlessness. In offering this, his distinct, 
indeed, unique phenomenology of some of the more foreboding aspects of the 
theologia crucis, his chosen idiom of social existentialism is strikingly 
reminiscent of the writings of the early Barth. As Hans Frei has observed, this 
makes for a profoundly illuminating communicative experience in which the 
108 Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
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reader recognizes much that is true of himself or herself in solidarity with the 
more general human condition being depicted in such dramatic terms.109 
Niebuhr now makes a bit more explicit the religious roots of such existential 
faithlessness as it both contributes to, and in turn, arises from, our broken and 
perverted faith relations. He writes: 
At the heart of this problem of deception and distrust is our relation to the nameless, 
ultimate Transcendent and Circumambient. The human distrust of life, of reality, of 
that out of which all things come, may in part be a result of all the deceptions and 
betrayals to which men have been subject in their relations to fellowmen, but to an 
even greater extent it seems that the temptations to deception and betrayal of 
companion by companion arise out of the distrust of Being. Because we think that if 
we do not maintain ourselves we will not be maintained; because we believe that if we 
do not fill a fleeting existence with values we have ourselves put there it will become 
valueless; because we deeply doubt that the Being or the source of being will bring 
success to our causes; therefore we think we cannot afford to keep our promises to 
each other, separately or in groups. The chain of distrust and disloyalty grows in length 
and complexity. The interpersonal interaction weaves back and forth with deceptions 
that call forth distrust, with distrust tempting to new betrayals, with families, nations 
and religions participating in the great confusion of the life of faith. This is our anxiety, 
a result not of our finiteness but of our dependence on an infinite and on finites which 
have the freedom to deceive us.lIO 
We have now reached that point in our exposition of Niebuhr's analysis of 
human faithlessness, where our radical need of God's reconciling work in Jesus 
Christ is clearly evident. We have already noted how, as a Christian theologian, 
Niebuhr presupposes our redemption from sin by the grace of God in Christ. In 
the next chapter, written from an evangelical perspective, we will be looking 
more closely at these Christological and soteriological aspects. But before 
doing so, we are required to follow another line of thought in Niebuhr's 
existential exploration of our human condition. 
109 Hans W. Frei, 'Niebuhr's Theological Background,' pp. 9-64, in Paul Ramsey, ed., Faith 
and Ethics: The Theology ofH. Richard Niebuhr, New York, Harper & Row, 1957, p. 16. 
110 HRN, Faith on Earth .• p. 84. 
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Thus far, most of our exposition has been based on Niebuhr's essay entitled 
Faith on Earth. This essay has an intriguing history. During the 1950's Niebuhr 
was extensively engaged in research and writing on the subject of human faith, 
and as well as numerous articles in journals, and lectures in various educational 
settings, the main fruit of these labours was the production of two extensive 
manuscripts. Niebuhr intended these to fonn two distinct but nonetheless 
unified aspects of one major book. These manuscripts went under two general 
headings: Radical Monotheism, and Faith on Earth. But as Fowler relates, 
referring in particular to the writings that largely comprised Faith on Earth, 
"[t]he potential publisher failed to grasp the significance and novelty of these 
chapters. The part of the manuscript dealing with faith as a phenomenon was 
rejected for publication, while the chapters on "radical monotheism" [in 
1960]111 were accepted.,,112 
Fowler's comment is now somewhat dated due to subsequent events. In 
1989 the Faith on Earth materials were finally edited and published by 
Niebuhr's son, Richard R. Niebuhr, himself a distinguished contemporary 
theologian. 1l3 The point is, however, that a major part of Niebuhr's theological 
material made its way into the public domain in a somewhat haphazard and 
unfortunate manner. The intended coherence of his reflections on faith suffered 
from being subject to a staggered approach with Radical Monotheism coming 
out in 1960, and Faith on Earth nearly thirty years later in 1989, some twenty 
seven years after his death. It was true, of course, that Niebuhr scholars had 
been given special pennission in the interim to study the unpublished Faith on 
Earth materials for themselves, but nonetheless, the convoluted way in which 
Niebuhr's major essays on faith have been published, has meant that his 
original and profound contribution to a crucial area of theology has been 
seriously hampered. 
I11 As HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture with Supplementary Essays, New York, 
Harper&Row,1960. 
112 Fowler, op. cit., p. 6. 
113 HRN, Faith on Earth. An Inquiry into the Structure of Human Faith. ed., Richard R. 
Niebuhr, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989. 
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So far this chapter has involved an intensive exposition of those parts of 
Faith on Earth which concentrate on the broken faith of the social self where 
the emphasis has been upon the self as it is finds itself in the dynamic force-
field that constitutes the interpersonal interactions of faith as trust/distrust and 
loyalty/disloyalty. The emphasis here has been personal but not individualistic. 
But before we move to the evangelical turning point as Niebuhr expounds it 
in the explicitly soteriological part of Faith on Earth, a subject which we will 
deal with in the second section of the next chapter, we need to spend some time 
considering another important aspect of his existential phenomenology of faith. 
This distinct but related aspect is what we might call ''the social self' where a 
subtle but important shift of emphasis is now placed upon the social 
manifestations or consequences of the self as it lives within the communal web 
of interpersonal faith interactions. For the relevant material on this aspect of 
Niebuhr's work, we thus need to turn to the other part of his faith manuscripts, 
namely Radical Monotheism which was published only two years before his 
death.114 We do this in order to demonstrate that our earlier depiction of 
Niebuhr's analysis of 'the social self, also has its corresponding and necessary 
counterpart in an equally powerful investigation of 'the social self. 
4. The Misplaced Faith of the Social Self 
Niebuhr begins this line of analysis with a definition of the general human 
phenomenon of/aith, a theme which is by now familiar to us: 
This is the attitude and action of confidence in, and fidelity to, certain realities as the 
sources o/value and objects a/loyalty. This personal attitude or action is ambivalent; it 
involves reference to the value that attaches to the self and to the value toward which 
114 HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture with Supplementary Essays, New York, 
Harper & Row, 1960. 
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the self is directed. On the one hand it is trust in that which gives value to the self; on 
the other hand it is loyalty to what the selfvalues.11S 
Niebuhr, as we saw earlier on in this chapter, then offers several illustrations 
of this rather abstract definition of 'faith relationships' among which the 
friendship between two close companions, and the relationship of a patriotic 
nationalist to his beloved country are the most prominent examples that he 
explores. 
He suggests that patriotic nationalism represents the more heuristically 
useful of these two examples in our attempts to understand the faithlessness of 
the social self. Here the mutuality of trust and loyalty is likely to be less 
pronounced than in the case of friendship between two people. The nationalist 
relates to his country by relying upon it, often uncritically and unreflectively, as 
his 'enduring value-center' .116 However, although the continued existence of 
the nation does, to some extent, depend on the faithful allegiance of its citizens, 
it functions as more of a transcendent entity than do any of the individual 
people who together make it a collective community. Strictly speaking then, the 
patriotic nationalist thus depends upon, or trusts his country for worth, 
significance, value and meaning far more than it does upon him.117 
Enlarging upon this example, and the faith phenomenology that lies behind 
it, Niebuhr proposes that '[t]he counterpart of trust in the value-center is loyalty 
or fidelity. Trust is, as it were, the passive aspect of the faith relation. It is 
expressed in praise or confessed in a creed that states the self-evident principle. 
Loyalty or faithfulness is the active side. It values the center and seeks to 
enhance its power and glory. It makes that center its cause for which to live and 
labour. In this active faith the loyal self organizes its activities and seeks to 
organize its world. Faith-loyalty, though it use the same words as faith-trust, 
expresses itself in a sacramentum, an oath of fealty, a vow of commitment.' 118 
The corollary of this would therefore seem to be 'that selfhood and loyalty go 
liS Ibid., p. 16. 
116 Ibid., p. 17. 
117 Ibid., p. 2S for further elaboration of this particular example of nationalism. 
118 Ibid., p. 18. 
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together; that however confused the loyalties of selves may be, yet it is by 
fidelity that they live no less than by confidence in centers of value which 
bestow worth on their existence. Centers of value and causes may, however, be 
only two names for the same objective realities from which and for which 
selves live as valued and valuing beings.' 119 
So far, Niebuhr's analysis has been expressed in very general terms, but now 
he begins to turn his attention somewhat more in the direction of what we 
might, with some caution, and with a nervous look over our shoulder to Barth, 
call "religion". Niebuhr writes: 
In ordinary discourse the word "gods" has many meanings. Now we mean by it the 
powers on which we men call for help in time of trouble; now the forces which they 
summon up in their search for ecstasy; now the realities before which they experience 
awe and the sense of the holy; now the beings they posit in their speculative efforts to 
explain the origin and government of things; now the objects of adoration. The 
question whether religion in which all these attitudes and activities are present is a 
single movement of the mind and with it the query whether the word "gods" refers to 
entities of one class, must be left to other contexts. We are concerned now with faith as 
dependence on a value-center and as loyalty to a cause. Hence when we speak of 
"gods" we mean the gods of faith, namely, such value-centers and causes .120 
Niebuhr now develops his argument in an interesting way. He proceeds to 
identify three distinct forms of faith, all of which demonstrate the 
phenomenology he has already outlined in general terms, namely, faith as trust 
in a value centre and loyalty to this value centre's cause. These three fonus of 
faith he names "polytheism", "henotheism" and "radical monotheism". The 
originality and sheer analytical depth of Niebuhr's essay begin to become 
apparent in the following paragraph: 
In this narrowed sense the plural term "gods" seems alone appropriate. The 
religious and also the political institutions of the West have long been officially 
monotheistic, so that we do not easily regard ourselves as polytheists, believers in 
119 Ibid., p. 22. My italics added for emphasis. 
120 Ibid., p. 24. My italics. 
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many gods, or as henotheists, loyal to one god among many. Using the word "god" 
without definition we regard ourselves as either theists or atheists. But if we confine 
our inquiry to the forms of faith, then it seems more true to say that monotheism as 
value dependence and as loyalty to One beyond all the many is in constant conflict 
among us with the two dominant forms: a pluralism that has many objects of devotion 
and a social faith that has one object, which is, however, only one among many. If by 
gods we mean the objects of such faith then atheism seems as irreconcilable with 
human existence as is radical scepticism in the actuality of the things we eat, and 
breathe, walk upon and bump into. Atheism in this sense is no more a live alternative 
for us in actual personal existence, than psychological solipsism is in our physical life. 
To deny the reality of a supernatural being called God is one thing; to live without 
confidence in some center of value and without loyalty to a cause is another.121 
Niebuhr next engages in an exploration of the two forms of 'false' or 
'defective' or 'inadequate' faith which are 'in constant conflict' with that fonn 
of faith which he sees incarnate in Jesus Christ, and which the Church is called 
to demonstrate in its corporate life, namely, radical monotheism. He writes: 
We may begin with henotheism of which the nationalism we previously used to 
illustrate faith is a characteristic representative. Instead of the nation some smaller 
social unit - family or tribe or sectarian community - or a larger one - civilization or 
humanity - may constitute the center of value and the cause of loyalty. In any case, 
where such faith prevails the ultimate reference in all answers to questions about the 
meaning of individual life and about the cause for which one lives, is made, in 
Bergson's phrase, to some closed society .. [E]very participant in the group derives his 
value from his position in the enduring life of the community. Here he is related to an 
actuality that transcends his own, that continues to be though he ceases to exist. He is 
dependent on it as it is not dependent on him. And this applies even more to his 
significance than to his existence. The community is not so much his great good as the 
source and center of all that is good, including his own value. But the society is also his 
cause; its continuation, power, and glory are the unifying end of all his actions. The 
standard by which also he knows himself to be judged, is the standard of loyalty to the 
community.122 
121 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
122 Ibid., p. 25. Niebuhr has in mind here Henri Bergson's influential study, The Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion, published in 1932. 
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Niebuhr names the mid-twentieth century examples of Gennan National 
Socialism and Italian Fascism as typical representatives of such henotheism, but 
it also takes many other non-nationalistic fonns, such as Marxism and any 
number of ethnic and sectarian embodiments. 123 My own context of Northern 
Ireland provides a sad and bitter instance of this, and is probably a major factor 
in my own attraction to, and appreciation of, Niebuhr's penetrating analysis of 
human faith in tenns of the tragic distortions of social selfhood, with their often 
destructive and disastrous consequences for communal life. '[O]ur combative 
human loyalty .... denies while it seeks to affinn the ultimate loyalty and so 
involves us in apparently never-ending religious animosities which at the same 
time unite and divide neighbors, as they forge close bonds of loyalty to each 
other in a common cause among closed societies disloyal to each other.' 124 
Niebuhr then turns his attention to that other fonn of false faith which we 
named earlier as polytheism. As the name implies, this is expressed and 
embodied in numerous ways, and often, though not always, follows the 
breakdown of a previously held henotheistic or social faith. As Niebuhr puts it: 
The great alternative to henotheism with its relative unification of life is pluralism 
in faith and polytheism among the gods. Historically and in the contemporary scene 
such pluralism seems most frequently to follow on the dissolution of social faith. When 
confidence in nation or other closed society is broken, men who must live by faith take 
recourse to multiple centers of value and scatter their loyalties among many causes. 
When the half-gods go the minimal gods arrive. Faith in the social value-center may be 
dissolved in acids produced by many bitter experiences .. these [erode] the confidence 
that life is worthwhile as lived from and toward the communal center. The natural, 
perennial faith of men in the society in which they were born .. evermore comes to a 
cheerless end among large and little, conscious and unconscious treasons, or among 
natural and political disasters, encountered or foreseen. It is in such a situation that 
123 See, for example, Michael Burleigh. The Third Reich: A New History, London, Pan Books, 
2001. 
124 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, op. cit., p. 37. For a similar perspective 
based on a different context, see Stephen William Martin, 'Faith Negotiating Loyalties: 
Exploring South African Christianity Through a Reading of the Theology ofH. Richard 
Niebuhr,' Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1999. 
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man's other faith, polytheism, never wholly suppressed even in the midst of his social 
loyalties, is likely to become dominant.12s 
What follows next, is Niebuhr's presentation of the shift from henotheism to 
the various polytheistic alternatives which claim our allegiance, as well as a 
phenomenological sketch of what generally passes for this type of so-called 
faith. He writes: 
To be sure, among the most critical and most self-conscious men the dissolution of 
communal faith may call forth an effort to substitute self for society, to make isolated 
seltbood both value-center and cause. Epicureanism and existentialism exemplify such 
an effort ... [These both] look like ghostly survivals of faith among men who, forsaken 
by the gods, continue to hold on to life. The more common alternative to communal 
confidence and loyalty appears in that less radical egoism in which an unintegrated 
diffuse self-system depends for its meanings on many centers and gives its partial 
loyalties to many interests. This is polytheism whatever mythology accompany the 
pluralistic faith. In it a break has occurred between the centers of value and the causes 
which for henotheism were one. Now men look for their worth to various beings, 
human and superhuman, who value them or from whom by effort they can extract 
some recognition of value. The old sense that the self is important because it is and 
exists as part of one enduring community is replaced by the feeling that it is justified in 
living insofar as it can prove its worth. In times when supernatural beings are thought 
to regard the actions of men, value dependence becomes a frantic effort to satisfy these 
gods that the believer is worthy of their attention. When there are no supernatural 
beings in one's world then the proof of worth must be offered to other humans, to the 
prestige persons in one's environment. These become the centers of valuation ... 
[These] are looked to for assurance of worth, while the self continues to pursue 
interests of many sorts and gives its fragmented loyalties to many causes. 
For as the sources of value are many in polytheism so are the causes. These, 
however, are no longer realities requiring unified fidelity; they have become interests 
that from moment to moment attract vagrant potencies in the mind and body.126 
Niebuhr brings his perceptive analysis of polytheism to a close with the 
observation, full of prophetic pathos, that '[t]he pluralism of the gods has its 
m HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, p. 28. 
126 Ibid., pp. 28-30. 
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counterpart in the pluralism of self and society. What is valuable in the self is 
not its being in wholeness or selfhood but the activities, the knowing, creating, 
loving, worshiping, and directing that issue from it. It has become a bundle of 
functions tied together by the fibers of the body and the brain. So also the 
society is an assemblage of associations devoted to many partial interests, held 
together in meaningful unity by no common derivation from a value-center and 
by no loyalty to an inclusive cause.' 127 
These, admittedly, extensive quotations, have, I believe, demonstrated 
something ofNiebuhr's acute exploration and exposition of the phenomenology 
of faith in terms of trust in value centres and loyalty to their respective causes. 
But of course, this has largely involved an exposure of our fallen existence, the 
faithlessness of the social self. It has therefore been a' necessary and 
illuminating exercise in 'clearing the ground' for a subsequent portrayal of that 
form of faith which 'is in constant conflict' with henotheism and polytheism, 
namely radical monotheism, which, for Niebuhr, is understood as trust in, and 
loyalty to the one, true God revealed in Jesus Christ. 
5. Niebuhr's Concept of Sin 
Our exposition and interpretation of Niebuhr's faith analysis in terms of the 
phenomenology of human faithlessness would seem to require at least one 
further question to be explored: what is his concept of sin? A major thrust of 
this thesis is that Niebuhr's work demonstrates a penetrating grasp of the power 
and pervasiveness of sin, providing a cluster of insights which are crucial to a 
proper understanding of human nature, but also setting into sharp relief, the 
glory of God's redemptive action in Jesus Christ to change this situation for the 
better. 
127 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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The major source of our reflections in this section will be a paper that 
Niebuhr devoted specifically to this theme as part of a symposium on the 
Christian doctrine ofman.128 It ought to be clear that 'the conviction that man is 
bad is one of the fundamental principles of the Christian interpretation of life. 
That it is not the only basic dogma need not be said; that it is of essential 
importance and that its abandonment involves the perversion of the remainder 
of Christian theology and faith needs to be emphasized.' 129 In saying this, 
Niebuhr is being careful to put the doctrine of sin in just the right place within 
the overall scheme of things, theologically construed. Neither comparative 
neglect nor, for that matter, comparative predominance, are fitting for a 
properly Christian treatment of this serious, yet, nonetheless, ultimately, 
subordinate subject matter. 
'The importance of the doctrine of human sinfulness is evident from the 
consequences which flow from its acceptance.' For Niebuhr this 'means that in 
our dealing with ourselves and with our neighbors, with our societies and our 
neighbor societies, we deal not with morally and rationally healthy beings who 
may be called upon to develop ideal personalities and to build ideal 
commonwealths, but rather with diseased beings, who can do little or nothing 
that is worth while until they have recovered health and who, if they persist in 
acting as though they were healthy, succeed only in spreading abroad the 
infection of their own lives.' 130 There is therefore little room in this Christian 
perspective for some of the other, less radical notions that are put forward to 
either explain or address the evil that human beings are prone or prey to, 
whether that be based on notions of race, class, social standing or the 'romantic' 
ideal that puts the blame on restrictive institutions, or the evolutionary 
hypothesis that our imperfection is only a 'cultural lag' in which the blight of 
immaturity will, at some stage, be alleviated, and eventually, eradicated, by the 
education of our species out of our unfortunate ignorance. 
128 HRN, 'Man the Sinner,' The Journal o/Religion 15 (1935), pp. 272-280. See also Fowler, 
op. cit., pp. 102-111 for an exposition of the theme of this paper. 
1[9 HRN, 'Man the Sinner,' p. 272. 
130 Ibid., pp. 272-273. 
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Niebuhr concedes that, at first glance, and certainly, to popular perception, 
the doctrine of human sinfulness may seem to be more pessimistic than the 
other theories often proposed. On further consideration, however, it can be seen 
to be 'fundamentally more optimistic.' This is because the 'doctrine of creation 
is the presupposition of the doctrine of sin' which 'implies that man's 
fundamental nature, obscured and corrupted though it is, is perfect.' Human 
perfection as a creature, or, to change the image, restoration to health, is thus 
'not a far-off achievement, a more or less remote possibility which future 
generations may realize after infinite effort; it is rather the underlying datum of 
life' given God's gracious action in Jesus Christ. l31 
However, the perfection which Niebuhr here refers to, is not simply moral 
perfection, a common mistake, which, he feels, unduly narrows, reduces and 
distorts the really radical nature of a properly Christian anthropology. 'To say 
that man is a sinner is not equivalent to the statement that he is morally bad. 
Modem moralism has subordinated all other value categories to those of the 
morally good and the morally bad. It has regarded these as somehow final and 
not in need of further definition, while it has reduced the value categories of 
truth, beauty and holiness, of intellectual, aesthetic and religious evil to their 
1" ,,132 Th It fth"d d d . .. fl h mora essence. e resu 0 IS WI esprea re uctlomsm IS to con ate t e 
undoubtedly important concept of "moral guilt" but so much so that it seems to 
hold a kind of 'tyranny' over every area of life. At the same time, the 'concept 
of God' is, to all intents and purposes, equated or 'identified with' the notion of 
"moral perfection.''' 133 
Niebuhr's critique of this common and narrow fallacy is indebted to insights 
gained from a specifically Christian perspective in which 'sin is not a composite 
term made up of a moral core and secondary accretions but a true concept 
which must be understood from the religious and not some other point of 
view.'134 For instance, in morality, which is only, finally, one such relative 
point of view, 'reference to a standard is implied, whether that standard be a 
131 Ibid., p. 273. 
132 Ibid., pp. 273-274. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid., p. 274. 
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code of laws or a table of values. This standard may be called moral, but 
properly it is the standard of morality, presupposed by morality' but which is 
itself, transcended by, dependent on, and derived from, some other reality. 'The 
source of that standard is always religion, not morality. It depends upon what 
man finds to be wholly worshipful, intrinsically valuable - in other words, upon 
the nature of his god or gods. The "chief good" of man is not the object but the 
presupposition of his moral choices, and his possession of a chief good is the 
presupposition of all moral judgments which he or another passes upon him.' 135 
Among the targets at which Niebuhr is clearly taking aim here are 'the 
aberrations of emotional, revivalistic evangelicalism with its ''unrealistic'' 
attempts to arouse the sense of sin' so as to then 'create a feeling of assurance' 
rather than doing what evangelism should properly do, which is to point to sin 
itself but only in light of the fact that salvation in Christ can be attested to and 
embraced.136 But he also states his dissatisfaction with what he also considers to 
be inadequate interpretations in which the essence of sin is thought to lie in 
human sensuality or selfishness or even creatureliness. To be sure, each of these 
viewpoints may name or describe an aspect of our propensity to sin, but none of 
them are radical or thoroughgoing enough to fully penetrate to the heart of the 
matter. 
Instead, as Niebuhr understands it, the 'religious concept of sin always 
involves the idea of disloyalty, not of disloyalty in general, but of disloyalty to 
the true God, to the only trustworthy and wholly lovable reality. Sin is the 
failure to worship God as God.'137 His argument now unfolds in a way that is 
consistent with the exposition of the faithlessness of the social self which we 
presented in the earlier sections of this chapter. This is apparent when he says 
that sin 'is more than the absence of loyalty to God. It is not possible for men to 
be simply disloyal; they are always loyal to something. Disloyalty implies a 
false loyalty and disloyalty to God always includes loyalty to something that is 
not God but claims deity. Sin therefore is not merely a deprivation, not merely 
m Ibid., pp. 274-275. 
136 Ibid., p. 276. 
137 Ibid., pp. 276-277. 
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the absence of loyalty; it is wrong direction, false worship. Furthermore, loyalty 
to a false God implies rebellion against God. It is impossible that it should be 
otherwise, unless God were something less than the Creator and the essence of 
Being. To make a god of the self, or of the class, or of the nation, or of the 
phallus, or of mankind, is to organize life around one of these centers and to 
draw it away from its true center; hence, in a unified world, it is to wage war 
against God. ,138 
The Christian doctrine that the human being is a sinner therefore does not 
mean that people occasionally become disloyal to God or that their disloyalty 
may only be considered 'real' in so far as they consciously choose to be 
disloyal. Instead, it means 'that those to whom God is wholly loyal and who are 
by nature wholly dependent upon him are in active rebellion against him.' Here, 
Niebuhr is consciously placing himself in line with the views of Augustine, 
Luther, Calvin and Edwards, to name but a few, all of whom have held strongly 
to the Pauline perspective, developed most fully in his letter to the Romans, that 
the human will is not free to easily or naturally choose the good whose source is 
in God, but must be first liberated or redeemed. 
To the moralist who still wishes to enter the qualification that people can be 
held accountable for this disloyalty only in so far as they are consciously and 
willingly disloyal, Niebuhr retorts that this is 'quite beside the point, first of all 
because Christianity is not primarily concerned with the question of assessing 
the blame but with the fact and the cure; second, because this qualification rests 
upon a highly dubious doctrine of freedom. The starting-point of the doctrine of 
sin is not man's freedom but man's dependence; freedom accounts for the fact 
that man can be and is disloyal, not for the fact that he ought to be loyal.' In this 
situation, it may well be that humans will feel a sense of guilt, but what is of 
greater significance is that they will see their 'disloyalty', their 'false loyalty,' 
and the consequences, so that such recognition will be an integral moment in 
the repentance that God requires Ofus.139 
138 Ibid., p. 277. 
\39 Ibid. 
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What then are the consequences of the fact that the human being is defined, 
among other things, as being a sinner? 'The first result of disloyalty appears to 
be conflict within the individual and within society. It is an inevitable result, for 
to leave the One is to be scattered among the many.' In the self-enclosed misery 
in which the human seems to be trapped, loyalty or devotion is offered to many 
objects other than God, these becoming, in effect, the practical gods or idols of 
existence, so that 'idolatry leads inevitably to polytheism and polytheism is 
conflict.,140 Our earlier exposition on the various examples of henotheism and 
polytheism come to mind once more. 'A second consequence is death. We are 
beginning again to become aware of the fact that the death of cultures is the 
consequence of the sin of social wholes. . . and that "spiritual" death, the 
disintegration of the self, is the consequence of false loyalties and conflicts.' 
And thus, in a properly grounded reference to morality, that is, one which takes 
its bearings from the Christian doctrine of sin, Niebuhr can write that the 'moral 
consequences of sin - man's inhumanity to man, cruelty to beasts, exploitation 
of nature, abuse of sex, greed, commercial profanization of creation and its 
beauty - these are no less patent.' 141 
Of particular importance for the Christian strategy of life is the consequence of 
man's impotence to rescue himself out of his disloyalty and rebellion, conflict, death, 
and vice. Moralism which makes the human free will the source of all good and evil 
cannot understand this impotence. Its savior is the will; every problem is solved by an 
appeal to the will. But there is no such thing as a free will in this sense. The will is 
always committed or it is no will at all. It is either committed to God or to one of the 
gods. "The will is as its strongest motive is." Man cannot transfer his loyalty from one 
of the false gods to God by exercising his will, since that will is loyal to the false god. 
Every effort it makes is an effort in some direction. So long as man is loyal to himself, 
or to his nation, or his class, or to his moral standard based upon a self-chosen highest 
140 Ibid., p. 278. 
141 Ibid., p. 279. Note here the reference to the non-human or extra-human dimensions where 
the beginning of an ecological sensibility comes to the fore. We will devote more attention to 
this in Chapter 5, Section 4 of this thesis where the emphasis is on Niebuhr's 'larger 
ecumenism'. 
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good, his efforts to rescue himself will be determined by his loyalty. The consequence 
is that he involves himself more deeply in disloyalty to God.142 
In a sermon published in 1934, when national and international crises were 
casting a dark shadow on contemporary life, Niebuhr sought to address the 
urgent question, "What Then Must We Do?" as the kind of cry or plea from 
those who are in near despair over their complicity in the sin of this suffering 
world.143 Niebuhr's answer then, and thereafter, throughout his now fast 
maturing work, was to respond to this existential anguish by turning to, as he 
saw it, the only possible source of reliable help: the good news of God's saving 
action in Jesus Christ. 'Our tragedy and our sin compel us to look again to that 
segment of history in which sin and tragedy and the God who brings our sin to 
its tragic and redeeming consequences came to fullest appearance. To believe in 
the Lord Jesus Christ means many things, but it means this at least, that our 
faith is based upon no wish nor dream but upon a very bitter reality', namely, 
'that we have seen the enemy and the judge of our sin as our redeemer. There 
are many loud voices today shouting at us to do this and to do that in order that 
we may be saved. But through all the turmoil the still small voice which bids us 
to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ carries a conviction with it that these other 
voices lack. Here is the beginning of our answer. How much more it entails few 
of us seem prepared to say today. But we wait for the fuller answer. ,144 
6. Conclusion 
The 'fuller answer' that Niebuhr here refers to, that of God's saving presence 
and action in Jesus Christ will be the subject of the next chapter, one written 
from an evangelical perspective. But for now, let us offer a brief summary of 
this first chapter, where the emphasis has been on an exposition and 
142 Ibid., p. 279. The quote within the quote here is from lonathan Edwards' work Freedom of 
the Will, and, as Fowler comments, appears to be Niebuhr's own paraphrasing of Edwards, see 
Fowler, op. cit., p. 106. 
143 HRN, 'What Then Must We Do?' The Christian Century Pulpit 5 (1934). pp. 145-147. 
1404 Ibid., p. 147. 
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interpretation of Niebuhr's work from an existential perspective. The word 
'existential', like many words or terms used in discourse, whether academic or 
otherwise, has accrued a wide range of meanings. As applied here to Niebuhr's 
theology, its main thrust implies an approach to the human being as a living 
subject in constant interaction with the world or environment in which he or she 
has been placed. This human or creaturely context sees the human being not so 
much as an isolated individual but a 'social self, and thus committed to a 
lifelong process of interpersonal interaction with other selves or agents. 
Niebuhr explores this situation of social existentialism primarily in terms of 
a phenomenological analysis of faith in which the prior bonds of mutual trust 
and loyalty are broken or misdirected in various ways, not just on the human 
plane between people as social selves, but more fundamentally still, between 
the faithless human self and God as attested in the Scriptures of Israel and the 
Church. This sinful incapacity to trust God at all, or the tendency to rely on 
some 'trustworthy value centre' or centres other than God, and thus to seek to 
be loyal to these value centres' associated 'worthwhile common goals', results 
in the tragedies and sufferings that form such a large part of our personal and 
political existence. In answer to the urgent and agonized question thus evoked: 
''what then must we do to be saved?" Niebuhr points to the saving action of 
God in Jesus Christ since it is by now clear that '[r]edemption from sin is 
possible only by a reconciliation to God which cannot be initiated by the 
disloyal creature. Man the sinner is incapable of overcoming his sin.' 145 To a 
fuller analysis ofNiebuhr's treatment of this evangelical aspect of his theologia 
crucis, we now turn in the next chapter. 
145 HRN, 'Man the Sinner,' p. 279. 
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Chapter Two: An Evangelical Perspective 
1. Soteriology: Salvation as theTransformation of Faith 
So far we have considered Niebuhr's most distinctive contribution to Christian 
theology. namely, radical monotheism, from an existential perspective. In the 
process we have become accustomed to his particular communicative style in 
which he seeks to engage the reader with something more than mere academic 
detachment as he searches out many of the deepest realities of our interpersonal 
being. By now, too, we may have come to appreciate the penetrating insight of 
his existential exploration, in which some of the most uncomfortable truths 
about the state of our human nature are exposed and analysed. This has been 
presented in such a way that we experience it as a shared sense of fallen 
faithlessness. Each and everyone of us is entangled in this web to which we all 
have, in turn, spun further threads. 
We now turn to consider radical monotheism from an evangelical 
perspective. The word 'evangelical' is admittedly one which has a contested 
meaning, but here it is meant to stand for those central biblical truths which 
were the focus of renewed emphasis in the mainstream writings of the 
Reformation, and also the church tradition which subsequently seeks to 
orientate itself by the same guiding lights. The main topics to be considered 
here will therefore be those of soteriology, Christology, pneumatology and thus 
also 'Theology', understood here in the more narrow sense of the doctrine of 
God. However it should be noted that Niebuhr was not self-consciously a 
'doctrinal' thinker. In his autobiographical reflections he wrote that 'important 
as theological formulations are for me they are not the basis of faith but only 
one of its expressions and that not the primary one. I discover further a greater 
kinship with all theologians of Christian experience than with the theologians of 
Christian doctrine.' 146 Typical of his modernist mentality or neo-Kantian 
stance, he felt that a heavy emphasis on doctrine led to a theology that was too 
146 HRN. 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative', op. cit., p. 250. 
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speculative or 'theoretical', and thus insufficiently attentive to matters of 
pressing practical importance in the historical sphere where social selves 
interacted. 147 
These comments are confirmed by an analysis of Niebuhr's writings where 
one looks in vain for explicit or exhaustive treatment of the usual doctrinal loci 
that form the core of the work of many other theologians, especially those from 
a Reformation background. Niebuhr's preference for a particular style of social 
existentialism which attempts to explore the interpersonal phenomenon of faith 
marks him out as an intriguing and perhaps, original voice in Christian 
theology's age-long conversation. However it also means that one has to draw 
upon many different strands in his corpus in order to bring what tends to be 
implicit and occasional into something closer to a more structured doctrinal 
form. That having been said, the posthumous publication of Niebuhr's most 
sustained and coherent reflections on faith in Faith on Earth, now allows us to 
offer a more thorough exposition, examination and evaluation of the saving 
significance of God in Christ. 
In the first chapter, in which we looked at radical monotheism from an 
existential perspective, we made use of the term the social self to describe 
Niebuhr's distinctive anthropology in which he studies the phenomenon of 
faith. We saw something of his unique and almost seamless interweaving of 
theological and sociological insights in which he demonstrates the depth, 
persistence and pathos of the universal human tendency to faithlessness in its 
myriad forms. 'There is no escape from life in faith and no escape from an 
existence in which all trust and faithfulness is malformed by distrust and 
treason.' 148 
It may be recalled when we examined the faithlessness of the social self 
from an existential perspective that we analysed, in turn, two distinct emphases. 
We looked first of all at the faithlessness of 'the social self' in which the 
internal structure of the trust-loyalty bond was seen to be twisted, distorted or 
fractured; in Niebuhr's own preferred terminology, this is the 'broken faith' of 
147 Ibid. 
148 HRN, Faith on Earth, p. 85. 
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the person. He explores this with penetrating insight in chapter five of Faith on 
Earth. In turning now to the evangelical perspective which corresponds with 
this way of looking at faithlessness, we propose to categorise the saving 
transformation of Jesus Christ under the heading: 'The Reconstruction of the 
Social Self's Broken Faith'. The emphasis here is on the faith phenomenon of 
the believing person, understood in each instance as a unique individual, but 
without falling prey to the atomistic distortions of rampant individualism. The 
major problem here is that the social self has difficulty in believing at all since 
its trust has seemingly been undermined or broken in various ways; and so, with 
this lack of confidence comes a deep-seated existential estrangement from God, 
others, self and the environing world. 
Secondly, our earlier existential analysis also looked at the faithlessness of 
'the social self in which the more explicitly communitarian aspects of this 
phenomenon were explored. The subtle shift of emphasis that occurs here is to 
look more at the social connections and thus the associated consequences of 
placing one's trust in specific 'value centres' and attempting to be loyal to 
certain 'common causes', The almost inescapable tendency of human beings to 
live out the many varied forms of what Niebuhr calls 'henotheism' and 
'polytheism' was very evident in this earlier exposition, As Niebuhr 
understands it, the saving transformation accomplished by Jesus Christ is to 
redirect people so that they put their trust in God as the true 'value centre' and 
thus seek to be loyal to all existents in the kingdom of God in which the 
'common cause' is a universal one, namely, the redemption of all things in the 
divine commonwealth. The gospel calls us to participate in this mission which 
has been uniquely and decisively inaugurated by Jesus Christ. In this instance 
we will categorise this way of considering the saving work of God in Christ 
under the heading: 'The Redirection of the Social Selfs Misplaced Faith', A 
crucial textual resource here is the second chapter of Niebuhr's Radical 
Monotheism and Western Culture in which he describes the kind of changes 
involved in moving from henotheism and/or polytheism to radical monotheism 
as embodied in, and inspired by, Jesus Christ. The major problem here would 
appear to be that the social self submits too easily to the predominant 'powers 
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that be' in the particular context in which it lives, whether these 'powers' be the 
'idols' or 'ideologies' or 'mores' or 'spirits' of the age. 
2. The Reconstruction of Broken Faith 
At what can clearly be identified as the evangelical 'turning point' of Faith on 
Earth Niebuhr writes as follows: 
Though there is no escape from life in faith, so disordered, into life without faith, 
there is a prospect of salvation from diseased faith. There is a prospect that this vast 
and complex disease in interpersonal existence will be healed. More than that, there is 
the assurance that a new promise, namely the promise of healing, will be kept. This is 
the prospect and this is the promise of which Christians speak. This is the New 
Covenant, which is not a substitute for the old promise given with life but is based 
upon it, yet so that it is not only the reinforcement of what we once believed but the 
answer to our disbelief of the first promise.149 
This New Covenant can be found in such historical realities as 'Christianity' 
or the 'churches', but Niebuhr is frankly rather wary, indeed highly sceptical, of 
identifying such faithfulness with these abstract or institutional entities. For him 
it 'is rather the interpersonal movement of faith that centers in the person of 
Jesus Christ; yet in such a way that he directs all trust and loyalty away from 
himself to the Transcendent and Circumambient. . . In this interpersonal life 
Jesus Christ is ... the personal companion who by his loyalty to the self and by 
his trust in the Transcendent One reconstructs the broken interpersonal life of 
faith ... As such, not as the founder of a religion, but as person among persons 
he carries on a work of salvation 'by faith unto faith,' the work of making us 
whole in our faith relations. ,1 SO 
149 HRN, Faith on Earth, p. 85. 
ISO Ibid., pp. 86.87. This is a good example of Niebuhr's tendency to keep the emphases of 
Barth and Schleiermcher in dialectical tension or relationship within his own theology: the two 
terms used of God or the Divine Mystery, namely 'Transcendent' and 'Circumambient' hint at 
the theologies of Barth and Schleiermacher respectively. 
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In due course we shall examine the Christology which implicitly belongs 
with Niebuhr's exposition here, and also as we find it elsewhere in his writings, 
but for the moment we shall continue to follow the specifically soteriological 
line of argument which he is presenting us with in Faith on Earth. For Niebuhr, 
Jesus Christ is the 'acknowledged companion' or 'present companion,lsl who 
embodies and represents 'the principle of faithfulness' IS2 as this is mediated to 
us by others who have trusted in him in trusting God, and who have sought to 
be loyal to him and to his cause - the cause of universal redemption. 
The striking feature of this Jesus Christ of our history is his faith and the striking 
feature of his fate is his betrayal. His faith has the three aspects which we have 
discovered in analysing the structure of faith in interpersonal relations, with this 
marked difference that the cause to which he is loyal is the rule of the absolutely 
Transcendent One. His faith is first of all the faith of trust in the Lord of heaven and 
earth . . . as One who has bound himself to care for the apparently most despised 
beings, human and animal and vegetable in his creation. He trusts in the loyalty of the 
Transcendent One and in his power, being certain in his mind that nothing can separate 
men from the love of God .... With this completeness of trust in God as wholly loyal, 
without the least deceptiveness in his nature, the Jesus Christ of our history combines 
complete loyalty to men. He does not trust his fellowmen but he is wholly faithful to 
them, even or perhaps particularly when he chastises them for their disloyalty to each 
other and their distrust of God. He seeks and saves the lost. He spends himself for 
others - and always with trust in God. As person, as living in faith, this Jesus Christ is 
Son of God. JS3 
Niebuhr is quite prepared to confess the divinity of Jesus Christ, but as we 
will have cause to see throughout our thesis, his normal procedure is to 
approach this character variously labelled as 'God's Son' and our 'Saviour' 
more by means of his faithful humanity. 'It is the personal relation of a faithful, 
trusting loyal soul to the source of its being which is the astonishing thing. This 
is a superhuman thing according to all our experience of humanity. Yet this is 
1S1 Ibid., p. 87. 
1S2 Ibid., p. 92. 
153 Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
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humanity in idea, in essence. This, we say, as we regard him, is what we might 
be if we were not the victims and the perpetrators of treason and distrust.,\S4 
This personal miracle of the existence ofa man of complete faith, of universal trust and 
loyalty, is conceivable. He is conceivable as the abnormal possibility of our normal 
human existence in negative faith. We do not doubt our fellowrnen when they tell us of 
the loyalty of Jesus Christ. We are not inclined to believe that they are deceiving us. 
What we doubt is not the possibility of such goodness; but we are sceptical of its 
power - not of the miracle of goodness, for we somehow see that the appearance of 
such loyalty and trust is not in contradiction of the laws of personal existence. It is 
rarely suggested that the goodness of Jesus Christ is mythological invention.ls5 
But of course it is not just the faith of Jesus Christ himself which is 
remarkable. What is even more striking is the fact that such a one as this, one 
who lived by such undiminished trust and loyalty should suffer the fate that he 
did. As the great evangelical emphasis affirms, it is in the passion of Jesus 
Christ that deeper truths emerge about the nature of God, about ourselves and 
how they are inter-related. Niebuhr emphasises that 'the Jesus Christ whom we 
remember was the subject of betrayal. His trust in God was profoundly 
distrusted as an attitude dangerous to the existence of his nation, of its cause as 
the people of God, of its leaders, its worship, its laws. This confidence in the 
loyalty of God is suspected as something which is demonic. This loyalty to all 
men ... is seen as dangerous to all treasured values. He is distrusted in his trust 
in God and in his loyalty to God and to God's creatures. Again we discover that 
the story of Jesus Christ's betrayal is easy to accept.,\S6 Given what we have 
learned about the perennial faithlessness of human beings, it is probably only to 
be expected, indeed, almost inevitable, that Jesus Christ should be distrusted 
and betrayed as the New Testament shows. Niebuhr then pauses, in order to 
pose some speCUlative alternatives about what we might have wanted or 
expected to happen in the narrative concerning Jesus: 
If ever there was an opportunity in human history for the reconstruction of faith, for 
the self-disclosure of the Incomprehensible Transcendent Source of being as God, as 
1S4lbid., p. 95. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
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wholly loyal to his creation, as redeemer of all the promises given with the gift of 
existence itself, then it was at this point where faith in him became incarnate. But the 
faith of Jesus Christ came to the end of its historic existence with the cry: "My God, 
my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" There was faith in the cry: "My God!" But it is 
the uttermost cry of faith, at the edge of nothingness. If at this point in the central 
tragedy in our history there had occurred the demonstration of the power and glory of 
the God in whom he trusted; if Elijah had come; if he who saved others had been 
saved; if we know not what natural or supernatural event had taken place to deliver this 
soul of faith from death and further shame; then might not faith as universal loyalty 
and universal trust have been reconstructed among men?IS7 
Niebuhr's rhetorical strategy is an attempt to articulate those sorts of 
questions which any sensitive person is almost bound to ask when confronted 
with the passion accounts of Jesus Christ. Could not something have happened 
or been done to vindicate his faithfulness, and thus to reconstruct the broken 
bonds of our faithlessness? Niebuhr interrupts and answers such a train of 
thought: 
This did not happen. In our distrust we should not expect it to have happened. 
Should the Son of God come again, it would not happen. But something else has 
happened; something that is very ordinary and very strange, something over which we 
wonder. In consequence of the coming of this Jesus Christ to us we are able to say in 
the midst of our vast distrust, our betraying and being betrayed, our certainty of death 
and our temptations to curse our birth: "Abba, our Father." And this we say to the 
Ground of Being, to the mystery out of which we come, to the power over our life and 
death. "Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name" (Matt. 6:9-12; Luke 
11 :2-4). "I believe, help thou mine unbelier' (Mark 9:24).158 
The 'something else' to which Niebuhr is alluding is, of course, the 
'resurrection' of Jesus Christ. This, so far as we know, unprecedented event, is 
to be seen as part of the entire 'Christ-event' in which the life, passion, death 
and resurrection and ascension of this completely faithful person, is the 
expression of his being vindicated by the transcendent faithfulness of God.1S9 
IS7 Ibid., p. 96. 
IS81bid., pp. 96-97. 
159 For a helpful typology of various views on the resurrection see George Hunsinger, 'The 
Daybreak of a New Creation: Christ's Resurrection in Recent Theology,' Scottish Journal of 
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But in evangelical perspective it is both the death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ which together reveal that God is our reconciler and redeemer: or as 
Niebuhr puts it in the tenninology of his particular interpretation - the 
reconstruction of our broken faith. In a summary statement from another 
manuscript, Niebuhr attests that 'Jesus Christ going to crucifixion and ignominy 
is the revelation of human faithfulness, of its possibility. The resurrection of 
Jesus Christ from the dead is the demonstration of the faithfulness of God, by 
which the distrust of man is broken and his trust in the power and goodness, 
that is loyalty of God [is] called forth.'160 
It seems most strange that by that recollection which we have of the betrayal and the 
disastrous end of the one who trusted in the Power of Being as utterly faithful to him, 
we should have introduced into our lives a little ability to trust. It seems most strange 
that when the one who had heard and believed the promise oflife given to him - "Thou 
art my beloved Son" - that when this one had the promise of life cancelled - that then 
we should in the recollection of this one believe that his God is indeed our Father, that 
his Father is the Determiner of our Destiny. This is the resurrection of Christ which we 
experience. In and through his betrayal, denial and forsakenness, we are given the 
assurance that God keeps his promises. In and through and despite this we hear him, 
we read him, we accept him as God's word to us that God is faithful and true, that he 
does not desire the death of the sinner, that he is leading his kingdom to victory over 
all evil, that we shall not die but live, that the last word to us is not death without 
ending, but life everlasting.161 
Niebuhr's exposition here is tightly packed and closely argued. 
Consequently, it is perhaps best appreciated by quoting from it extensively, as 
we have done so, since there is much in it which shows fresh insight into the 
meaning and significance of 'Easter'. Another important point to note is that 
Niebuhr's interpretation involves a particular way of interweaving both 
soteriological and christological insights thus making it difficult to separate 
Theology, 57, 2 (2004), pp. 163-181. Of the three types suggested, namely the 'spiritual way' 
(Schleiermacher, Bultmann, TilIich); the 'historical way' (Pannenberg, NT Wright); and the 
'eschatological way' (Moltmann, Frei, Barth), Niebuhr possibly comes closest to the 'spiritual 
way' though he is, as ever, not neatly classifiable. For more on the relatively neglected theme of 
the ascension see Douglas Farrow, Ascension and Ecclesia: On the Significance o/the Doctrine 
o/the Ascension/or Ecclesiology and Christian Cosmology, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans. 1999. 
160 HRN, 'The Mediation of Faith,' unpublished handwritten manuscript from the 1950's, p. 21. 
161 HRN, Faith on Earth, p. 97. 
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them out completely, though it is desirable to distinguish them for the purpose 
of our present analysis. Reflecting further on the effect upon us of the 'Christ-
event' as it centres on the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus, Niebuhr writes: 
In our relation to this betrayed, forsaken, destroyed and powerful Jesus Christ we 
are enabled to qualify our distrust of the Ground of Being so that we pray to the 
mystery out of which we come and to which we return, "Our Father who art in 
heaven." Jesus Christ, we say, reveals God. What we can mean by that does not seem 
to be what certain theologians seem to think, that apart from Jesus Christ we do not 
acknowledge God at all, for we do acknowledge him with perhaps all of our human 
companions in the distrust manifest in fear, hostility and evasion; yet we do not 
acknowledge him as God, as the supreme object of our devotion, as the faithful one in 
whom we trust, as the one in whose kingdom we are bound to loyalty to all our fellow 
citizens in creation. There is an acknowledgement even of the personal element in the 
Ultimate in this distrust and anxiety of ours. But it is perverted faith. What appears to 
happen in fellowship with Jesus Christ to our life of faith is that our distrust of God is 
turned somewhat in the direction of trust, that our hostility is turned slightly in the 
direction of a desire to be loyal, that our view of the society to which we are bound 
begins to enlarge. The thunderclouds on the horizon of our existence are broken; the 
light begins to shine through. A great metanoia, a revolution of the personal life, begins 
in us and in human interpersonal history.162 
As ever, with Niebuhr, the main focus is on the consequences to the life of 
faith as it presupposes the 'evangelical turning point' of God's saving work in 
Jesus Christ. 'We may describe what happens to faith by saying that the two 
great problems of existence are solved at least in principle. The first of these is 
the problem of the goodness of Power. The great anxiety of life, the great 
distrust, appears in the doubt that the Power whence all things come, the Power 
which has thrown the self and its companions into existence, is not good. The 
question is always before us, Is Power good? Is it good to and for what it has 
brought into being? Is it good with the goodness of integrity? Is it good as 
162 Ibid., p. 99. This is a profound and moving instance, though only one of many in his entire 
corpus, where Niebuhr's distinctive theologia crucis is evident. As has been stated earlier, this 
is not simply a theory of the atonement but also an entire disposition, 'spirituality' or way of 
life. The unfolding of my argument in the rest of this thesis will help to emphasise this point. 
The representative theologian whom Niebuhr criticises would appear to be Barth, though 
whether the critique is fully sustainable is debatable. It is interesting, however, how often 
Niebuhr feels the need to distinguish his own position vis-A-vis Barth. 
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adorable and delightful? On the other hand we know something of what true 
goodness is. We recognize goodness in every form of loyalty and love. But our 
second great problem is whether goodness is powerful, whether it is not forever 
defeated in actual existence by loveless, thoughtless power. The resurrection of 
Jesus Christ from the dead, the establishment of Jesus Christ in power, is at one 
and the same time the demonstration of the power of goodness and the 
goodness of power. , 163 
Here we have, what is in effect, Niebuhr's response to the theodicy question. 
For him, it is as if everything hinges on the resurrection of the crucified Christ, 
for without this 'mysterious' and 'miraculous' event, there would be little, if 
anything, to demonstrate that human faithfulness is in harmony with, or 
vindicated by, the faithfulness of a trustworthy, loving, loyal and powerful God. 
One also notes the heavy strain of existentialism that is very evident throughout 
Niebuhr's reflections. Ever sensitive to the suffering, the doubts and the 
tendency to faithlessness in our shared human nature, he writes in a manner 
which bears the unmistakeable stamp of personal experience and authenticity, 
though refraining from becoming too autobiographical. Perhaps this makes it all 
the more persuasive as an exemplar of what human testimony should be: a 
pointing towards, and exploration of, an objective truth, which in its 
interpersonal nature, also brings about profound subjective change for good. 
Specifically, in Niebuhrian terms, the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ 
is confessed as the reconstruction of the social selfs hitherto broken faith. 
3. The Redirection of Misplaced Faith 
Niebuhr's work can be described as an analysis of the interpersonal interaction 
of the social self, particularly as we find this manifesting itself in the 
phenomenology of faith where trust and loyalty are the reciprocal bonds 
whereby human beings relate to each other and to God. In the previous section, 
163 Ibid., p. 100. 
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where we leant heavily on Niebuhr's essay Faith on Earth, we were especially 
concerned with the personal agent as an individual in whom the saving work of 
Jesus Christ enabled a reconstruction of its previously broken faith in God; in 
particular as a restoring of trust or confidence in the face of previous 
disappointments and doubt. 
Now, in this section, we are concerned more with the ways in which the 
phenomenon of faith, understood primarily as trust and loyalty, or its synonyms 
of confidence and fidelity, manifests itself in the attitudes, actions and 
associations of the social self in the communal sphere in which it inevitably 
exists. Our chief interest will be in how Niebuhr traces the kinds of saving 
transformation which Jesus Christ brings about in terms of redirecting the social 
selfs misdirected faith. Niebuhr understands this as a transfer of devotion from 
one 'value centre' to another, together with its associated 'common cause'. In 
'henotheism' or idolatrous faith, there is a distinction made between an 'in-
group' and an 'out-group' whereby the social self only seeks fellowship or 
works for the well-being of those deemed to be 'insiders'. In radical 
monotheism, however, the faith of Jesus Christ himself, and thus the form of 
faith which the community of Jesus Christ is called to demonstrate, there is no 
distinction between a so-called 'in-group' and 'out-group'. Rather, God is the 
one, true value centre whose cause is that of universal redemption, and 
therefore this becomes the common cause of all who espouse Christ-like faith. 
Our exposition here will follow closely the argument which Niebuhr presents in 
chapter two of Radical Monotheism and Western Culture. 
In the previous chapter, we saw how Niebuhr offered a searching analysis 
and critique of two pervasive but aberrant forms of faith, namely, henotheism 
and polytheism. This was, in effect, a necessary yet illuminating exercise in 
'clearing the ground' for a portrayal of something much more positive, indeed, 
redemptive: that new or alternative form of faith to which he gives the 
descriptive label 'radical monotheism'. He introduces this more constructive 
part of his argument as follows: 
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There is a third form of human faith with which we are acquainted in the West, 
more as hope than as datum, more perhaps as a possibility than as an actuality, yet also 
an actuality that has modified at certain emergent periods our natural social faith and 
our polytheism. In all the times and areas of our Western history this faith has 
struggled with its rivals, without becoming triumphant save in passing moments and in 
the clarified intervals of personal existence.l64 
Niebuhr is not suggesting that this fonn of faith has only occurred in the 
Western world, it is simply that he does not feel qualified to speak about the 
phenomenology of faith in Eastern cultures, and so confines his analysis to 
those areas he is more familiar with through experience and research. He now 
begins to unfold his argument, informing us that though he will here describe it 
in rather fonnal or abstract terms, that in fact, it does not appear 'otherwise than 
as embodied in the concreteness of communal and personal, of religious and 
moral existence.'16S He writes: 
For radical monotheism the value-center is neither closed society nor the principle 
of such a society but the principle of being itself; its reference is to no one reality 
among the many but to One beyond all the many, whence all the many derive their 
being, and by participation in which they exist. As faith, it is reliance on the source of 
all being for the significance of the self and of all that exists. It is the assurance that 
because I am, I am valued, and because you are, you are beloved, and because 
whatever is has being, therefore it is worthy of love. It is the confidence that whatever 
is, is good, because it exists as one thing among the many which all have their origin 
and their being, in the One - the principle of being which is also the principle of value. 
In Him we live and move and have our being not only as existent but as worthy of 
existence and worthy in existence. It is not a relation to any finite, natural or 
supernatural, value-center that confers value on self and some of its companions in 
being, but it is value relation to the One to whom all being is related. Monotheism is 
less than radical if it makes a distinction between the principle of being and the 
principle of value; so that while all being is acknowledged as absolutely dependent for 
existence on the One, only some beings are valued as having worth for it; or, if 
speaking in religious language, the Creator and the God of grace are not identified. 166 
164 HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, p. 31. 
165 Ibid., p. 32. 
166 Ibid. 
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It has been necessary to quote this long paragraph in its entirety since its 
tightly woven argument is crucial to the interpretation of Niebuhr that I offer. 
The main point of the paragraph, and the others that will soon follow, is to 
separate out the various distinct strands of a complex and nuanced reality about 
the phenomenology of faith in its three basic fonns, and to do so in such a way 
that the singular or unique, yet universal nature of radical monotheism is more 
precisely analysed, articulated and appreciated. It is this combination of a unity 
which is theocentric, coupled with an inclusivity which is in fact nothing less 
than universal in intent, which is particularly noteworthy in Niebuhr's 
interpretation of faith. This interpretive interweaving of unity and universality 
underlies the following paragraph where Niebuhr writes: 
As faith reliance, radical monotheism depends absolutely and assuredly for the 
worth of the self on the same principle by which it has being; and since that principle is 
the same by which all things exist it accepts the value of whatever is. As faith loyalty, 
it is directed toward the principle and the realm of being as the cause for the sake of 
which it lives. Such loyalty on the one hand is claimed by the greatness and 
inclusiveness of the objective cause; on the other hand it is given in commitment, since 
loyalty is the response of a self and not the compulsive reaction of a thing. The cause 
also has a certain duality. On the one hand it is the principle of being itself, on the 
other, it is the realm of being. Whether to emphasize the one or the other may be 
unimportant, since the principle of being has a cause, namely, the realm of being, so 
that loyalty to the principle of being must include loyalty to its cause; loyalty to the 
realm of being, on the other hand, implies keeping faith with the principle by virtue of 
which it is, and is one realm. 167 
The language that Niebuhr employs throughout this argument might appear, 
at first reading, to be couched in a rather dry, abstract and philosophical style, 
but what it actually conveys, on closer inspection, is a precise yet passionate 
description of radical monotheism. What begins to emerge is that this form of 
faith makes possible an ethos that is both magnificent in scope and 
magnanimous in spirit. The following paragraph, long, subtle and nuanced as it 
is, continues the marvellous exposition that Niebuhr unfolds: 
167 Ibid., p. 33. 
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The counterpart, then, of universal faith assurance is universal loyalty. Such 
universal loyalty cannot be loyalty to loyalty, as Royce would have it, but is loyalty to 
all existents as bound together by a loyalty that is not only resident in them but 
transcends them. It is not only their loyalty to each other that makes them one realm of 
being, but the loyalty that comes from beyond them, that originates and maintains them 
in their particularity and their unity. Hence universal loyalty expresses itself as loyalty 
to each particular existent in the community of being and to the universal community. 
Universal loyalty does not express itself as loyalty to the loyal but to whatever is; not 
as reverence for the reverent but as reverence for being; not as the affirmation of world 
affirmers but as world affirmation. 168 
We pause at this stage in our citation of the rest of Niebuhr's paragraph in 
order to point up the fact that this universal faith stance, understood in radically 
monotheistic terms as trust in the One God, and thus loyalty to all that exists 
within the universal realm of his kingdom or commonwealth, can be 
distinguished, in typically Niebuhrian fashion, from the other forms of faith, 
and their inherent moralities, in ways that are deeply instructive. Speaking of 
the loyalty that is involved in radical monotheism, Niebuhr's paragraph 
continues thus: 
Such loyalty gives form to morality, since all moral laws and ends receive their form, 
though not their immediate content, from the form of faith reliance and faith loyalty. 
Love of the neighbor is required in every morality formed by a faith; but in polytheistic 
faith the neighbor is defined as the one who is near me in my interest group, when he is 
near me in that passing association. In henotheistic social faith my neighbor is my 
fellow in the closed society. Hence in both instances the counterpart of the law of 
neighbor-Iove is the requirement to hate the enemy. But in radical monotheism my 
neighbor is my companion in being; though he is my enemy in some less than 
universal context the requirement is to love him. To give to everyone his due is 
required in every context; but what is due to him depends on the relation in which he is 
known to stand.169 
168 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
169 Ibid. p. 34. 
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By now the idea and actuality of radical monotheism should be clear. 
However, to illustrate its continuing struggle with, and distinctiveness from, the 
other forms of 'defective' faith that Niebuhr has identified for us, he now 
throws radical monotheism into even sharper relief over against them. He 
writes: 
The meaning of radical monotheism may be further clarified if we compare it with 
some of the nonradical, mixed forms of faith in which it seems to appear in disguised 
or broken fashion. Something like monotheism is present in henotheism at those points 
in personal or social life where a closed society fills the whole horizon of experience, 
where it is in fact not yet a closed society because everything that comes into view is a 
part of it. But as soon as an in-group and out-group are distinguished and as soon as the 
contingency of the society, as not self-existent but as cast into existence, is brought to 
consciousness, such embryonic radical monotheism is put to the test. Though the 
possibility of a movement toward conscious radical monotheism may be present in 
such a moment, the apparently invariable process in human history at such points leads 
toward closed-society faith or toward polytheism or toward both.170 
Niebuhr's next move in this cumulative argument, one which has been 
gathering momentum as it goes along, is to cite certain types of henotheism, 
analysing them in the light of, and comparing them against, radical 
monotheism. The representative examples that he explores, and all of which he 
ultimately finds wanting, are humanism, naturalism and Albert Schweitzer's 
celebrated philosophy of 'reverence for life'. These all demonstrate signs or 
traits of generosity of spirit and inclusiveness of belonging, but at some point or 
other, each one fails to live up to the theocentric logic and ethos of radical 
monotheism. Bringing this particular part of his argument to a finish, Niebuhr 
offers two short summary paragraphs which are a fitting culmination to his 
foregoing interpretative reflections: 
All such ways of faith seem, at least as protests, to be movements in the direction of 
radical monotheism. Yet they all fall short of the radical expression; each excludes 
some realm of being from the sphere of value; each is claimed by a cause less inclusive 
than the realm of being in its wholeness. 
170 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
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Radical monotheism dethrones all absolutes short of the principle of being itself. At 
the same time it reverences every relative existent. Its two great mottoes are: "I am the 
Lord thy God; thou shalt have no other gods before me" and "Whatever is, is good."J7J 
Niebuhr next briefly examines how radical monotheism was 'in constant 
conflict' with polytheism and henotheism throughout the Old Testament 
rendering of the history of Israel. He suggests that the Hebrew writer who 
perhaps gave the greatest and most consistent expression to this was the so-
called 'Second Isaiah' (Isaiah 40_55).172 However, as a Christian theologian, it 
is in the Jesus of the New Testament that Niebuhr finds the supreme, perhaps 
even unique, incarnation and mediation of radical monotheism, though the 
continuities with the theology of Second Isaiah should be noted. Jesus came 
among us to inaugurate and communicate the coming kingdom of God, this 
latter phrase being understood in characteristic Niebuhrian terms as 'both the 
rule that is trusted and the realm to which loyalty is given.' 173 In Jesus, we have 
'the concrete expression in a total human life of radical trust in the One and of 
universal loyalty to the realm of being. ,174 
But lest anyone imagine that he is advocating a vague or sentimental faith, 
such as might be suggested or presupposed by the soft pan-universal ism of say 
nineteenth century liberalism, encapsulated in the phrase 'the fatherhood of 
God and the brotherhood of man' , Niebuhr goes on to articulate his reading of 
the perennial cost that radical monotheism entails, given the contested nature of 
human history and contemporary existence: 
To say that this faith acknowledges whatever is to be good is not to say, of course, that 
for it whatever is, is right. In their relations to each other and to their principle these 
many beings in the realm of being are often wrong and grievously so. They are 
171 Ibid., p. 37. 
J72 Note the strong affinities with Brueggemann who also gives 'a privileged place' in his 
interpretation to Second Isaiah, see Waiter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: 
Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy, Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1997, p. 120. Niebuhr used to quip 
that he read Second Isaiah so much that his bible fell open there when set down on its spine. 
173 HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, op. cit., p. 38. 
174 Ibid., p. 40. 
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enemies to each other as often as friends; but even enemies are entitled to loyalty as 
fellow citizens of the realm ofbeing.17S 
What the foregoing exposition and interpretation has, I believe, 
demonstrated, is that Niebuhr's analysis of the phenomenology of faith is not 
just plausible but persuasive as a theologia crucis. That unified complex of 
events which, according to the New Testament, centre on Jesus Christ, attest to 
the good news that in and through him the transformation of the faithlessness of 
the social self into faithfulness has been effected, both in terms of the 
reconstruction of its broken faith, as well as the redirection of its misplaced 
faith. In Niebuhrian terminology, soteriology is here designated as the saving 
significance of Jesus Christ, whose radical monotheism brings about 
'pistological' transformation within and among the fallen and distorted faith 
structures of human beings. In order to further explore this evangelical 
perspective, the next section of this chapter will go on to deal more with some 
of the Christological issues that it prompts. In other words, we now shift our 
primary focus from the 'work' to the 'person' of Christ. 
4. Christoiogy: Jesus as the Incarnation and Mediator of Faith 
Lonnie Kliever has remarked that 'H. Richard Niebuhr is seldom thought of as 
a christologian.' Often the target for criticism due to his alleged 'christological 
inadequacy', his work, however, 'though rejecting all christocentrisms ... is 
decisively christological. His entire theological program pivots on a Christology 
which holds together God's radical sovereignty and graciousness with man's 
radical historicity and sinfulness. Unfortunately, Niebuhr offers no systematic 
statement on God's revelation and reconciliation in and through Jesus Christ. 
But the structure for a fully developed Christology can be drawn and 
systematized from his writings. ,176 
m Ibid., p. 38. 
176 Lonnie D. Kliever, 'The Christology of H. Richard Niebuhr,' The Journal of Religion, 50, 
(1970) pp. 33-57, p. 33. 
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Kliever's point is well taken. Niebuhr does not offer a fully developed 
Christology, perhaps in part due to his reluctance to be a self-consciously 
'doctrinal' theologian, operating primarily in a highly technical mode. l77 
Niebuhr's work, as we suggested earlier in this thesis, is more like 'sapientia' 
than 'scientia', and thus fits more into Barth's category of 'irregular 
dogmatics', as distinct from the 'regular dogmatics' which Barth himself 
eventually felt called to as his life's work. 178 Nonetheless, there is, as Kliever 
and others have noted, and as I argue too, a genuinely coherent christological 
structure to Niebuhr's theology,179which though not without some unresolved 
problems and tensions, does have certain persuasive features and offers the 
promise of further development in this most crucial of doctrinal loci. Indeed, 
Kliever himself has done much to elucidate Niebuhr's theology, and in 
particular the evangelical interconnections of his Christology and soteriology. 
This is all the more noteworthy when one considers the fact that at the time 
when Kliever was engaged in his research and writing he did not have available 
to him, indeed may not even have been aware of, the important manuscript 
Faith on Earth which was only published in 1989. My own thesis, having the 
benefit of this latter publication, is able to confirm much of Kliever's 
systematizing of Niebuhr's evangelical interpretation, as well as grounding it 
more concretely in an extensive exposition of Faith on Earth, providing, as this 
posthumous book does, probably the most sustained and explicit 
soteriologicallchristological work in Niebuhr's entire corpus. 
A helpful and possibly illuminating way in which to approach the question 
of Niebuhr's Christology in relation to his soteriology, is to consider the 
manner in which Bruce Marshall addresses the interaction of these two 
important doctrinal loci. As Marshall puts it : 
177 HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative.' op. cit., pp. 250; 251; URN, Faith on Earth. p. 
102. 
178 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1956-1975, Ill, pp. 275-280. 
179 Hans Frei, 'The Theology ofH. Richard Niebuhr,' in Faith and Ethics: The Theology ofH. 
Richard Niebuhr, Paul Ramsey, ed., New York, Harper and Row, 1957, pp. 104-116; Libertus 
A. Hoedemaker, The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr, Philadelphia, Pilgrim Press, 1970, pp. 
114-126; John D. Godsey, The Promise ofH. Richard Niebuhr, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 
1970, pp. 96-115. 
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There seem to be two basically different and contrary ways in which the 
question "How can Jesus Christ be significant for salvation?" might be answered. One 
way would be to say that what makes Jesus Christ heilsbedeutsam [significant for 
salvation] is his own life, passion and death and resurrection, so that both the meaning 
and meaningfulness of "that which is significant for salvation" are detennined by and 
inseparable from his particularity. On this account, since Jesus is heilsbedeutsam 
precisely in virtue of the actions and events which make him a particular person, 
principally his death and resurrection, recognizing him as the particular person he is is 
the one logically indispensable condition of the possibility of knowing him to be 
heilsbedeutsam, that is, of faith in him as redeemer. This position need not shun the 
question of how faith in Jesus Christ as the unique redeemer is credible; but it insists 
that because of the way in which Jesus Christ is heilsbedeutsam, this question can in 
the final analysis only be answered by appeal to Jesus as a particular person, and hence 
by appeal to an identifying description of him. On this account, therefore, the 
"credibility" question - the question of how faith in Jesus Christ is possible - cannot be 
answered by an appeal to general criteria of religious meaningfulness or significance 
for salvation. On the contrary, an adequate description of Jesus Christ is the logical 
basis of any answer to the question of how he can be significant for salvation; the task 
of theology in this respect is to elucidate conceptually the way in which significance 
for salvation is detennined by and dependent on Jesus Christ as a particular person. 
A different way of answering this question of credibility would be to say that in 
order to show how Jesus Christ can be heilsbedeutsam, it must be possible to show 
how there can be anything at all which is heilsbedeutsam. That is, on this account one 
must show how it can be meaningful (sinnvolf) and intelligible (verstandlich) to say 
that any reality is significant for salvation. Here, appeal to a description of Jesus Christ 
is taken to be insufficient as a basis for an explanation of how he can be 
heilsbedeutsam, although such a description is of course a necessary part of a complete 
account of Christian faith in Jesus as the unique redeemer. On the contrary, the general 
question of the credibility of that which is putatively heilsbedeutsam is separate and 
independent of the question of how the status of unique significance for salvation can 
be ascribed to Jesus Christ as a particular person. Unless the possibility of something 
"significant for salvation" can be shown to be credible, a belief like "Jesus Christ is the 
unique savior" will not be credible, even though a demonstration that there can be 
realities which are heilsbedeutsam does not alone fully account for the credibility of 
faith in Jesus Christ. Both questions must be answered in order to show how Jesus 
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Christ can be significant for salvation; neither response by itself constitutes an 
adequate answer to the basic question of credibility. ISO 
The specific issue at stake for Marshall in the foregoing reflections is to try 
and test both of the above Christological methodologies as found in Barth and 
Rahner respectively, where Barth represents the first method and Rahner the 
second. Marshall's study argues a persuasive case for the fonner method in 
which Jesus Christ is deemed to be both "logically indispensable" and 
"materially decisive". 181 
Subsequently, George Hunsinger has developed Marshall's thesis in an 
interesting manner. For Hunsinger, Marshall's insights become a useful means 
by which to distinguish between what Hunsinger calls "middle" and "high" 
Christologies. 182 Not only so, but it also becomes possible to draw similar 
distinctions between various soteriologies too. In a so-called "high conception" 
of the person and work of Jesus Christ, such as found, for example, in Barth or 
von Balthasar, '[t]he work of Christ is regarded as materially decisive, because 
it brings about our reconciliation with the God toward whom we as sinners are 
hostile and by whom we stand otherwise condemned. A high view of Christ's 
person is logically indispensable to this work, because it is inconceivable that a 
mere human being, no matter how fully actualized in no matter what 
transcendental a way, could accomplish this work.' For this conception, 
therefore, '[o]nly a particular person who was at once truly God and yet also 
truly human could do a work of this kind. Both the person and the work are 
exclusively unique. Christ dies in our place. He enacts both the mercy and the 
righteousness of God through vicarious expiatory suffering. This enactment is 
as ineffable as it is real. It views our sin as radical evil, and yet saves us from 
its penalty by bearing it and bearing it away. ,183 
180 Bruce D. Marshall, Christ%gy in Conflict: The Identity of a Savior in Rahner and Barth, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 21-22. 
181 Ibid., pp. 76-106 for Rahner's alleged inconsistencies and inadequacies and pp. lIS-ISO for 
Barth's more satisfactory treatment. 
182 George Hunsinger, 'Baptized into Christ's Death: Kart Barth and the Future of Roman 
Catholic Theology,' in Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, pp. 253-278, 
Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2000; p.263. 
183 Ibid., p. 264. Italics included in the original text. 
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However in the so-called "middle conceptions" of both Christology and 
soteriology, or at least in its more consistent versions, things seem to be rather 
different. In these conceptions, Hunsinger argues that: 
The work of Christ is again regarded as materially decisive for our salvation, but the 
defmition of that work has changed. Sin is now more nearly a matter of bondage than 
of guilt, so that what we are saved from is more nearly sin's power than its penalty. 
Consequently, the work of Christ is significant for us, because what it effects is more 
nearly our re-empowerment than our complete recreation. Because our plight is one of 
estrangement from God more nearly than enmity and condemnation, the solution is 
more nearly one of our being reunited with God through an inner experience of 
spiritual re-empowerment. The cross of Christ is significant, not because of vicarious 
expiatory suffering, but because it shows that Jesus fully took part in the brokenness of 
the human condition without forsaking his spiritual union with God. We are saved not 
so much by something fundamentally unique and unrepeatable that took place apart 
from us on our behalf as by a certain communion with Christ which allows some 
measure of his perfected spirituality and destiny to be repeated or re-enacted in our 
lives. We are saved by the effect in us for which the work apart from us functions as 
little more than the precondition for its possibility. Consequently, the person who goes 
with this work ... would not be Jesus Christ the incarnate Savior (fully God, fully 
human) so much as Jesus Christ the Redeemed Redeemer (the divinely empowered 
human being). This person would be materially decisive, because the work he actually 
accomplished is efficacious for us. But he is not logically indispensable, because it 
would seem at least in principle that any other human being, if sufficiently empowered, 
might have accomplished or might yet accomplish much the same thing. The person of 
Christ required by a middle Christology is unique but not unique in kind. 184 
It would therefore seem that 'the very essence of middle soteriology is the 
idea of salvation by spiritual repetition: what took place spiritually in Christ is 
what now takes place spiritually in us, i.e., the same sort of thing is to be 
repeated, regardless of all differences in degree. Although the Savior is the 
source of our salvation (or spiritual empowennent), the difference between the 
Savior and the saved would seem to be both relative and provisional. 
184 Ibid., pp. 264-265. Italics in Hunsinger's original text. 
91 
Consequently, at the consummation of all things it would seem that the Savior 
will be little more than the first among equals.' 185 
Hunsinger's essay makes important use of the Greek New Testament 
concept of koinonia, which is rather weakly translated as 'fellowship' or 
perhaps better 'communion' but which he suggests is best understood as 
'mutual indwelling' and is often rendered in the New Testament by the 
preposition "in".186 The koinonia relation therefore would seem to exemplify 
the "Chalcedonian pattern" in that it 'is always an ineffable union of mutual 
indwelling in which the terms [or persons] participate in one another for the 
sake of love ''without separation or division" (inseparable unity), ''without 
confusion or change" (irreducible identity), and with one tenn [or person] 
taking precedence over the other (asymmetry). ,187 
The use of the concept of koinonia therefore enables a fresh and perceptive 
analysis of the much contested, and often confused issues of Christology and 
soteriology, allowing further important clarifying distinctions to be drawn 
between what Hunsinger has here been calling "middle" and "high" 
conceptions. 'Koinonia with Christ for the middle conception is essentially our 
participation in and appropriation of Christ's "spirituality," no matter whether it 
is called his God-consciousness, or the kingdom of God, or the new being, or 
authentic being-towards-death, or experiential religion, or the hermeneutical 
privilege of the poor, or womanspirit rising, or the rejection of violence, or the 
original blessing, or perhaps simply faith, or even faith formed by love. The list 
goes on and on, but the structure is always the same. What took place extra nos 
is no more than the condition for the possibility of what takes place in nobis. 
The decisive locus of salvation is not fixed in what took place in the cross of 
Christ there and then, but in what takes place in us or among us here and now. 
Salvation essentially encounters us as a possibility that is not actual for us until 
it is somehow actualised in our spiritual and social existence, and the process of 
185 Ibid., pp. 265-266. 
186 Ibid., pp. 256-261. 
187 Ibid., pp. 260-261. 
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actualisation proceeds by degrees. Though primarily a divine gift, salvation is 
always also a human task.' 188 
Pressing the distinctions thus opened up a bit further still it would appear 
that '[w]hat high views ... share over against middle views ... is the 
conviction that the decisive locus of salvation is what took place there and then 
on Golgotha, that our communion with Christ is our communion with the risen 
Savior who died in our place, that salvation encounters us as a finished and 
perfect work so that here and now it can only be received and attested for what 
it is, that neither its actuality nor its efficacy depends on our acceptance of it, 
that our accepting it depends rather on its prior actuality and efficacy precisely 
for us, and indeed for the whole world. In sum, in a high soteriology it is not 
Christ who points us to spirituality but spirituality that points us to Christ, who 
as God with us is the exclusively unique object of our worship and our faith. No 
one else will ever be God incarnate, and no one else will ever die for the sins of 
the world. High views agree that this conviction is the heart of the gospel, and 
that it is compatible with much in the middle view though not with the middle 
framework as a whole.' 189 
When Niebuhr's interpretation of the person and work of Jesus Christ is 
pondered in the light of the above analysis it would seem that his presentation 
falls within the bounds of what Hunsinger labels the "middle conception".I90 To 
construe Christ, as Niebuhr does, as essentially the 'incarnation and mediator of 
faith' who transforms or converts our innate polytheisms and henotheisms, is to 
place a relatively greater degree of emphasis on the existential appropriation of 
God's saving work in Christ rather than on the more classically evangelical 
affirmation about its already perfectly complete nature as a finished work 
established once-for-all. There is much that is penetrating and illuminating in 
Niebuhr's exposition of the person and work of Christ, especially in its 
portrayal of how the myriad ways in which faithlessness, be it broken faith or 
188 Ibid., p. 266. 
189 Ibid., p. 267. For a similar line of argument on the greater adequacy of what he calls 
'soteriological objectivism' see George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape o/his 
Theology, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 103-151. 
190 George Hunsinger, personal correspondence with myself, 12 October 2001. 
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misplaced faith, is reconstructed and redirected by the radically monotheistic 
faith of Jesus so that human beings can once more trust in God's rule and be 
loyal to God's realm. The insights that Niebuhr offers here are undoubtedly of 
great and lasting benefit to our understanding of the phenomenological field of 
faith where issues of anthropology, Christology and soteriology intersect. But it 
would appear that Niebuhr's Christology and soteriology do not quite fit into a 
"high conception" in that his interpretation does not necessarily entail that Jesus 
Christ is "logically indispensable" or, at least 'unique in kind', in relation to his 
"materially decisive" work with the singularity or specificity of say a Barth or 
von Balthasar. 
The matter may not, however, be quite so 'cut and dried' as Hunsinger, or 
perhaps Marshall, would imply. Both Frei and Hoedemaker have analysed 
Niebuhr's Christology, and the way in which it is entwined with his soteriology, 
and have offered a rather different assessment. Of particular importance to both 
of their analyses is the brief and often overlooked, but nonetheless important 
christological section in Christ and Culture entitled 'Toward a Definition of 
Christ,.191 Here, Niebuhr argues that, whilst there are many varied and even 
contending interpretations or views of Christ, nonetheless, through the objective 
'givenness' of the New Testament, there always remain these 'original portraits 
with which all later pictures may be compared and by which all caricatures may 
be corrected. And in these original portraits he is recognizably one and the 
same. Whatever roles he plays in the varieties of Christian experience, it is the 
same Christ who exercises these various offices. ,192 
Niebuhr is here working his way towards his own definition of Christ, 
acknowledging that though 'every description is an interpretation, it can be an 
interpretation of the objective reality. Jesus Christ who is the Christian's 
authority can be described, though every description falls short of completeness 
and must fail to satisfy others who have encountered him.'193 The description 
that Niebuhr here chooses to elucidate is that of what he calls a 'moralist' 
191 HRN, Christ and Culture, New York, Harper and Row, Torchbooks, (1951) 1975, pp. 11-29. 
192 Ibid., p. 13. 
193 Ibid., p. 14. 
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whose task is that of 'pointing out and defining the virtues of Jesus Christ; 
though it will be evident that the resultant portrait needs to be complemented by 
other interpretations of the same subject, and that a moral description cannot 
claim to come closer to the essence than do metaphysical or historical 
descriptions. By the virtues of Christ we mean the excellences of character 
which on the one hand he exemplifies in his own life, and which on the other he 
communicates to his followers.' 194 
Amongst many possibilities, the virtues that Niebuhr expounds are those of 
love, hope, obedience, humility and faith. In such a Christology, 'anyone of the 
virtues of Jesus may be taken as the key to the understanding of his character 
and teaching; but each is intelligible in its apparent radicalism only as a relation 
to God. It is better, of course, not to attempt to delineate him by describing one 
of his excellences but rather to take them all together, those to which we have 
referred and others.' But what is of chief importance for such a moral estimate 
of Jesus is that his identity or status 'is due to that unique devotion to God and 
to that single-hearted trust in Him which can be symbolized by no other figure 
of speech so well as the one which calls him Son ofGod.'19s 
The thought may occur that Niebuhr's account of Jesus Christ, though 
biblically-informed, is an example of what is sometimes rather unsatisfactorily 
called a 'Christology from below' in which the methodological focus is 
exclusively, and therefore, reductively, on the humanity of Jesus.196 'Yet this is 
only half the meaning of Christ, considered morally ... Because he is the moral 
Son of God in his love, hope, faith, obedience, and humility in the presence of 
God, therefore he is the moral mediator of the Father's will towards men. 
Because he loves the Father with the perfection of human eras, therefore he 
loves men with the perfection of divine agape, since God is agape. Because he 
is obedient to the Father's will, therefore he exercises authority over men, 
commanding obedience not to his own will but to God's. Because he hopes in 
194 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
195 Ibid., p. 27. 
196 Nicholas Lash, 'Up and Down in Christology,' in Stephen Sykes and Derek Holmes, eds., 
New Studies in Theology I, London, Duckworth, 1980, pp. 31-46; Colin E. Gunton, Yesterday 
and Today: A Study of Continuities in Christology, London, SPCK, 1997, pp. 10-55. 
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God, therefore he gives promises to men. Because he trusts perfectly in God 
who is faithful, therefore he is trustworthy in his own faithfulness towards men. 
Because he exalts God with perfect human humility, therefore he humbles men 
by giving them good gifts beyond all their deserts.' 197 Niebuhr's christological 
summation therefore is that: 
Since the Father of Jesus Christ is what He is, sonship to Him involves the Son not in 
an ambiguous but in an ambivalent process. It involves the double movement - with 
men toward God, with God toward men; from the world to the Other, from the Other to 
the world; from work to Grace, from Grace to work, from time to the Eternal and from 
the Eternal to the temporal. In his moral sonship to God Jesus Christ is not a median 
figure, half God, half man; he is a single person wholly directed as man toward God 
and wholly directed in his unity with the Father toward men. He is mediatorial, not 
median. He is not a center from which radiate love of God and of men, obedience to 
God and to Caesar, trust in God and in nature, hope in divine and in human action. He 
exists rather as the focusing point in the continuous alternation of movements from 
God to man and man to God; and these movements are qualitatively as different as are 
agape and eros, authority and obedience, promise and hope, humiliation and 
glorification, faithfulness and truSt.198 
Niebuhr makes it quite explicit that '[o]ther approaches besides the moral 
one must be taken if Jesus Christ is to be described adequately.'199 But it would 
seem to be that with this 'moral interpretation' of Jesus Christ, as well as the 
extensive exposition that he offered into the transformation of broken and 
misplaced faith that we analysed earlier, that he has indeed answered much of 
MarshaU's call for an 'identifying description' or 'adequate description' of 
Jesus Christ. Hans Frei, is so convinced, for in his opinion, 'Niebuhr meets the 
test that the tradition always imposes on the content of a Christology regardless 
of the merits of its method or approach (which should be secondary issues). A 
Christology must indicate the Lord's consubstantiality with the Father 
according to his Godhead; his consubstantiality with us according to his 
197 HRN, Christ and Culture, p. 28. 
198 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
199 Ibid., p. 29. 
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humanity; the union of the two distinct natures; and the abiding distinctness and 
unconfusedness of these two natures in the one, unitary person. ,200 
Marshall and Hunsinger have posed some challenging questions in the 
realms of Christology and soteriology. These questions can and should continue 
to command attention and respect. But they may not be fully adequate to the 
task of classifying each and every Christology and its associated soteriology. I 
would venture that Niebuhr is one such exception to the perhaps too neat 
'pigeon-holing' that Marshall and lor Hunsinger strive for. According to Frei, in 
Niebuhr's distinctive, though brief outline of Christology, he 'takes a new and 
suggestive departure, and goes beyond the question of methodology to turn to 
actual theological content.' Frei's hope, that perhaps Niebuhr might yet turn his 
suggestive approach into something more substantive never took place, but 
Frei's wistful comment that Niebuhr's Christology, 'as the culmination of 
careful systematic thought and biblical exegesis, merits close attention' 
provides impetus for the aspiration that others might yet pursue this potentially 
'fruitful' Niebuhrian line of approach to the person and work of Jesus ChriSt.201 
Indeed, recent New Testament scholarship has made Niebuhr's approach to 
Christology, seem, at the very least, a plausible one, in that it takes seriously 
once more, the socio-historic milieu in which Jesus the Jew interpreted and 
enacted his divine vocation.202 
Niebuhr offers an innovative and yet deeply instructive prophetic wisdom of 
the cross. In particular, the powerful grip that sin, especially faithlessness, has 
upon our social selfhood, is delineated with a sure and sensitive grasp. However 
the evangelical tradition to which Niebuhr belongs has also given classical 
expression to the significance of Christ's person and work by speaking of his 
200 Hans Frei, 'The Theology ofH. Richard Niebuhr,' in Faith and Ethics, op. cit., p. liS. 
201 Ibid., p. 116. See also Hoedemaker, The Theology 0/ H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., pp. 114-
120 in which he offers a largely positive assessment of Niebuhr's Christology and soteriology, 
noting its ability to dialectically relate the approaches ofBarth and Bultmann, though not 
without some unresolved tensions. 
202 James D. G. Dunn, 'Christology as an Aspect of Theology, ' in The Christ and the Spirit: 
Volume J Christology, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1998, pp. 377-387; Richard Bauckham. God 
Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the New Testament, Carlisle, Paternoster Press, 
1998; N. T. Wright, 'The Reasons for Jesus' Crucifixion,' in Jesus and the Victory o/God, 
London, SPCK, 1996, pp. 540-611. 
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'priestly' and 'kingly' offices as well as his 'prophetic' office. Niebuhr is not 
entirely bereft of references to Christ as 'priest' or 'king'. Indeed his most 
sustained christological/soteriological argument in Faith on Earth, speaks often 
of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ as now being in the ascendancy as a 
living presence who continues to exercise a mediatorial or priestly role. 'He is 
personally present as Master and Lord. He is the personal companion who by 
his loyalty to the self and by his trust in the Transcendent One reconstructs the 
broken interpersonal life of faith. ,203 As Niebuhr's son puts it in an editorial 
footnote, Niebuhr seems to have adapted some insights from George Herbert 
Mead and applied them to his own christological/soteriological argument so 
that 'HRN's line of argument appears to be that the present Jesus Christ of faith 
is the companion who reconstructs the faith by which we have lived in the 
past.,204 
Niebuhr's distinctive idiom of radical monotheism tends, as we have seen, 
towards an emphasis upon the phenomenological or existential effects of 
salvation. Perhaps it is this which prompts Hunsinger to suggest that 'like most 
modem theologians he was incapable of dealing adequately with Christ's 
priestly office. ,205 But, as our lengthy exposition thus far of Niebuhr's work 
makes clear, and the material yet to come in subsequent chapters, especially the 
ethics of the responsible self should confirm; there is much that Niebuhr says 
that seems to correspond with the traditionally understood role of Christ as 
'priest'. Niebuhr's language for this is couched in terms of Christ's radical 
monotheism or theocentric and universal responsibility, but in this vicarious 
and representative way he is still carrying out a saving ministry in our midst.206 
203 HRN, Faith on Earth, p. 87. 
204 Ibid., Editor's note 3., pp. 88-89. 
205 George Hunsinger, personal correspondence with myself, 12 October 2001. 
206 See Douglas John Hall, Christian Theology in a North American Context: Vol. 2:Professing 
the Faith, Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1996, pp. 363-553. Of particular importance is his use of 
the term 'representation' as a contemporary christological term. closely reflecting Niebuhr's 
moral or 'pistological' approach, pp. 506fT. See also Dorothee Solle, Christ the Representative: 
An Essay in Theology after the "Death of God", trans. David Lewis, London, SCM Press, 
1967; Wolthart Pannenberg, 'Representation as the Form of the Salvation Event,' in Systematic 
Theology: Vol. 2, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1994, pp. 416-437. 
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Hunsinger, though, it must be said, offers a more helpful line of thought 
when he writes that '[t]he entire gospel, as understood by the Reformation, 
depends on the affirmation that Christ's righteousness and life become ours as a 
gift that is received not by works but by faith alone. Because salvation is not 
properly a process but a once-for-all event that comes to us whole and entire, as 
a sheer gift, which is Christ himself, salvation is the stable basis and not the 
uncertain goal of the Christian life. ,207 
Niebuhr's work as a whole, and certainly its main thrust, leave one with the 
impression that here was someone so sensitively attuned to the existential 
pathologies of faithlessness and the attendant difficulties of life that salvation 
did seem to be at times, in fact rather often, more of a far-off, if not entirely 
uncertain goal, rather than a stable basis already objectively achieved and 
offered in Christ. 
The title of this thesis, Crucial Faith, is intended to, in some way, indicate 
the issue under consideration here. The use of the word 'faith' demonstrates 
Niebuhr's abiding interest in the more subjective aspects of the broad subject 
matter of theology as a whole. His self-stated kinship with those whom he 
called 'theologians of experience', rather than 'theologians of doctrine' is clear 
evidence of where his primary interests lay, as well as the methodological 
approach that he normally took, since his work was predominantly a thorough 
analysis of the believing self or 'Christian life', albeit not narrowly or 
exclusively construed. Much less evident in Niebuhr is an equally sustained 
consideration of the 'object' of faith, namely the God made known in Jesus 
Christ by the Holy Spirit. Unsurprisingly, then, he never attempted or aspired to 
write a comprehensive systematics, let alone a dogmatics, even in outline, since 
he rarely dwelt on matters of ontology, about either the being of God or of 
humanity, preferring, instead, to remain with descriptions of disposition and 
action.208 
207 Hunsinger, 'Baptized into Christ's Death,' Disruptive Grace, op. cit., p. 273. 
208 Daniel Day Williams, 'H. Richard Niebuhr (1894-1962) A Personal and Theological 
Memoir,' Christianity and Crisis 23 (1963), p. 211, 212. 
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It would be unfortunate and erroneous, however, to gain the impression that 
Niebuhr had a "low" conception of the person and work of Christ, or that he 
somehow fell far short of the classic evangelical truths for which the 
Reformation so strongly and rightly contended. Niebuhr was as vigorous as 
anyone in his affirmation that salvation is a divine gift and not a human 
achievement. Though seldom making use of the formulation 'justification by 
grace through faith'. Niebuhr could be said to have been an exemplar of that 
motto's truth throughout his writings. In particular, his 'pistology' or 'faith 
analysis' has offered the theological world the deceptively simple but 
profoundly subtle insight that faith is both 'divine gift' and 'human task' by 
rendering this in the terminology of 'trust' and 'loyalty'. Trust is the 'passive 
aspect of the faith relation' in that God demonstrates his trustworthiness in 
Jesus Christ as divinely-effected gift thus evoking or calling forth 'loyalty or 
faithfulness' as the active side of the grace-enabled faith relation.209 Much 
fruitless and quarrelsome disagreement about the nature of salvation and faith is 
undercut or re framed by Niebuhr's christologically-grounded exposition. 
Niebuhr's delicate interweaving of christological and soteriological issues 
prompts the question of the actuality or possibility of growth or progress in the 
life of faith so reconstructed and redirected by God in Christ. An abiding and 
recurring theme in his work is that the life of faith so restored by Christ is to be 
understood in terms of 'transformation' or 'conversion', motifs which 
emphasize the restless, dynamic and unfinished nature of the social selrs faith 
relation. In a way which is again reminiscent of Barth, Niebuhr stresses the 
'event-like' character of the faith relation which centres in Christ, constantly 
reiterating and underscoring the fact that the relation in question is one of 
'occurrence, happening, event, history, decisions, and act. .210 
Barth, it must be acknowledged, makes much more of the 'once-for-all' 
nature of the saving work of God in Jesus Christ. His thoroughly 'objectivistic' 
209 HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, p. 18. See the more extended treatment of 
this theme in Niebuhr. Faith on Earth. pp. 85 ff.; Radical Monotheism. pp. 16ff. 
210 George Hunsinger. How to Read Karl Barth. op. cit.. p. 30. Hunsinger calls this "actualisrn" 
and it aptly describes Niebuhr's recurring emphasis too, for example. HRN. The Meaning of 
Revelation. pp. 138-139; Faith on Earth, pp. 99, 108ff; Radical Monotheism, p. 31, as well as 
numerous other possible references. 
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understanding of soteriology is much more thorough and consistent in 
emphasising and grounding salvation in the stable basis of the already achieved 
historic event of Christ than is Niebuhr's more 'subjectivist' interpretation. The 
extra nos aspect of salvation is a strong feature of Barth's interpretation, as it 
was for Luther and Calvin as well, in that our salvation is simply 'in Christ' as 
is affirmed in, for instance, 1 Corinthians 1 :30. However at the more existential 
in nobis level, where salvation is appropriated in the life of the believer, there 
are other aspects to be considered as well as the 'once-for-all' motif. These are 
the motifs of 'again and again' where the working of grace through faith is a 
newly recurring event; and the 'more and more' motif, which speaks, though 
with caution and restraint, so that complacency and presumption do not hold 
sway, of what might be called 'progress' or 'growth' in the life offaith.211 
Where and how to place Niebuhr with regard to these motifs is an intriguing 
question. Arguably more concerned with the existential in nobis of soteriology 
rather than the more classically evangelical extra nos, he nonetheless did accept 
and affirm the latter. In my judgement, at the existential in nobis level, Niebuhr 
is probably closer to Luther and Barth in that he was sceptical of placing too 
much emphasis on the 'more and more' aspect. His writings give evidence of 
his belief that growth or maturity in faith was possible, but his perennial 
critique of Christian henotheism, as a manifestation of his distinctive 'logic of 
the cross', prevented him from becoming too sanguine about the supposed 
righteousness of the 'faithful'. 
211 Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace, pp. 274-275; 295-304 where Hunsinger compares the use of 
these three in nobis motifs in Luther, Calvin and Barth. According to Hunsinger, Luther • 
emphasised all three in the following diminishing order of significance: 'once-for-all', 'again 
and again', 'more and more'; Calvin also accepted the 'once-for-all' but the 'again and again' 
receded in favour ofa strong emphasis on the 'more and more'; whereas in Barth the 'once-for- f 
all' emphasis was very strong, as, to a lesser extent, was the 'again and again' (echoing Luther), 
but the 'more and more' aspect tended to recede. 
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5. Pneumatology: A Niebuhrian Problem? 
As the previous section has served to show, Niebuhr's theology is, if not 
entirely Christocentric in the thoroughgoing manner of the mature Barth, 
nonetheless rich in christological insight. His radical monotheism is an 
interesting and innovative treatment of how Jesus Christ is materially decisive 
for what the Church understands by salvation, even if certain questions still 
remain open or unresolved, about whether Christ, so understood, is also 
uniquely indispensable. Jesus is crucial to the evangelical perspective that 
Niebuhr develops in his theocentric depiction, albeit at the level of what 
Hunsinger suggests might be a 'middle conception' of the person and work of 
Christ. The importance and richness of Niebuhr's Christology, especially as we 
have explored it in his posthumous Faith on Earth, is a resource upon which 
future theology can surely draw, highlighting as it does certain features that 
may amplify and supplement the christological insights of others. 
But as our focus now turns to that of pneumatology, it will become apparent 
that Niebuhr's treatment of this important aspect of theology is remarkably 
scant. Throughout his corpus as a whole, there is relatively little direct reference 
to the Holy Spirit, and those that do occur are rarely developed at any great 
length. In this section, therefore, we shall offer a brief exposition of the major 
exception to this rule, namely, his reflections on pneumatology in the final 
chapter of Faith on Earth.212 Then we shall trace his other references to the 
Holy Spirit elsewhere in his writings, as well as offering a brief assessment or 
critique of what we find. 
In the closing chapter of Faith on Earth Niebuhr states that 'theology will 
understand that neither faith nor love, neither wisdom nor dependence, is the 
foundation on which the Christian life rests; that the foundation is God, Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit; and that the unity which is present in life with God and 
212 See Fowler, op. cit., pp. 232-235. 
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Christ and neighbor comes from Him and from Him alone. ,213 Remarkably, 
considering the strength of the affirmation or confession made in the above 
statement, this is the first reference to either the Holy Spirit or to God as Trinity 
in the entire constructive argument of the book. To only bring this conviction 
into play at such a late stage in his argument is noteworthy, to say the least. But 
it is how Niebuhr addresses the specific issue ofpneumatology that concerns us 
here, and obviously, as the following reflections show, also calls for further 
testing on his part as well. 
In tension with, or even in seeming contradiction to, his earlier Trinitarian 
affirmation, Niebuhr speaks of 'the impossibility of developing an adequate 
understanding of the reality and work of the Holy Spirit on the basis of such a 
theory of faith as has been set forth above. There is no need when we speak of 
faith as acknowledgment of and trust in the reality of faithful, self-binding, 
promise-making and promise-keeping selfhood to develop the binitarian 
formula, so prevalent in Christianity, into a Trinitarian fonnula.'214 
As Niebuhr understands it, his particular faith analysis deals with vital 
'spiritual principles, that is, with internal elements in man and God,,21S but this 
is more at the level of what he variously labels 'character' or 'personality' or 
'freedom' or 'selfhood'. From this Niebuhr concludes that 'the Creator is Spirit, 
in this sense of "spirit," that he is Being with the inner reality of selfhood, 
covenanting and keeping faith. ,216 Likewise, argues Niebuhr, since the human 
being is said to live by faith through mutual bonds of trust and faithfulness, 
there 'is a spirit in man, which not only proceeds from the Father in the sense 
that man was and is so created as to be and to become a covenanting self, but 
also in the sense that this inner selfhood is in every moment dependent upon the 
presence of that Other Spirit, a Universal Thou. ,217 
213 HRN, Faith on Earth, pp. 102-103. 
214 Ibid., p. 103. 
m Ibid. 
216 Ibid., p. 104. 
217 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, Niebuhr cites 2 Corinthians 3: 17, ''The Lord is the Spirit", to 
indicate that, according to his understanding of the matter, this text refers to 
Jesus Christ as Lord, one who is 'not simply the historic individual Jesus, 
though he is that too, but ... the inner personal companion who as person is 
present in the memory and expectation of the believer.,2IS Niebuhr also cites 
Galatians 2:20, "It is no longer I that live but Christ who lives in me", to speak 
of the relation between Christ and the Christian where Christ is 'the personal 
companion who has been engrafted into my personal existence so that I cannot 
and do not live except in this companionship.'219 But for Niebuhr, it is 
important to note that this emphasis on personal unity between Father, Son and 
believer, established by Christ's mediating presence and action, is not simply 
reduced to one of identity since '[p]ersonality precludes identity.,22o Niebuhr 
thus draws the following important conclusions: 
When we have said this we have said that the third principle in the Deity of which 
our beliefs speak does not appear from the point of view of the analysis of faith to be a 
person as the Father and the Son are persons. The three persons who are involved in 
the community of faith are Father, Son and this poor human self which has by creation 
and redemption been lifted into the unbelievable privilege of communion with Father 
and Son and with all those other persons into whom God has breathed his Spirit. Spirit, 
rather than being a third personal principle in the Deity, is an attribute of the two 
persons in the Godhead and that which makes it possible for us to be selves with them. 
We are thus led to a kind ofbinitarian formula; God is Father and Son in two persons. 
The Spirit is that which, being of the very nature of God, is given and matured and 
restored to human persons. It is the principle of community among selves who are 
united in trust and loyalty to Father and to Son. But Spirit on the basis of this analysis 
is not person in the sense in which Father and Son are.m 
Niebuhr suggests two further reasons to back up his claims. First, he appeals 
to what he calls the 'prevalence of the binitarian rather than of the Trinitarian 
formula in the Scriptures and in the church. ,222 Second, he argues that the 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid., pp. 104-105. 
220 Ibid., p. 105. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
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'direct language of faith in prayer and in oaths of loyalty' rarely makes 
reference to the Holy Spirit, unlike the frequent addressing of Father and Son 
that perennially occurs in the Christian life. The relative truth of these claims 
might be contested, but one can allow that Niebuhr's assertions are at least 
plausible.223 
However, Niebuhr's next move is intriguing. Having shown the binitarian 
logic of his analysis, he backs away from making it into a positive assertion 
which would thus contradict classical trinitarianism. Even though he feels that 
the latter seems to be 'speculative', he states his unwillingness to break faith 
with the attested experiences of many in the community of faith whose belief is 
that they have had real encounter with a personal agent whom the tradition has 
named as the Holy Spirit.224 This leaves Niebuhr to ponder three possible 
options. First, we can explicitly deny all so-called extraordinary spiritual 
events, including Pentecost, declaring all such phenomena as 'abnormal' or 
even 'heretical'. Second, we can place an almost blind trust in the veracity of 
such encounters as have been attested in Scripture and in subsequent tradition, 
but 'without seeking to re enact for ourselves under their guidance the 
experiences of which they speak without seeking to understand what has 
become a part of our own existence. ,22S 
Niebuhr suggests that neither of these first two options are satisfactory, so 
instead, he offers a third one in which we 'consider only one reality as 
normative, God in Christ, Christ in God, to whom the faith of the past and ours 
is directed and from whom it proceeds.,226It follows. therefore, that '[w]e shall 
not repeat the beliefs of the past as statements reflecting our own faith; this we 
cannot do and still keep faith with our fellowmen; yet we shall trust these men 
of our community who so reported what they understood of their life with God 
and we shall think of these beliefs as reports and as prophecies. Sometime, 
223 Ibid., pp. 105-106. 
224 Ibid., pp. 106-107. 
225 Ibid., p. 107. 
226 Ibid., p. 108. 
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perhaps, we shall understand the reality to which they refer. This applies to 
many of us when we deal with the beliefs about the Holy Spirit.,227 
The foregoing remarks are an exemplary demonstration of Niebuhr's sense 
of what it means to be accountable to both church and academy without, 
thereby, denying his own intellectual integrity. In a way not dissimilar to his 
remarks in the next section of this thesis about the relative weight of importance 
that confession of the Lordship of Christ should occupy, Niebuhr here attempts 
to offer his own distinct perspective in as responsible and humble a manner as 
possible. This leads him to conclude that 'in our life in faith we know that God 
is Spirit, that the Lord is Spirit, that the spirit in the human being proceeds from 
the Father and the Son, that the Spirit which proceeds from the Father and the 
Son is interpersonal reality. We can attach great significance to the statement 
that the Spirit is consubstantial with Father and Son. What we cannot say for 
ourselves is that the Spirit is not the Father, that he is not the Son, and that he is 
equal to Father and Son - as a power or a person like them but distinct from 
them. But those of us who speak in this fashion are not in a position to deny that 
the classic formulation is true. We can believe it; it is not an expression of our 
trust in God, however, and not an oath of loyalty to him but only an expression 
of our lower trust, our secondary but real loyalty to the community of faith 
which has so expressed its trust in God and so made its vow of fidelity. I 
believe that there is a Holy Spirit. ,228 
These reflections typify much in Niebuhr's theological rationale. in 
particular his intellectual integrity. He acknowledges the strength of the classic 
doctrinal tradition, and so, whilst recognising that his own existential 
convictions and understandings of the matter do not quite match the Church's 
commonly-held creed, he is prepared to defer to its historic and communal 
authority within the community of faith. Once again, it is an example of his 
reluctance to promulgate or perpetuate any doctrine which he feels is not rooted 
in his own experience or does not resonate with him existentially. To do so, to 
his mind, would be to give too much credence to the more theoretical or 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
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speculative aspects of doctrine. But it is important to note that he intends to 
keep open the future possibility that what he cannot, at present, fully and 
unreservedly endorse, may yet become his own personal experience and 
confession. In the meantime, he will accept, at what he considers the lower 
level of faith namely, propositional belief, that the Holy Spirit is both personal 
and divine. 
The consensus of informed opinion is that Niebuhr's pneumatology is 
underdeveloped.229 In this he could be said to have much in common with many 
theologians for whom reflection on the identity and agency of the Holy Spirit 
has suffered much by comparison with other doctrinal loci. His 
pneumatological neglect is perhaps partly understandable when one considers 
that during the time of his major creative output, that is, roughly the middle 
third of the twentieth century, explicit reflection on the Holy Spirit was 
relatively sparse. Since then, of course, there has been a marked upsurge in 
attention to this particular theme, which, though demonstrating a wide variety 
of approaches, nonetheless bears witness to a felt need to correct the imbalance 
or comparative neglect that pneumatology and even, Trinitarian theology had 
undergone in previous generations.23o 
To say much more than this would take us well beyond the scope of this 
thesis. There are, I believe, certain elements in Niebuhr's theology which would 
lend themselves to a more robust or developed pneumatology than we have 
found to be the case in our analysis thus far. Some of these will emerge in the 
next chapter where we will look at his legacy from an ethical perspective, and 
in which the theme of the human being as 'the responsible self will come to the 
fore. It is my proposal that this concept might well provide some raw material 
out of which could be developed something more substantial about the 'agency' 
229 See, for example, Hoedemaker, op. cit., p. 126; Frei, 'Niebuhr's Theological Background,' 
ofo. cit., p. 14. 
20 For useful if not exhaustive surveys ofpneumatology and some appreciation of its historic 
and ecumenical diversity see Gary D. Badcock, Light of Truth & Fire of Love: A Theology of 
the Holy Spirit, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1997; Donald Bloesch, The Holy Spirit: Works and 
Gifts, Illinois, IVP, 2000; Veli-Matti Karkkainen, Pneumatology: The Holy Spirit in 
Ecumenical. International. and Contextual Understanding, Grand Rapids, Baker Academic, 
2002. 
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or 'work' of the Holy Spirit, if not so much about the Spirit's 'person' or 
'identity' . 
6. Theology: Niebuhr's Doctrine of God 
We have already noted the way in which Niebuhr attempts to place his own 
reflections in responsible relation to the classic creedal and doctrinal reflections 
of the mainstream of Christian theological tradition. In the areas of both 
Christology and pneumatology, we have seen how he develops his own 
particular line of thought, one which is marked by a neo-Kantian and social 
existentialist epistemology. In both these areas, he attempts to develop his 
favoured 'faith-analysis' as a distinct contribution to the interpersonal 
interactions of divine and human selves who live by covenant relationships of 
trust and loyalty. Because he asks rather different questions from much of the 
mainstream tradition, his enquiries produce answers that do not always or 
immediately sound 'orthodox' or 'classical'. But he is no theological maverick, 
and as we had cause to see in the areas of both Christology and pneumatology, 
he is always aware of where his own proposals stand in relation to the Church's 
orthodox formulations. Whilst demurring from repeating them verbatim as his 
own doctrinal beliefs, he is still prepared, nonetheless, to defer to the central 
teachings of the Church as authoritatively and communally binding and 
normative. 
The question arises, however, about Niebuhr's 'Theology' proper: that is, his 
doctrine of God. If he acknowledges that the Lordship of God 'comes before 
the acknowledgment of Christ's lordship·231 and if he also believes in the Holy 
Spirit but not necessarily as a distinct person, co-equal with God the Father and 
God the Son, what then are we to make of his understanding of this most basic 
of Christian doctrines? More pointedly still: is his 'Theology' consistent with 
the affirmations of the tradition in its most classic form, that is, God as Trinity? 
231 HRN. 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative', op. cit, p. 250. 
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Scholarly opinion is divided on this issue. The secondary literature presents 
a far from unanimous verdict on Niebuhr's doctrine of God, partly, perhaps, 
because of his inconsistent, or as some might say, ambivalent appeal to the 
classic understanding of God as Trinity; but also, perhaps, because as suggested 
above, his distinct line of enquiry, in which he sometimes asked, and attempted 
to answer, a rather different set of questions from the mainstream tradition, led 
to a number of hypotheses or proposals which are difficult to neatly classify 
according to the typical categories of theological discourse. 
Among those who are most critical of Niebuhr's doctrine of God are 
Kenneth M. Hamilton and John Howard Yoder. Hamilton's critique is based on 
only one of Niebuhr's books, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, and 
basically argues that Niebuhr doesn't so much defend unitarian principles as 
assume them, since as Hamilton interprets Niebuhr here, 'the doctrine of the 
Trinity [is] something less to be discarded than to be disregarded.,232 In Yoder's 
case, the charge levelled at Niebuhr is that in his writings, it would appear that 
most of the time any 'reference to the Trinity seems . . . to be a slogan, 
symbolizing in a superficial way our author's urbane, pluralistic concern for a 
balance between Christ and other moral authorities. ,233 Yoder feels that 
Niebuhr's appeal to orthodox Trinitarianism is somewhat disingenuous since, 
when quizzed about this by Yoder, none of those who are former students and 
friendly interpreters of Niebuhr 'seem to believe that he meant seriously to 
claim that the distributive or modalist use which he makes of the doctrine of the 
Trinity, for purposes of a corrective polemic against one-sidedness in modem 
ethics, should be taken as real appeal to what was at stake at Nicea. ,234 
Speaking further of those Niebuhrian students whom he consulted, Yoder 
writes that there seems 'to be agreement on their part that Niebuhr's ostensible 
claim to be reading the doctrine of the Trinity as normative doctrinal history 
ought to be taken with a grain of salt. His concern is with the notion of 
232 Kenneth M. Hamilton, 'Trinitarianism Disregarded: The Theological Orientation of H. 
Richard Niebuhr and Cyril C. Richardson,' Encounter 23 (1962) pp. 343-352, p. 343. 
233 John Howard Yoder, 'How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned: A Critique of Christ and 
Culture,' in A uthentic Transformation: A New Vision of Christ and Culture, ed. Glenn H. 
Stassen, Nashville, Abingdon Press, pp. 31-89, p. 63. 
234 Ibid., p. 63. 
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balancing out competing considerations, to which end he uses numerous triads; 
Trinity is merely one metaphor for that. ,235 
The paper that has largely prompted this line of interpretation is The 
Doctrine of the Trinity and the Unity of the Church.236 In this paper, Niebuhr 
makes use of the doctrine of the Trinity on largely pragmatic or ethical grounds, 
arguing that one, though only one of many important things that this doctrine 
does, is to provide a more balanced and comprehensive framework against 
which perennial tendencies towards various 'unitarianisms' can be measured 
and corrected. It acts, one might say, in an ecumenical or 'regulative' way by 
means of which, not only various 'unitarianisms' of the 'Creator' or 'Father' 
may be critiqued, but also does so for what he calls 'unitarianisms' of the 'Son' 
or 'Jesus Christ', and also those 'unitarianisms' which focus preponderantly on 
'the Spirit'. But whatever potential this Niebuhrian use of the doctrine of the 
Trinity may hold, one cannot help but feel that those who criticise his approach, 
or at least have certain questions and misgivings about it,237 are right to infer 
that it is more of a convenient and corrective device in the face of various 
distortions, rather than a positive means of saying something about the identity 
of the God made known in Jesus Christ, and thus confessed as Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit. 
As has been suggested earlier in this thesis, some key Christian doctrines 
were not exhaustively defined or developed by Niebuhr. Among those doctrines 
which remained underdeveloped in his theology, we may place his treatment of 
the Trinity. Perhaps then, it is all the more important to attend to what is his 
most explicit reflection on this topic in his entire corpus, albeit one which is 
found in a rather obscure publication, and one which yet again offers only hints 
and suggestions, rather than substantive dogmatic material. He writes: 
235 Ibid., n. 80, p. 279. 
236 HRN, 'The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Unity of the Church.' Theology Today 3 (1946), 
pp. 371-384; Reprinted in Theology Today 60/2 (1983), pp. 150-157; and also in Theology, 
History and Culture. William Stacy Johnson, ed., New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996, pp. 
50-62. 
237 John D. Godsey, The Promise o/H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., pp. 99-100. 
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The theological standpoint from which I shall endeavor to view these [missionary] 
motives is Trinitarian, that is to say, it is neither Christocentric, nor spiritualistic, nor 
creativistic, but all of these at once. In this sense it seeks to be theocentric. I seek to 
understand as one who believes in God, the Father, the Almighty Creator of heaven 
and earth and in Jesus Christ his Son, who for us men and our salvation was incarnate, 
was crucified, raised from the dead and reigns with the Father as one God, and in the 
Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son (from the Father as much as 
from the Son), and who is the immanent divine principle not only in the church but in 
the world created and governed by God.m 
What seems to emerge from this and from the other scattered references in 
his writings, is that within what he claims is a broadly Trinitarian framework, 
Niebuhr's enduring emphasis is on the unity of God in which a strongly 
monarchical element comes to the fore. In his class lectures he gives the 
descriptive label 'patro-centred Trinitarians' to those theologians whom he 
considers to have a broadly similar approach to his own theocentric orientation, 
namely, Augustine, Calvin and Jonathan Edwards.239 In the same lecture, 
Niebuhr asks rhetorically, 'Why isn't HRN a Unitarian?' to which he replies, 'I 
am - but [I'm] also a Trinitarian!' These personal confessions bring us back to 
one of the bedrock affirmations that Niebuhr refuses to let go, the basically 
monotheistic belief of Judaism that God is sovereign. Niebuhr invests so much 
in this concept that a strain is continually placed upon his attempts to hold both 
theocentricity and Trinity together, and the way in which he tries to do so, by 
means of the radical monotheism incarnate in and mediated by Jesus Christ, 
presents some possibly Christological, and certainly, pneumatological 
inadequacies which he seemed either unwilling or unable to resolve. Hence we 
can concur with the insights of both Frei240 and Hoedemake~41 that Niebuhr, 
though making claim to the Trinity as his fundamental theological framework, 
never quite convinces that this is indeed the case. The main reason would 
appear to be that his methodology, which is a unique combination of neo-
238 HRN, 'An Attempt at a Theological Analysis of Missionary Motivation,' Occasional 
Bulletinfrom the Missionary Research Library [New York] 14, 1 (1963), pp. 1·6, p. 1 
239 HRN, 'Introduction to Theological Studies,' Yale Divinity School, 31 October 1960, notes 
transcribed by Beth Keiser, a student in Niebuhr's class. 
240 Frei, 'The Theology ofH. Richard Niebuhr,' op. cit., pp. 94·104. 
241 Hoedemaker, op. cit., pp. 108·114. 
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Kantian, historicist, moral and social existentialist elements, severely 
compromises any efforts to understand God's inner being. From the outset, 
therefore, and in principle, Niebuhr is only left with the option of exploring 
certain dimensions of God's actions ad extra, the so-called 'economic Trinity', 
that is, the history of God's actions in relation to the creation. He can therefore 
say little about a subject that has exercised some of the greatest minds in classic 
Christian thinking: the relation between, and, indeed, identity of, God as 
'economic' and also 'immanent' Trinity. 
Perhaps it is best, therefore, to finish this section by attending to Niebuhr's 
own words on the matter, reflecting as they do, his own characteristically 
restrained appeal to the Trinity, together with his emphasis on the unity of God, 
and also his hints that the doctrine as historically stated, does not quite resonate 
with the deepest existential tendencies of contemporary life. He writes: 
If the long story of the Trinitarian debate in Christendom is to be re-enacted in our 
present time its outcome may result in somewhat different formulations from those of 
the past, but scarcely in a substantive change of the affirmation that God is One and 
that however the doctrine of the Personae is stated it must still be affirmed that the 
Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Father and the Spirit cannot be equated 
with either.242 
7. Conclusion 
It finally remains, therefore, to draw the various stands of this chapter together. 
We have been considering Niebuhr's mature work from an evangelical 
perspective, that is to say, in the twofold sense, firstly, of carrying out an 
exposition of the subject matter that deals primarily with the good news of 
God's saving work in Jesus Christ, and secondly, of assessing this against the 
mainstream position of the classic evangelical tradition, that is, one which has 
242 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, p. 45. 
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its roots in Biblical, Nicean, Cha1cedonian and Refonnation discourse. What do 
we make of Niebuhr's work in this perspective so defined? 
Niebuhr's reflections, it would appear, are at their best and most persuasive, 
in tenns of addressing some areas of the work of God in Jesus Christ. His chief 
focus here is on soteriology as a matter of how human faithlessness, in its 
various fonns, is transfonned into radical faithfulness, in which Jesus Christ is 
the incarnation and mediator of such a 'materially decisive' saving conversion. 
He depicts this change with great impressionistic power in such a way that the 
reader literally feels caught up in the existential transition being thus described. 
As such, Niebuhr has surely contributed something of lasting value to the 
evangelical presentation of what is meant by 'saving faith' in Christian 
discourse, especially in its deployment of such basic interpersonal dispositions 
of trust and loyalty. To this extent, his is a noteworthy demonstration of the 
theologia crucis tradition. 
But the very strength of this also hints at some of its inadequacies as well. 
Niebuhr's heavy investment in the currency of social existentialism, together 
with his relative neglect of the value that others have found in the more 
classical doctrinal tradition, arguably yields a lower return in tenns of such 
crucial evangelical themes as pneumatology and 'Theology' proper, that is, the 
Christian understanding of God as Trinity. Niebuhr is not entirely lacking in his 
treatment of these particular aspects of the gospel, but his work in these areas is, 
as we have seen, underdeveloped at best, and reductionist at worst. As regards 
the theme of Christology, it is perhaps wiser to record a more provisional and 
open-ended verdict. Niebuhr's emphasis is more on the 'work' of Christ than 
the 'person' but, in his distinctively innovative 'pistological' and 'moral' 
depictions, he does give us, I believe, something approaching an 'adequate 
identifying description' of Jesus and therefore may well meet most of the 
important criteria for a proper and productive Christology. 
If Niebuhr's questions to the great evangelical tradition of the Church have 
to do with wondering whether it does well enough in relating the good news of 
Christ to the existential exigencies of contemporary humanity, the challenge 
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running the other way is whether Niebuhr's work has finally let the anguish of 
his existential concerns partially eclipse or mute the full ramifications of that 
'triumph of grace' which the Triune God has definitively established in Jesus 
Christ. 
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Chapter Three: An Ethical Perspective 
1. Root Metaphors: A Critique of Two Traditional Theories 
In his Christian Ethics lecture courses given in Yale over many years, Niebuhr 
nonnally undertook a historical-comparative and constructive approach to the 
study of what he called 'The Structure and Dynamics of the Moral Life' .243 In 
these he conducted an investigation of the two major classical principles which 
Christian ethical thinkers have used to understand and expound morality. 
Niebuhr spoke of how Christian ethicists mostly went about their task by 
appropriating already existing theories from elsewhere, namely, the teleological 
and deontological approaches. 'The Christian moralist is always converting a 
philosophy in his theology [and therefore] many of the disputes between 
Christian ethicists arise out of the fact that they convert different 
philosophies. ,244 
Niebuhr's procedure in his class lectures, and in his posthumously published 
ethical prolegomena, The Responsible Self, was to analyse these two major 
approaches, noting that within each one there were many varying versions or 
types. In brief compass, his main insights on each can be articulated by making 
use of what he called 'root metaphors' or 'symbolic fonns' ,245 Since Niebuhr's 
use of these cognate tenns are of vital importance to the exposition and 
interpretation of his ethics, it is important to briefly consider them at this point 
of our thesis. 
'What is' he asks, 'the general idea in such interpretation of ourselves as 
symbolic more that as rational animals? It is, I believe, this: that we are far 
243 HRN, 'Christian Ethics Lecture Notes., 1946-47; 1952-53; 1953-54; 1961-62. 
244 HRN, 'Christian Ethics Lecture Notes', 1946-47, p. 5. 
245 Niebuhr was influenced in this regard by Stephen Pepper's 'root metaphor' theory of 
metaphysical reflection and Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of 'symbolic forms'. See Stephen 
Pepper, World Hypotheses, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1961 and Ernst Cassirer, 
An Essay on Man, Garden City, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953. Of significance here too to 
Niebuhr was Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, 
trans. W. R. Trask, New York, Oxford University Press, 1953, esp. chapter 1. 
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more image-making and image-using creatures that we usually think ourselves 
to be and, further, that our processes of perception and conception, of 
organizing and understanding the signs that come to us in our dialogue with the 
circumambient world, are guided and formed by images in our minds. ,246 Our 
languages, no less than any other part of our lives, are shaped by, and 
manifestations of, this same phenomenon. 'And so with metaphysics the root-
metaphors of generating substance, of the republic, of the organism, of the 
machine, of the event, and of the mathematical system have exercised a deep-
going influence on the construction of the great systems which those great 
artists, the metaphysical philosophers, have set before us as images of being 
itself. ,247 
Man as language-user, man as thinker, man as interpreter of nature, man as artist, 
man as worshiper, seems to be always symbolic man, metaphor-using, image-making, 
and image-using man. What then about man as moral, man as deciding between goods, 
as evaluating man, as self-defining, self-creating man, as the judge of conduct in its 
rightness and wrongness? Is man in this activity also the symbolic animal? Since man 
as moral agent is present in all his activities it would seem likely that in his total 
decision-making and the administration of all his affairs he would be no less symbolic 
than he is in anyone of them. 248 
It is therefore on the basis of 'root metaphors' or 'symbolic forms' that Niebuhr 
thus proposes to analyse the moral or ethical life of the human being or social 
self. He will do so by considering the underlying image or 'synecdochic 
analogy,249 as a kind of heuristic device so as to construe the whole person 
according to one of two basic patterns: in the case of teleological ethical theory, 
"man-the-maker"; and according to deontological ethical theory, "man-the-
citizen". To each of these we briefly tum.2SO 
246 HRN, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy, New York, Harper 
and Row, 1963, pp. 151-152. 
247 Ibid., p. 153. 
248 Ibid., pp. 153-154. 
249 Ibid., p. 56. A 'synechdoche' is a figure of speech by which a part is made to comprehend 
the whole, or the whole is put for a part. 
250 Ibid., pp. 48-68, but especially here pp. 48-56. 
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In the case of teleological ethics, as exemplified in the works of Aristotle 
and Aquinas, the human being is understood according to the seemingly 
inherent characteristic of being able to fashion things so as to achieve some 
necessary or desirable end. "Man-the-maker" has the aptitude or ability to 
perform certain acts in order to achieve a particular purpose or goal. This 
intentional urge is so basic and prevalent that for many people it has become a 
persuasive, or even the most predominant way of construing the human being 
as ethical agent. 
In the case of deontological ethics, as exemplified by, among others, Kant, 
the human being is understood according to the master image of politics or 
legislation. "Man-the-citizen" considers that life is to be interpreted and lived in 
accordance with the proven necessities of organising self and society as laid 
down in laws, rules and customs. 
Within each of these basic positions there are, of course, many variations, so 
much so, that internal strife between competing teleologists and deontologists is 
a widespread and perennial occurrence. But in addition to these internal sources 
of strife, there are many points of disagreement and conflict between these two 
basic orientations themselves. As Kliever puts it in an admirable summary: 
"Man-the-maker" theories of ethics help make sense of human freedom and historical 
change in moral action, but they underestimate the facticities of life and the importance 
of the human past. They do not fully perceive how life stubbornly resists human 
design, nor do they understand the impact of the past on present and future experience. 
As a consequence, teleological theories do not adequately account for the place of 
guilt, tragedy and character in the moral life. "Man-the-citizen" ethics clarify the 
importance of objectivity and impartiality in moral judgment and offer a clear rationale 
for moral instruction and discipline. But they reflect even less awareness of the 
temporality and solidarity of moral existence than do teleological accounts. 
Consequently, deontological theories offer little illumination of anxiety, freedom and 
change in the moral1ife.2S1 
2Sl Lonnie D. Kliever, op. cit., p. 117. 
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Both of these venerable theories have, of course, served humanity well. 
They have given reflective shape and substance to the ethical existence of 
numerous individuals and communities throughout history, and doubtless will 
continue to do so. But Niebuhr also asks us to notice their inadequacies as well: 
the inconsistencies and contradictions within the varied sub-groups that shelter 
under each broad theory; the disagreements which arise as a result of 
fundamental differences as to whether 'goals' or 'rules' per se are the principal 
concern in ethics; the failure of each, either separately or in conjunction, to 
illuminate and address the 'moral ontology,252 oflived experience.253 
So if both "man-the-maker" and "man-the-citizen" are not fully adequate to 
the task of clarifying and guiding our ethical conduct, is there another image 
that might not entail such distortions or shortcomings? Niebuhr suggests that 
there is such an alternative theory and this he names as that of ''man-the-
answerer".254 He does not assert the absolute superiority of this third option 
over and against the two more traditional theories already mentioned, but he 
does now begin to make a persuasive case for its viability in illuminating 
certain aspects of the wholeness of our moral ontology that escape both 
teleology and deontology. This alternative theory that Niebuhr advances is what 
he calls the 'ethics of responsibilty'. In light of this image 'we think of all our 
actions as having the pattern of what we do when we answer another who 
addresses us. To be engaged in dialogue, to answer questions addressed to us, to 
defend ourselves against attacks, to reply to injunctions, to meet challenges -
this is a common experience. And now we try to think of all our actions as 
having this character of being responses, answers, to actions upon us. ,255 
It is Niebuhr's belief that this ethical theory corresponds more fully to the 
reality of moral experience than do the other alternative theories since these 
tend, in their differing ways, to abstract from the actual contextual dynamics of 
2S2 The phrase 'moral ontology' is one used by Charles Taylor and later borrowed by John 
Webster in his work on Karl Barth. See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 8; John Webster, 
Barth 's Ethics of Reconciliation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 215. 
253 Kliever, op. cit., p. 116; HRN, The Responsible Self, pp. 56-60. 
254 HRN, The Responsible Self, p. 56. 
2S5lbid. See also Albert R. Jonsen, Responsibility in Modern Religious EthiCS, Washington, 
Corpus Books, 1968. For Jonsen on Niebuhr's ethics, see pp. 132-152. 
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life. Furthennore, the ethics of responsive relations seem to make more sense of 
the so-called 'limit experiences' that people often encounter in which personal 
sufferings and social emergencies call seriously into question the prominence or 
predominance of the pursuit of goals or the obedience of rules. 'Because 
suffering is the exhibition of the presence in our existence of that which is not 
under our control, or of the intrusion into our self-legislating existence of an 
activity operating under another law than ours, it cannot be brought adequately 
within the spheres of teleological and deontological ethics, the ethics of man-
the-maker, or man-the-citizen. Yet it is in the response to suffering that many 
and perhaps all men, individually and in their groups, define themselves, take 
on character, develop their ethos. ,256 
Niebuhr is nudging his argument in the direction of what might be called 
'greater coherence': that is, he is arguing for what he believes to be the greater 
applicability and flexibility of his theory of responsibility than is possible with 
either the theories of teleological or deontological ethics. Indeed, he goes as far 
as to suggest that the ethics of responsibility can overcome some of the 
inadequacies of these two theories, and perhaps also combine some of their 
strengths in a new or more comprehensive 'third way'. The trajectory of this 
argument would seem to be borne out when he writes: 
If we use value terms then the differences among the three approaches may be 
indicated by the terms, the good. the right and the jitting; for teleology is concerned 
always with the highest good to which it subordinates the right; consistent deontology 
is concerned with the right. no matter what may happen to our goods; but for the ethics 
of responsibility the jitting action, the one that fits into a total interaction as response 
and as anticipation of further response. is alone conducive to the good and alone is 
right.m 
256 HRN, The Responsible Self, op. cit., p. 60. 
2S7 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
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2. An Alternative Metaphor: The Responsible Self 
At perhaps the crucial juncture in his Christian Ethics lectures at Yale in 1952-
53, Niehuhr wrote that 'we should think of life as more than movement to a 
goal, as more than obedience to law; we should think of it also as response to 
action. ,258 This third perspective seeks to offer and explore what he considers to 
be the most adequate root metaphor at work in both the Biblical narrative and in 
contemporary life. 'In Scripture we read of divine activity in history. The 
important thing to be said is not that we have a law to obey or an end to 
achieve, but that God is acting. Ours is to be acting with the hope of responding 
to his action. This is something we ought to do; however we do it. The law and 
gospel are so related to each other that insofar as we see divine action, we 
respond to it. The response is not so much a goal or an obligation as it is an 
actuality. ,259 
The master metaphor and the key term in Niebuhr's own proposal is thus 
that of 'response-ability or responsibility; we should not think of it as it is used 
in legal terminology, but rather think of it as it is on the face of it: the ability to 
respond. ,260 As Niebuhr reminds us, this response-ability can take various 
forms: these he labels as the mechanical; the habitual or conditioned; and the 
command. But the one which interests him most, and which he proposes to 
explore. is what he calls 'the free level' of response. 'Man is unique because of 
his ability to answer, an ability which is within himself: when [one] does 
respond freely, it is not part of the self, but the whole self; it is not the society 
commanding, nor is it conditioning. It is free.'261 In short, Niebuhr's chosen 
designation for the human being as ethical agent is that of 'the responsible self. 
In the Introduction to this thesis, we noted the following statement: 'The 
idea or pattern of responsibility, then, may summarily and abstractly be defined 
258 HRN. 'Christian Ethics Lecture Notes', transcribed by his students, Yale 1952-53, p. 97. 
2S91bid. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid., p. 98. 
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as an agent's action as response to an action upon him in accordance with his 
interpretation of the latter action and with his expectation of response; and all of 
this in a continuing community of agents. ,262 Four main points of interest are 
ventured in this succinct definition, one which Niebuhr feels is both applicable 
to life in general, and, also. specifically. to the field of Christian ethics. In 
general terms. these are the elements of (1) responsiveness; (2) interpretation; 
(3) accountability and (4) social solidarity. 
In more specifically theological terms we can expound this definition of 
responsibility somewhat more precisely. (1) There is the affirmation that God is 
the determining reality of. in. and for life; an assertion or presupposition that 
finds classic expression in the scriptural phrase 'The LORD reigns' also 
rendered in theologies of a reformation type as 'The sovereignty of God'. We 
are called to respond to God's prevenient action upon us. (2) We understand 
ourselves as those within the creaturely realm who have the capacity for 
reasoned response. and not just reflex reaction or conditioned behaviour; this 
results from our interpretation of what God's address to us. or action upon us 
involves and implies. (3) We can say that this dialogue or relation between God 
and ourselves is a living and ongoing one in which we may expect or anticipate 
that God will have yet more things to say and do which will constitute new or 
surprising elements in the unfolding of his loving will for us. With the aid of the 
metaphor of responsibility, God's creative fidelity can be conceived as 
involving elements of both his divine predetermination in relation to us, shaping 
and sustaining our human self-determination but in such a way that his further 
actions may be adjusted in accordance with our answering response. God's 
loving sovereignty does not negate but engages in, a reciprocal relation with 
humans. Many aspects of prayer would, in fact, be meaningless without this 
notion.263 This dialectical situation implies that there is a large degree of 
accountability in our past, present and future dealings with God and each other. 
(4) We attain this ability to interpret and thus fittingly respond. not just as 
isolated individuals but rather as members of a community whose experience, 
262 HRN, The Responsible Self, op. cit., p. 65. 
263 George Hunsinger, 'Double Agency as a Test Case,' in How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape 
of His Theology, op. cit., pp. 185-224. 
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language and reason are continuing resources of help and guidance in the 
hermeneutical task. We interpret the signs of Divine Action upon us in a 
personal manner which is profoundly indebted to, and embedded in, a social 
and communal matrix. The Scriptures, and subordinately, the subsequent 
history of Christian witness and reflections, act as the 'community of 
interpretation' as we attempt to discern God's activity and respond 
appropriately. 
For Niebuhr, then, responsibility affirms that 'God is acting in all actions 
II . d h' . ,264 upon you. So respond to a actIons upon you as to respon to IS actIon. 
Philosophically speaking, this seems to hint strongly at monism, especially as 
understood in its rationalist and Stoic forms.26s In theological terms, it is what 
we have been referring to throughout as monotheism, or, in Niebuhr's preferred 
terminology, 'radical monotheism'. But, of course, such monotheism can be 
interpreted in various ways. One extreme way is to interpret God's action in 
such a one-sidedly mechanistic way as to introduce an overwhelming sense of 
fatalism such that God is entirely past and has no real living relation to either 
the present or the future. Certain types of Islamic and Christian theology, the 
latter, especially in some of its Augustinian-Calvinistic forms, can be said to 
illustrate this tendency. At the opposite end of the monistic or monotheistic 
spectrum are the more extreme versions of eschatology where God's action is 
so stressed in terms of what has yet to happen in the future that human life 
becomes almost predominantly the passive stance of waiting 'the final 
alteration of things. While the fatalistic view makes God all past, this view 
makes him all future and alive only at the eschaton.' For Niebuhr, however, in 
contrast, 'God's action is neither mechanistic nor finalistic, but vitalistic. ,266 
But this then begs the question of what form or forms God's action actually 
does take in relation to creation, its creatures, and within this environment, 
human beings? Are there certain patterns which might be discerned and 
264 HRN, The Responsible Self, p. 126. 
265 Richard E. Crouter, 'H. Richard Niebuhr and Stoicism,' The Journal of Religious Ethics 2, 
1974, pp. 124-146. 
266 HRN, 'Christian Ethics Lecture Notes, op. cit., p. 100. These descriptive categories may 
strike one as being rather too simple and sweeping, and are perhaps better taken as broad 
interpretive schemata. 
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partially described as we consider the question of how God interacts with us? 
Placing his own views within the context of some other proposals Niebuhr 
writes that 'we cannot say that God lets his world to the determination of law 
and whimsy, or that He enters in only occasionally with exceptional miracles 
[and] supernatural events. Some would limit God's action to events in the 
Scriptures, to the incarnation and to conversions. However, I would say that we 
are confronted with finite agencies and in them we are confronted with the 
intention and the ordering of intentions by the Infinite. To say that one part and 
it only is the working of God is to think of God as a finite being. We must look 
at the whole; the meaning of the Passion and of the action of Judas cannot be 
known simply by looking at the action of Judas, or at the action of Peter, or 
even solely at the action of Jesus Christ. There is one pattern to salvation; what 
God is doing can be known only through the whole plan. ,267 
Once again, then, we are finding evidence of Niebuhr's perennial refrain, 
namely, that God's intentions and actions all have a unity of purpose. 
'Christianity asserts the presence of the one in the many; it asserts that there is a 
''uni-verse''. God is one and is acting; we must see this to get the view, lest we 
first fight this devil and then adore that deity - seeing no connection between 
this and that. ,268 Niebuhr makes extensive and repeated reference here, and 
elsewhere in his corpus, to the insights of the so-called 'Second Isaiah' where 
the unity of God's actions within history, especially as it involves Israel, is 
given perhaps its most profound expression in the Old Testament; an 
interpretation which the New Testament only serves to reinforce by 
concentrating its reflections upon the person and work of Jesus Christ within 
this monotheistic framework. This is, in effect, Niebuhr's call for us to refuse to 
succumb to fragmented, partial or imbalanced interpretations of divine activity. 
Instead, he asks us to 'use a larger hypothesis to explain all things: God is 
acting as Creator, as King and as Savior.'269 
267 Ibid., p. 100. 
268 Ibid., p. 103. 
269 Ibid., p. 101. Note again the close affmities with Brueggemann who argues that Israel's 
normative interpretive strategy in its canonical testimony 'is organized around an active verb 
that bespeaks an action that is transformative. intrusive. or inverting.' Israel's 'God-talk' is 
therefore characteristically rendered in Hebrew such that God's action is depicted in active, 
causative verbs in the hiph 'iI stem, and his presence expressed in 'nominal sentences, sentences 
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One might want to question whether Niebuhr's choice of the word 'explain' 
was just a bit too ambitious in the above quotation, but that aside, what is clear 
is that Niebuhr is arguing strongly for an interpretation which stresses the unity 
of divine intention and activity. In the varied multiplicity of what we encounter 
and experience 'we must respond to each action as a part of a whole: not as a 
particular action, but in the totality of actions' in which God's action is believed 
to be one.270 Such belief is uniquely and decisively shaped by the Bible, which 
Niebuhr describes as being 'the classic manual'; a 'dictionary' or 'grammar' to 
help us understand the ways of God.271 It should also be noted that Niebuhr 
considers certain other writings which are chronologically subsequent to the 
Bible, as having an important, if derivative status, in this hermeneutical task of 
'the continuing community' which consciously seeks to live in relation to 
God.272 
As noted earlier, Niebuhr interpreted the divine action in terms of God being 
Creator, King and Saviour. Such terminology, which, of course, was already 
part of the social discourse of the context in which the biblical authors lived and 
wrote, serves as the means by which 'we understand and communicate' but 
does so, as Niebuhr notes, in the form of 'metaphors, parables, symbols and 
even allegories.'273 This 'hermeneutical realism' allows us to interpret the 
ongoing relation of God's action and our 'fitting' response in tenns which 
Niebuhr himself used in his Yale lectures over many years: namely, response to 
the Creative, Governing and Redemptive Action of God. These categories mean 
much the same as the three ones used at the start of this paragraph and will be 
used hereafter as we study them in more detail in the remaining sections of this 
chapter. It is crucial to note, however, that these terms do not represent 
divisions or separations, but rather distinctions within God's unified action. Nor 
without verbs' which nonetheless imply or infer divine activity, see Waiter Brueggemann, 
Theology of the Old Testament, op. cit., pp. 123fT. See also Thomas F. Tracy, God. Action and 
Embodiment, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1984. 
270 HRN, Christian Ethics Lectures, op. cit., p. 103. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid. For an excellent discussion of such issues see George Hunsinger, 'Beyond Literalism 
and Expressivism: Kart Barth's Hermeneutical Realism', in Disruptive Grace: Studies in the 
Theology of Karl Barth, op. cit., pp. 210-225. 
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are they to be understood primarily as successive chronological stages, rather, 
they are best seen as simultaneous aspects of divine activity where there is 
believed to be a mutual coinherence of God as Creator, Governor and 
Redeemer.274 
3. Response to the Redeeming Action of God 
The point of putting this aspect before the analysis of God's creative and 
governing action is that, following Fowler's similar line of argument, we do not 
have to repeat in exhaustive detail this whole area of Niebuhr's work since it 
has already been covered in the previous two chapters where we looked at his 
the%gia crucis from both an existential and an evangelical perspective. That 
earlier work is now able to pay us a nice dividend at this point of the thesis. In 
developing a theology, rather than trying to philosophically adopt an explicitly 
apologetic procedure, which would be addressed to the posture of unbelief, we 
can posit the fact that God in Christ does act redemptive/y, and we can therefore 
allow that presupposition or disposition of faith to work back with transforming 
effect upon our analysis of what is involved in responding to God's creative and 
governing actions.27s One might observe that this is how the biblical authors 
worked: they reasoned that God's redemptive actions were already to be 
trusted, and therefore, on this presupposition were able and willing to affirm 
God's creative and governing actions as distinct aspects of one divine process. 
In temporal tenns, it is of course more correct to treat these aspects in the order 
of response to God's creative, governing and redemptive actions, but viewed 
another way, the way of biblically-informed faith, the knowledge that God is 
the Redeemer, has arguably deeper and more far-reaching consequences than 
274 Fowler suggests several influences on Niebuhr's use of these three depictions of divine 
character and agency. Briefly stated: Luther, Edwards, Troeltsch and Macintosh inform his 
ideas about 'God as the source of all being and norm of all valuing'; Tillich (structural motif) 
and Whitehead (process motif), together with elements of Marxist philosophy of history help 
shape his interpretation of God as 'the intentional structure in the processes of reality'; and the 
biblical witness of Old and New Testament is fundamental to his construal of God's redeeming 
nature and activity as well as helping shape his ideas about divine creative and governing 
action. Further discussion of these issues would take us well beyond this thesis: see Fowler, op, 
cit., pp. 134-140. 
m Fowler. To See the Kingdom, op. cit., p. 156. 
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any other aspect or perspective of belief. Furthermore, since we are seeking to 
develop throughout this thesis, an approach which takes as its leading motif the 
theologia crucis, then we are further constrained or obliged to view God's 
creative and governing actions from the standpoint of faith in the God who is 
decisively and definitively encountered in the crucifixion, resurrection and 
ascension of Jesus Christ. As always, such faith is crucial: that is, it is both 
centred on the crucified Christ, and absolutely necessary to any further insights 
which may be derived from this locus. 
In brief, what we saw in the two previous chapters was how Niebuhr offers a 
compelling and persuasive analysis of the faith of the social self. Our 
primordial relation to God is that of faith: that is, the divine intention for us is 
that we relate to God as our sole trustworthy value centre and supremely 
worthwhile common cause. Somehow, a surd posits itself in this relation. In 
biblical terms there is a 'fall into sin', which, in Niebuhrian terms, is described 
as 'the faithlessness of the social self. The two main manifestations of this are 
what we called 'the broken faith of the social self where trust is radically 
shattered into such various phenomena as anger, fear or evasion in relation to 
God; and 'the misplaced faith of the social self where loyalty becomes 
diseased in its attachment to various deceptive value centres and their attendant 
causes in what are known as the false forms of idolatrous faith called 
polytheism and henotheism. 
There is no prospect of self-salvation from this dreadful and drastic plight. 
Humanity would be doomed to destruction within this vicious circle were it not 
for the fact, attested in the Scriptures, that God has acted definitively and 
decisively in Jesus Christ, to bring about the salvation of the human creature. 
Through the so-called 'Christ-event' God has effected the reconciliation and 
redemption of humanity, an action which Niebuhr understands in terms of 
salvation as 'pistological transformation', namely, 'the reconstruction of broken 
faith' and 'the redirection of misplaced faith'. This change or conversion is the 
evangelical reality and perspective made possible by God's saving action in the 
crucified, risen and ascended Jesus who, as 'the incarnation and mediator of 
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faith' enables human beings to live by renewed faithfulness in the interpersonal 
interactions of trust and loyalty. 
Niebuhr has thus presented us with a series of images of the human being 
which we may state conceptually as successively: the divinely-intended or 
primordial social self which lives faithfully by trust and loyalty; the social self 
fallen into existential faithlessness; and the social self transformed by God's 
grace in Jesus Christ to a position of renewed faithfulness whenever it 
'participates in the present passion' by metanoia in a kind of 'Christo-morphic 
cruciformity' .276 The next image in that series is now offered as the would-be 
faithful self, or, as is appropriate to the ethical perspective being offered here, 
'the responsible self. Since 'the social self' becomes 'the faithful self' through 
God's redeeming act in Christ, and is now to be understood as 'the responsible 
self', we will analyse further what it means to respond in faith to God's creative 
and governing, as well as redeeming actions. 
4. Response to the Creative Action of God 
'We are now at the subject of the creative action of God and of the human response to 
it in faith. We might begin by seeing that the moral life has a basis in the aesthetic. We 
often separate the beautiful, the true and the good, and consequently aesthetics, religion 
and ethics. The distinction of ethics and religion, made since the eighteenth century. is 
false. Religion is not merely sacred rites; neither is the ethical merely utilitarian 
behavior. The aesthetic, similarly, is not something we do occasionally. It is not "art 
for art's sake," nor is beauty something kept in a museum. The most memorable people 
generally have a quality we might call aesthetic ... It is a matter of what we value and 
consider important. A value is that which we consider important enough to respond to. 
276 More detailed discussion of the term 'Christo-morphic' will be found in section 6 of this 
current ethical chapter; more detail on the meaning of the cognate phrases 'participation in the 
present passion' and 'cruciformity' will be given in section 5 of the fourth chapter on Niebuhr's 
ecc1esiology. 
277 HRN, Christian Ethics Lecture Notes, pp. 104 -105. 
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Thus, Niebuhr initiates his ethical reflections on this particular aspect of 
God's unified though differentiated action: response to the creative action of 
God. As will soon become clear, Niebuhr has little or no interest in questions of 
how exactly God may have created; one will search his writings in vain for an 
exegetical analysis of the literal factuality or otherwise of the biblical creation 
accounts in the first two chapters of Genesis. Niebuhr never seeks to be a 
cosmologist in any comprehensive sense of the tenn. Instead, employing 
something like the 'henneneutical realism' which Hunsinger advocates as a 
more satisfactory alternative to either 'literalism' or 'expressivism' ,278 Niebuhr 
is quite content to follow the main thrust of the biblical witness, and subsequent 
theological reflection, in accepting, as a presupposition, that God is the Creator 
of all that is. He therefore acknowledges God to be 'the source of being'; 'the 
center of value' and 'the norm of valuing': the One in relation to whom all 
things may be considered to be valuable since God has willed them into 
existence and therefore affinns his desire for them to be. Within this 'divine 
commonwealth t there is the intention and expectation that human beings, who 
themselves are valued by their creator, will also be valuing creatures. 
'Yet we must recognize' observes Niebuhr, 'that our response to these [other 
beings] is a response in sin, in perverted faith. We must speak of our sinfulness, 
which has perverted our emotions. We have a perverted selectivity of what is 
important. We say, "This seems important; that is unimportant; I will heed the 
important and the beautiful and avoid the ugly, the unimportant." And we do 
this in a personal sort of way: we look for our own creativity and action in the 
things about us. We deal with other people as reflections of ourselves. How am 
I mirrored in them? What influence am I having on them?,279 Niebuhr mentions 
the relation of parents to their children; pastors to their parishioners; teachers to 
their students and statesmen to their citizens as examples of this attitude. 'We 
want to say, "I have been here!" It is ... as Luther put it in his famous quote 
278 George Hunsinger, 'Beyond Literalism and Expressivism: Kart Barth's Hermeneutical 
Realism,' op. cit., pp. 210-225. 
279 HRN, Christian Ethics Lectures, op. cit., p. 105. 
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about us being turned in upon ourselves in self-regarding or self-centred 
sinfulness. ,280 
We may summarize Niebuhr's reflections thus far, on the subject of 
response to the creative action of God, by saying that in faith or faithfulness, we 
consider other beings because of their intrinsic value to God, but that in 
contrast, in our perennial tendency to faithlessness we relate to other beings on 
the basis of their supposed instrumental value to us, a stance that is basically 
utilitarian and self-centred, whether that be in terms of 'self-love' or 'group-
love' .281 As Niebuhr poignantly concludes: 'Ultimately behind inhumanity is a 
lack of the aesthetic. ,282 
Thankfully, however, a better alternative is also available, one to which the 
biblical witness, in particular, attests. 'The Christian response is quite different 
from those which we have been condemning ... Man is of more value than the 
sparrows, but the value of the sparrows is asserted. The reason they are to be 
valued and appreciated is not because they have a human source or because 
they can be used to any human end. They are valuable because they are the 
product of the infinite Creator. When we think of Christians, we think of grace, 
of a sort of graciousness. ,283 Several names are summoned as examples of this 
kind of gracious value for God's works of creation, among whom Augustine 
and Jonathan Edwards seem to stand highest in Niebuhr's estimate of what a 
non-utilitarian ethic might be like. Edwards is commended for his insight that 
'the participation of a thing in Being is the highest criterion of value and 
appreciation.284 And Augustine is applauded for his affirmation that 'Whatever 
is, is good' by virtue of the very fact that God is its creator and valuer.285 
An important distinction begins to emerge here, in which Niebuhr draws our 
attention to the differences between two common terms of evaluation, namely 
'the good' and 'the right'. As Niebuhr states it: 'Whatever is, is good: this is the 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid., p. 106. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Ibid., p. 107. 
28S Ibid., p. 106. 
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Biblical statement. Whatever is, is right: this is the statement of conservatives, 
which fail[s] to see that truly things are, though good, in a wrong relation to one 
another ... No matter in what form one states the Christian ethics, one must see 
that Whatever is, is good; but Whatever is, is not right. ,286 What Niebuhr 
evidently wants to communicate is a sense that the underlying themes of the 
biblical narrative should be acknowledged, notably that God's creation is good; 
that a particular part of that creation has fallen in sin, manifesting itself in a 
complex network of wrong and perverted relations; yet also that God the Father 
is at work to redeem this condition through his Son, Jesus Christ. However, 
Niebuhr is also at pains to ensure that an appropriate balance is maintained, as 
indeed the biblical witness does, between God as creator and redeemer, thus 
giving a due sense of proportion, something that has not always been the case 
with certain theological traditions or individuals, especially those which all too 
easily denigrate or ignore, the creative action of God. 
What then of the actual response that we make, given that we are now in a 
position to presuppose God's creative action? If, in agreement with the biblical 
witness and the Christian tradition at its best, we reflect upon this issue from the 
perspective of faith, as those who are being changed by the 'metanoia' (a 
favourite Niebuhrian term) initiated and sustained by Jesus Christ, what then 
does such responsibility entail? According to Niebuhr, this metanoia 'turns us 
from looking for our own creation to the appreciation of ever-fresh reality' a 
'response of love ... that seems to take place in stages; [ or] if not in stages, at 
least, [having] several aspects. ,287 These 'stages' or 'aspects' are what Niebuhr 
identifies as acceptance; affirmation; understanding; cultivation and mimesis or 
imitation.288 To each of these we now turn. 
Niebuhr begins his reflections on the transformation that our value responses 
undergo as a consequence of faith in Christ by speaking of acceptance: 
'acceptance is not enjoyment, but it is a far cry from despair' .289 This means 
that some of the feelings that often threaten or diminish life, be it in relation to 
286 Ibid., p. 108. 
287 Ibid., p. 109. 
288 Ibid., pp. 109ff. 
289 Ibid. 
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ourselves or to other beings, are questioned and qualified. Acceptance breaks 
the strangleholds that pride, despair and frustration may place upon us. I may 
not like something or someone else; I may well be unhappy with various things 
about myself; but in acceptance I learn to live with and within the 
circumstances that currently prevail. 
'After the stage of acceptance comes affirmation: one can say of the 
Christian ethos - that it is not ethics, but ethos, the Christian attitude to things -
that it is a world-affirmation: it asserts, what is, ought to be! It is to be 
affirmed. ,290 The reason for this is that the sense of distrust, which we explored 
back in the chapter on faithlessness from an existential perspective, is now 
being turned in the direction of trust or confidence, which cannot help but issue 
in attitudes, and therefore also actions, of affirmation and creative intent. We 
decide to bring children into a world, even though we know there are hazards to 
confront. We recognize that our 'enemy', ifhe is to be understood as such in 
certain circumstances, is nonetheless willed and created by God, even if we are 
as yet unable to achieve reconciliation. We confront the fact that in the labour 
or prison camps of brutal regimes, there are some who still seek to affirm and 
conserve life as valuable and worthwhile. 'Even at the extremities, perhaps 
there most of all, conservatism is of value. ,291 
'The next stage or aspect after affinnation is understanding. ,292 Going 
beyond the mere acceptance that something exists; or even the notion that this 
other being ought to be affirmed if not necessarily loved; there is the 
willingness to say: 'let me look at it; let me try to understand it. ,293 As Niebuhr 
acknowledges, the change of attitude from what often comes naturally to us, 
especially in circumstances of hostility or suspicion, 'is indeed laborious; it 
requires struggle to think the thoughts of the Creator after him. ,294 What 
Niebuhr clearly has in mind here, is a perspective on knowledge which is less 
like 'the Baconian' one, where knowledge is power which is then bent to some 
290 Ibid., p. 110. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid., p. 111. 
293 Ibid. 
29<4 Ibid. 
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instrumental use; and one more like what he calls 'the Newtonian (the 
Keplerian) which says: there is a ratio in the world; what a wonderful world this 
is; therefore, let us think. the thoughts of God after Him; because they are good, 
let man try to understand them. ,295 An obvious instance of this perspective is 
the folly, and perhaps, therefore, tragedy involved, in not seeking to understand 
the contextual causes and consequences of human attitudes and actions. Those 
who will not learn from history are all the more likely to repeat its, perhaps 
preventable, mistakes. The modem phenomenon of terrorism is an apt example 
here. 
'Beyond understanding is cultivation. ,296 Making reference to the two 
creation accounts in Genesis, Niebuhr picks up a strand of insight from the 
second of these when he says: 'one response to the Creator is service and 
tendence of his creatures. It is a response that work for one's self, egoistic 
work, work for some idol- be it nature, or reason - cannot be; for it does not 
serve the entelechy within the thing itself. ,297 In other words, there is a delicate 
balance to be struck between holding back to let things be, and also the right 
sort of intervention which one discerns to be appropriate, especially as one tries 
to discern the goal or fulfilment which God intends in each case. This holistic 
ethos is well expressed by Niebuhr as follows: 'If understanding is response to 
the Creator, cultivation and tending is response to the Redeemer: tendence and 
ministration to the soul and mind as well as to the body. ,298 It is the One God 
whom we respond to, for in the faith stance that Niebuhr names radical 
monotheism, there is no ultimate separation or strife between God's creative, 
governing and redemptive actions. Using the responsibilities inherent in 
parenthood, as both an example and analogy of what he means, Niebuhr is at 
pains to stress that 'this is not to say we must tend all the tendencies [in our 
children]: it requires selectivity, elimination and transplanting. ,299 And 
extending the analogy still further he points out that '[w]hat is true in familial 
relations is true internationally ... Each community has its own entelechy, its 
295 Ibid. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid. 
299 Ibid., p. 112. 
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own genius; we should see that each community grows in its own way. Self-
determination is the way [such that our role] is to tend them and not impose 
upon them. ,300 
Finally, beyond cultivation, there is what Niebuhr, quoting Aristotle's 
Poetics, calls mimesis. 'Mimesis is imitation, but not imitation of products; it is 
rather imitation of the action of the creator or Creator. It is doing what he does 
in the way we can do it. ,301 It is possible, therefore, maybe even desirable, that 
there be a kind of 'artistry' to life, neither primarily for self-aggrandizement, 
nor in conscious rivalry to God or others. Nonetheless, we may say that 'we are 
created to be creative, to be mimetic. We must realize we are limited; we cannot 
begin with nothing; our sense of novelty is small; but we can create ... we can 
create in pride and to our destruction; or we can create in response to God, 
prayerfully: thanks be to God that creation is not complete, but that it continues 
toward us and also through us. ,302 
But, of course, Niebuhr's analysis begs further questions, not least regarding 
the value preferences that are at work as we are asked to choose from between 
various possible goods which one might serve or pursue. Anticipating such 
questions, Niebuhr considers and rejects some of the answers which are often 
offered in ethical discourse: these include 'the standard of perfection; the 
quantitative scale; the metaphysical scale; the anthropomorphic scale; the 
instrumental scale; the inclusive scale' etc.303 Niebuhr acknowledges that 
several of these are used in the Scriptures without there necessarily being any 
final systematic resolution to the question of value preference. But if there is 
one predominant criterion to be discerned in the Bible, Niebuhr suggests that it 
is what he calls the 'Divine Scale' insofar as he interprets this in a way 
consistent with, or at least, compatible with, radical monotheism.304 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid. 
302 Ibid. 
303 Ibid., pp. 114-115. 
304 Ibid., p. 116. 
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There are several 'rules' which Niebuhr discerns when one uses this divine 
scale, although it should be said that they are rather more like directions than 
directives. Briefly stated, these are as follows: (1) remember that the 
fundamental choice is not so much between good and evil as it is between a 
greater or a lesser good. (2) You need not serve yourself, for God is already 
seeing to it that your needs are being met. You are thus able to live by a kind of 
'self-forgetfulness'. (3) 'Serve that value which is in greatest need of your 
service, not that which is considered highest.' (4) 'Serve that which is at hand; 
serve the nearest.' (5) 'In all choice of value, one must remember that one is 
making a sacrifice of something sacred. Vicarious suffering is in the nature of 
things; one good thing is sacrificed to another.' It would seem that Niebuhr has 
an acute sense that even in terms of our response to the creative action of God 
there are contours consistent with a theology of the cross since this latter is not 
simply to be limited to a so-called theory of atonement but is woven into every 
aspect of the network of 'divine-human-otherkind' relations. The Christian life 
is therefore a kind of theologia crucis, as we have been expounding the matter 
throughout this thesis. 'Sacrifice is a rule of existence ... therefore, since we 
live through destruction of goods, since our lives are mixed with good and evil, 
we must offer that which we use in penance and sorrow to God and his 
glory.'30S Even creation and creativity implies and involves the cross. Luther's 
motto, 'Crux probat omnia' applies here too, for redemption and creation are 
closely and inextricably linked.306 
s. Response to the Governing Action of God 
The second subject in Niebuhr's lecture series on Christian ethics was that of 
the response to divine governance, but, as has already been explained earlier on 
in this chapter, this aspect has been held back to now since we had certain 
logical, that is to say, 'theo-Iogical' reasons for dealing first with response to 
305 Ibid. 
306 This theme will be addressed further in section 4 of the fifth chapter in this thesis where we 
will look more closely at the 'ecological' aspects of Niebuhr's ecumenical ethic. 
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God's redemptive and creative actions. 'What we are concerned with here is not 
only the fact that we have many companions to which we respond - in praise, in 
adulation, in appreciation, and also in bitterness, in condemnation and in hatred 
- but we are concerned with companions who limit our existence by their 
existence. We are finite; we not only die, but we transcend ourselves and know 
that we die; this leads to anxiety. The anxiety of which we speak is not so much 
the anxiety of those who know they have boundaries as it is the anxiety of those 
who know they are being bound. ,307 
These boundaries or limitations take many different forms. Since we and all 
our other companions are created beings, that is, are limited in terms of space 
and time, there is a mutual impingement constantly going on in the world which 
has profound, indeed, inescapable consequences for us all. As temporal 
creatures, we are born without our own consent, brought into existence by 
parents who radically condition our genetic makeup as well as the context in 
which we are nurtured. As physical creatures, we are effected by, and also 
effect in turn, the environment in which we live. As social creatures, we are 
shaped by, but also, to a lesser extent, contribute to, the ethos or culture of a 
given community, often exacerbating the self-defensiveness that one such social 
grouping feels or encourages in relation to others. As rational creatures, we are 
able to consciously reflect upon the multi-faceted experiences and aspirations 
that belong to the life of the human being, but our reason is in some ways 
limited or conditioned by passions, emotions, drives and instincts. 
Niebuhr here picks up a clue from the history of language, putting this to 
helpful use in his exploration of what it means to respond to the governing 
action of God. He reminds us that '[t]he word, suffering, originally meant 
merely, being acted upon. ,308 To live is to act upon other created beings, who 
will, in turn, act upon us. Often this will take the form of limitation or 
impingement which will be experienced and interpreted as pain, whether it be 
physical, emotional, mental, moral or social. In other words, to be human, 
means to suffer, to act upon and be acted upon by others. 
307 HRN, Christian Ethics Lectures, op. cit., p.117. 
308 Ibid., p. 118. 
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Niebuhr now puts this into the sort of context he has been expounding 
throughout his lectures on Christian ethics. 'A great deal of our moral action 
involves teleological thinking; we set up goals and then find ourselves thwarted. 
We have ideas about a profession; then, our father dies and we must take care 
of the family. We get ready to build the kingdom of God and along comes a 
world war. We have beautiful schemes for social justice and socialism, and we 
have a depression, in which those who ought to be busy bringing it to pass are 
selling apples to keep alive. Other moral action, we think of deontologically. 
We have a law, "Thou shalt not kill." But people are killed and we are faced 
with the problem of what to do with the killer. Most of our conscious moral life 
has to do with emergency situations about which our ideal ethical systems have 
nothing to say; yet our real ethic is seen in our response to these emergency 
situations. The lack of integrity, the discontinuity between study and life, 
between the ethics of Sunday and the practice of Monday, is largely due to our 
failure to see that our real ethics are those we practice in life. It is this ethics, 
the ethics we show forth in our life, about which we should talk and study. ,309 
We have already seen Niebuhr's preference for monistic rather than dualistic 
schemes of interpretation, as one would expect, given the logic of radical 
monotheism. In this regard, he expounds with great appreciation, the Stoic 
ethical tradition, implying that here, we have a greater wisdom than is possible 
in dualistic ethical theories, especially when life's emergencies impinge upon 
us. According to Niebuhr, 'The Stoic says: Stop, look and listen before you 
respond [to external aggression] with anger, fear and grief; accept the truth that 
there is reason in all things, both within and without; it is rational; you are 
rational; therefore, accept what happens to you as rational, as a rational being.' 
310 Spinoza, whom Niebuhr considers to be the greatest of the Stoics, suggests 
that 'our emotions are cleansed when we realize that we are intended; bitterness 
arises from the belief that particular events have will behind them. Further, we 
cause ourselves unnecessary anxiety when we think that other people are as 
concerned about us as we are about ourselves.' In doing so we try to 'see the 
309 Ibid., p. 119. 
310 Ibid., p.120; also Richard E. Crouter, 'H. Richard Niebuhr and Stoicism,' op. cit. 
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logos in the nature ofthings.,311 We seek to 'ascend above emotional reaction' 
to that 'intellectual love of God' in which we respond in acceptance of the field 
of interactions in which we participate. 
What Niebuhr appreciates and appropriates from Spinoza is the fundamental 
notion that 'reality is one; there is one will behind the multiplicity; we are 
dealing with one reality in all the experiences of life.,3!2 However, in Spinoza's 
system of thought, this is mostly rendered in mathematical principles. This 
prompts Niebuhr to define his own position in relation to the great Stoic thus: 
'We will use the idea of patterns, of the logos, from Spinoza, but we will hold 
that the idea of person is higher than the idea of geometry. I will not reduce 
myself to pure intelligence. I will see that there is something more characteristic 
than reason in the nature of things. The world is the Kingdom of God; God is 
King; he does something like a ruler does.'3!3 God governs his creation, a 
relation interpreted by Niebuhr more in terms of Hebraic than Greek idioms. 
'The Hebrew sees God as the counterpart, not so much of the thinking self, as 
of the moral self, the self that makes contracts, swearing to his own hurt and not 
changing.'3!4 The primary symbol to be employed here, then, is that of reality 
as being like 'a society, a kingdom, a polis, a republic.'3!5 
God's governing action is thus the 'postulate' or 'presupposition' that we 
make use of in our interpretation of life. Such divine governance involves 
several things. One is that 'God is present in judgment.,3!6 Clearly, for any 
community or society to function properly there must be some sort of moral 
standard or framework in existence. There is a necessary, even desirable truth in 
this. And yet, the idea of justice taking structural form in practices of judgement 
which must deal with instances of criminality, often leads to a hardened form of 
dualism in which punishment for wrongdoing and reward for virtue becomes 
the predominant paradigm of thought and legislation. Experience proves that in 
its more simplistic forms this leads to a reductionist understanding of human 
311 HRN, Christian Ethics Lectures, op. cit., p. 121-122. 
312 Ibid., p. 122. 
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selves and their societies. In certain religious interpretations, it is transposed 
and inflated into an eschatology of divine reward and punishment based on the 
dualism of heaven and hell. Niebuhr acknowledges the scriptural precedents for 
this but also takes note of, and clearly favours, those biblical texts which 
question the ultimate adequacy of this dualism, citing Job, Second Isaiah and 
passages in the Pauline corpus as just a few of many possible examples. 
Furthermore, the logic, both theological, and thus eschatological, of his 
radically monotheistic interpretation of God's gracious sovereignty in Jesus 
Christ, leads him to different emphases, in contrast to the dualisms mentioned 
above. 
God's governing action, therefore, does involve the will to justice or 
judgement. But as Niebuhr notes: 'The Kingdom of God is not simply justice, 
even as government is not merely the administration of law. Human 
government has many ends, not just justice: it seeks welfare, security, freedom 
etc.'317 God's governing action may thus be understood as the comprehensive 
context, the unassailable wisdom, the one will which works within, upon and 
beyond all aspects of creation, so as to order it into a form or pattern which 
corresponds to the rule and realm of God. 
'What then is the end of divine government?,318 Niebuhr offers an 
intriguing, and, at first glance, quite surprising answer to this question: 'It is the 
production of novelty.' 319 A series of biblical quotes are brought to our 
attention here in support of this view: Isaiah 42:9; 43:19; 48:6; 62:2; 65:17; 
66:22. Interestingly, biblical scholars believe that these chapters were written in 
response to some of the great emergencies through which Israel passed: the 
exile in Babylon and subsequent reconstruction of Jewish society centred at 
Jerusalem and its environs. 'Creation did not cease: "I am always bringing forth 
a new thing", says the Lord. Here in the midst of destruction, something new is 
always being brought forth. Human beings, as we know, must sometimes be 
placed upon the anvil and beaten into nobility. Persons come into being in trial 
317 Ibid., p. 124. 
318 Ibid. 
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and tribulation: Hebrews 12:6ff; Revelation 3:19. Chastening is necessary for 
creation of being. Why? God knows. But we know that suffering can be 
creative.' Niebuhr quotes approvingly the poet John Keats who reckoned that 
this world is not so much a Vale of Tears as 'the Vale ofSoul-making,.320 
As he was often fond of saying, Niebuhr regarded the Christian ethics of 
response to the governing action of God as being primarily 'emergency ethics', 
that is, 'our responses to the limitations of life' .321 He observes that most of the 
great 'devotional books' or 'classics of Christianity' deal more with 'adversity, 
poverty, torment etc, and with what to do in response to these' than striving 
after the goals of life or following some great rule.322 It is in those situations 
where people are put to the test that they 'realize what life really is all about' 
prompting us, in the process, to engage in 'rational [and] systematic 
interpretation of these same problems; namely, ethics.323 
In the introduction to this thesis, where we offered a brief sketch of 
Niebuhr's life and work, we noted that he lived through, and wrestled with, 
some of the greatest crises of the twentieth century, in particular, the second 
world war. Professional intellectual though he was, Niebuhr had anything but a 
detached and merely academic interest in these issues; if anything, he indwelt 
them with such deeply existential intensity and sensitivity that he suffered 
profoundly as a result, the most extreme manifestation being the several months 
of hospitalisation he underwent in 1944. And yet, ironically, it was his 
grappling with such contemporary crises that enabled Niebuhr to explore some 
potentially rich interpretations of these, and similar, events and experiences. 
Indeed, in Fowler's opinion: 'In his effort to discern God's action in the war, 
and to understand how Christians might respond so as to respond to God's 
action in it, Niebuhr came to a depth of insight and clarity of vision which, in 
my judgment, stand in almost direct continuity with biblical prophecy. ,324 To 
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some of these crises, and to the crucial insights that were consequently wrung 
from Niebuhr's almost tortured mind, we now turn. 
The first large-scale social crisis that evoked a public response from Niebuhr 
was the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in the early 1930's. In a celebrated 
exchange of views with his brother Reinhold, Niebuhr began to articulate the 
radically monotheistic position that was to become characteristic of his 
theology and ethics thereafter. Analysing the prevailing responses to the 
brewing international crisis, Niebuhr found flaws in each of the viewpoints 
being argued. But it is his dispute with his brother Reinhold over the 
appropriate course of action in the Manchurian crisis which is most pertinent to 
our present analysis in that it opens up some vital perspectives on their 
respective theologies of history, and, in particular, how one should interpret, 
and thus respond to, God's governing action.32s 
The main analogy that Richard Niebuhr employs in his initial article The 
Grace of Doing Nothing is that of the then contemporary communism to which 
he had recent in-depth exposure to on his trip to Europe, including Russia. 
Niebuhr characterises the inactivity of the radical Christian faith that he 
espouses as follows, in contrast to his brother Reinhold's more muscular 
interventionism: 
There is yet another way of doing nothing. It appears to be highly impracticable 
because it rests on the well nigh obsolete faith that there is a God - a real God. Those 
who follow this way share with communism the belief that the fact that men can do 
nothing constructive is no indication of the fact that nothing constructive is being done. 
Like the communists they are assured that the actual processes of history will 
inevitably and really bring a different kind of world with lasting peace. They do not 
rely on human aspirations after ideals to accomplish this end, but on forces which often 
325 HRN, 'The Grace or Doing Nothing,' The Christian Century 49, 1932, pp. 378-380; 'A 
Communication: The Only Way into the Kingdom of God,' The Christian Century 49, p. 447. 
For his brother's contribution see Reinhold Niebuhr, 'Must We Do Nothing?' The Christian 
Century 49, pp. 415-417. See also John D. Barbour, 'Niebuhr versus Niebuhr: The Tragic 
Nature of History,' The Christian Century 101,1984, pp. 1096-1099. 
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seem very impersonal ... [yetl as parts of the real world they are as much a part of the 
divine process as are human thoughts and prayers.326 
Niebuhr affirms 'the meaningfulness of reality [in that] the history of the 
world is the judgment of the world, and also its redemption.' But the austerity 
of his prophetic insight is apparent when he writes that '[t]his God of things as 
they are is inevitable and quite merciless. His mercy lies beyond, not this side 
of, judgment. ,327 However, unlike the perennial tendency of other philosophies 
or programmes, including that of communism, towards self-righteousness, 
Niebuhr argues that the type of radical Christian stance that he is 
recommending may prove to be a less moralistic alternative since its posture of 
'repentance' or rigorous 'self-analysis' will help to mitigate or eliminate just 
such an attitude. He concludes his argument in this important article thus: 
The inactivity of radical Christianity is not the inactivity of those who call evil 
good; it is the inaction of those who do not judge their neighbors because they cannot 
fool themselves into a sense of superior righteousness. It is not the inactivity of a 
resigned patience, but of a patience that is full of hope, and is based on faith. It is not 
the inactivity of the non-combatant, for it knows that there are no non-combatants, that 
everyone is involved, that China is being crucified ... by our sins and those of the 
whole world. It is not the inactivity of the merciless, for works of mercy must be 
performed though they are only palliatives to ease present pain while the process of 
healing depends on deeper, more actual and urgent forces. 
But if there is no God, or if God is up in heaven and not in time itself. it is a very 
foolish activity.m 
At the request of the editor of the Christian Century, Niebuhr's brother, 
Reinhold. was invited to write a critical response to this article in which the 
main difference that he argues for is the type of military interventionism that 
was often synonymous with his so-called 'Christian realism. ,329 But to Richard 
Niebuhr's mind, and more partiCUlarly. for the purposes of this aspect of our 
326 HRN. 'The Grace of Doing Nothing,' p. 379. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Ibid., p. 380. 
329 Reinhold Niebuhr, 'Must We Do Nothing?' The Christian Century, 49,1932. pp. 415-417. 
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thesis, the crucial question turned more on the nature of God's governing 
action. It is 'whether "the history of mankind is a perennial tragedy" which can 
derive meaning only from a goal which lies beyond history, as my brother 
maintains, or whether the "eschatological" faith, to which I seek to adhere, is 
justifiable. In that faith tragedy is only the prelude to fulfilment, and a prelude 
which is necessary because of human nature; the kingdom of God comes 
inevitably, though whether we shall see it or not, depends on our recognition of 
its presence and our acceptance of the only kind of life which will enable us to 
enter it, the life of repentance and forgiveness' .330 
Reinhold Niebuhr, in both his long-running fraternal argument with his 
brother, and the article cited above, believes that God is external to, or beyond 
the historic process, in response to which Richard tries to make his own 
position yet more clear and distinct: 
But God, I believe, is always in history, he is the structure of things, the source of all 
meaning, the "I am that I am," that which is that it is. He is the rock against which we 
beat in vain, that which bruises and overwhelms us when we seek to impose our 
wishes, contrary to his, upon him. That structure of the universe, that creative will, can 
no more be said to interfere brutally in history than the violated laws of my own 
organism can be said to interfere brutally with my life if they make me pay the cost of 
my violation. That structure of the universe, that will of God, does bring war and 
depression upon us when we bring it upon ourselves, for we live in the kind of world 
which visits our iniquities upon us and our children, no matter how much we pray and 
desire that it be otherwise.331 
In this kind of world, as Niebuhr envisages it, human self-interest will 
inevitably, if not always immediately and obviously, rebound at great and 
destructive cost. It is as though he understands God as letting certain processes 
within the created order run their destructive course, not out of vindictiveness 
330 HRN. 'A Communication: The Only Way into the Kingdom,' The Christian Century, 49, 
1932. p. 447. 
331 Ibid. Note the Tillichian overtones here, where God is likened to an almost impersonal 
unconditioned structure which (who?) nonetheless intends and acts so that righteousness will 
ultimately prevail in the historical sphere. See Fowler, op. cit., pp. 134fT. Such emphases are in 
constant tension with a more 'personalist' aspect in Niebuhr's thought, derived primarily from 
the biblical witness. 
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but out of a greater desire to let the divine righteousness be ultimately 
vindicated, and, at certain times and places, be anticipated within history as 
well. This seems to be the logic at work when Niebuhr continues: 
But this same structure in things which is our enemy is our redeemer; "it means 
intensely and means good" - not the good which we desire, but the good which we 
would desire if we were good and really wise. History is not a perennial tragedy but a 
road to fulfilment and that fulfilment requires the tragic outcome of every self-
assertion, for it is a fulfilment which can only be designated as "love." It has created 
fellowship in atoms and organisms at bitter cost to electrons and cells; and it is creating 
something better than human selfhood but at bitter cost to that selfhood. This is not 
faith in progress for evil grows as well as good and every self-assertion must be 
eliminated somewhere and somehow - by innocence suffering for guilt, it seems,.332 
The above passage demonstrates Niebuhr's sensitive appreciation of the hurt 
and pain that belongs inescapably in our relation to God, even or especially 
when faith allows one to perceive that the same God who appears at times to be 
our enemy, is really, in fact, working in gracious and tenacious ways at our 
redemption. God's governing action derives its inner logic from what we have 
throughout been calling the theologia crucis. 
A year after this celebrated exchange with his brother Reinhold, Niebuhr 
read a most remarkable paper to the American Theological Society in New 
York, on 21 st April 1932. The paper was entitled The Social Gospel and the 
Mind of Jesus. It remained unpublished throughout Niebuhr's life but, with the 
permission of his wife and son, it was edited and introduced by Diane Yeager in 
The Journal of Religious Ethics.333 In it, Niebuhr seems to have come to a new 
degree of insight and conviction about faith in God's governance as this may be 
discerned in the crucial figure for a Christian understanding of the matter, 
namely Jesus. His paper offers a penetrating, though not unsympathetic critique 
of some of the leading representatives of the then prevailing ethos in North 
America, of liberal theology and the social gospel. But for our present purposes, 
332 Ibid. 
333 HRN, 'The Social Gospel and the Mind of Jesus,' edited and with an introduction by Diane 
M. Yeager, The Jouma/ o/Religious Ethics 16, 1988, pp. 109-127. 
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it is Niebuhr's alternative depiction that helps to further flesh out our 
understanding of response to God's governing action in history. Thus: 
We have characterized the mind of Jesus according to the social gospel as the mind 
of a humanistic or perfectionistic, pacifistic, and progressive moralist. We may 
describe the mind of Jesus which is not in the social gospel as the mind of a God-
centered, apocalyptic, revolutionary strategist. . . Penetrate through the apocalyptic 
symbol to its meaning and we find, not what the liberals or the social gospel want us to 
find, an ethical teacher proclaiming humanitarian morality and relatively painless 
progress toward the Family of God, but a prophet of doom and deliverance who sees 
impending in the events of his time a revelation of the destructive God who is at the 
same time man's deliverer.334 
As Niebuhr continues, this is a 'Jesus whose thoughts were directed not in 
the first instance to what man ought to do and in the second place to what aid he 
might receive from God in doing what he ought to do, but rather toward what 
God was doing and what man ought to do in the light of God's doing. God's 
doing - not what God ought to do in order that he might live up to the 
expectations men had of him - stands in the center of Jesus' mind. God for him 
is not the moral ideal but rather cosmic reality. He is the God of Job rather than 
the God ofPlato.,33s This God whom Jesus knows and makes known is the one 
who rules over and works within both nature and the socio-historic process, but 
it is the latter of these two spheres in which Niebuhr particularly discerns the 
divine sovereignty. 
It is here that the rule of God comes to be of decisive importance and the meaning of 
eschatology lies largely in this, that it represents history not as an indeterminate 
sequence of events where men may adjust themselves to a relatively stable 
environment and to each other, but as a driving, directional movement ruthless so far as 
individuals and nations are concerned, almost impersonal in its determinism. The God 
of history plays no favorites with the Jews; the children of the kingdom may be cast 
into the outer darkness. He does not stop even for women who are with child nor 
because winter adds further woes to his judgment. This God of history, to whom the 
334 Ibid., pp. 119-120. 
335 Ibid., p. 120. 
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mind of Jesus is directed, is not the head of a family endeavouring to cement its 
members together by infinite kindliness. He is a destructive as well as a constructive 
God. He is a rock which falls with crushing weight; he is the God, let us remember, 
who previously had directed Babylonians and Assyrians to destroy Jerusalem and 
Samaria. Evidently now he is directing the Romans to repeat the judgment. At all 
events, he will destroy Jerusalem which does not know the things which belong to its 
peace. That his rule is becoming manifest calls first of all not for rejoicing and 
celebration but for fear and repentance.336 
The God of the liberal Jesus exists merely for the sake of human life and 
morality, but worthy though this seems. it leads to a subtle misunderstanding 
whereby God is only ever construed as being friend, or saviour or father. Rather 
different is the God of Jesus the Jew. 'the God of Abraham. Isaac and Jacob -
the reality which is that which it is. He is the God of Amos, Isaiah, and Micah. 
terrible in his judgments. He is not the synthetic unity of goodness. truth. and 
beauty nor a first cause but [is] faithful. that is. unswerving, reality with laws 
that can only be broken at the price oflife' .337 
But though Jesus understands God in the manner of Jewish prophetic faith. 
he also does so as a representative of that robust yet pious Judaism that we 
often find attested in the psalms. Thus Jesus 'unites the two elements ... in a 
true synthesis, the fear of God and the love of God. the knowledge of God the 
enemy and the knowledge of God the deliverer. The manifestation of the rule of 
God in the events of his time calls not for repentance only but also for rejoicing. 
There is a bad time coming; there is also a good time coming. The two events 
cannot be separated from each other. The slayer may be trusted because he is 
the bringer of life. The life-giving father. however, cannot be separated from 
the destroying judge. It is one and the same process which damns and saves -
not a father who slays and a son who gives life. not a righteousness which 
condemns and a love which redeems - but one God with one faithful 
working .• 338 
336 Ibid .• p. 120-121. 
337 Ibid., p. 121. We may recall from chapter 1 that Niebuhr borrowed from Whitehead the 
notion of God being known as 'void, enemy and companion,' See Fowler, op. cit., p. 59. 
338 Ibid. 
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As Niebuhr interprets him, therefore, Jesus lives as a revolutionary since he 
understands God's revolutionary rule as the decisive factor in history, thus 
requiring human beings to live faithfully, and respond appropriately, to the 
continuous in-breaking of this relentless, yet ultimately redemptive, sovereign 
reality. Human nature finds itself perennially tempted to evade the thrusting 
initiative of God's righteous rule and in a myriad of ways settles down into 
patterns of life that become self-centred, with the almost inevitable tendency to 
a stifling status quo in which the divine intent for comprehensive historical 
well-being is thwarted. But God's 'disruptive grace,339 comes to effect the 
necessary changes which we find so unwelcome or even distressing since we 
are far more comfortable with the continuities, whether slow or speedy, of life. 
But God's way, discerned by, and demonstrated in Jesus, is often by means of 
discontinuity, even through those ruptures that seem most like a revolution. As 
Niebuhr puts it: 
A revolution is an event which has [an] end character, not as the '"telos" toward which 
men strive, but as the "eschaton" which terminates striving, not by fulfilment but by 
complete denial. In that sense death is the great revolution in the life of the individual; 
the end of a national existence, the end of a civilization. is the great revolution in the 
life of social groups. Jesus' mind is directed toward such an end, an "eschaton," in the 
existence of his people. Jerusalem will be destroyed, its inhabitants scattered. And like 
the prophets before him, he does not merely seek to read moral meanings into this 
impending catastrophe; he accepts it rather from the hands of God and reads the 
meanings that are in it. The God of Jesus here is neither the kind father whose concern 
is the welfare of his people nor the transcendent ideal or source. He is the dynamic 
driving force immanent in the events oftime; he is the judge, the destroyer. 
But Jesus the revolutionary Jew sees ... that the end was also a new beginning and that 
end and new beginning together offered an opportunity for entrance into a better life. 
opportunity for the fulfilment of the great prophetic hope. Let men accept the end as 
judgment and the new beginning as mercy, let them yield to it as those who accept. let 
them have faith, and they may enter into the Kingdom of God.3-40 
339 The phrase is George Hunsinger's from the book of the same name. 
3-40 HRN. 'The Social Gospel and the Mind of Jesus.' p. 122. 
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For Niebuhr, then, Jesus so depicted, is not so much a moralist, in the 
pejorative meaning of that term, but rather a strategist, one whose imperatives 
were more about being alert and expectant in trust and hope to the new 
possibilities which God's revolutionary actions were bringing to birth, rather 
than aspiring to realise some self-projected ideals or supinely conforming to the 
observance of a set of divinely-given laws moralistically construed. Concerning 
the former of these two, as he sees it, false alternatives, Niebuhr writes that 'the 
difference between a hope and an ideal is tremendous. An ideal is an end to 
toward which we strive; a hope is a termination which is given, cannot be 
achieved. To act in the light of an assured hope is not to engineer a direct road 
toward the ''telos'' but rather to prepare oneself for a gift, so that one will not 
miss its possibilities. The strategic approach to life, in opposition to the 
teleological, consists in such preparations for taking advantage of gifts which 
the situation gives us and in adjusting ends to means rather than means to 
ends. ,341 
Regarding the other ethical option alluded to above, namely moral 
perfectionism in the form of obedience to divine laws, an ethics often 
associated with, or even equated with Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, Niebuhr 
argues as follows: 
Jesus does not demand that men love their brethren because from a transcendent 
perspective all men are equal, but because the God of the historic and cosmic process is 
one who avenges all lovelessness, all lack of forgiveness, because selfishness [and] 
self-assertion lead to destruction. The laws of God are not the laws of moral perfection, 
but the laws of reality. The Sermon on the Mount does not tell men what to do in order 
that they may live up to a moral ideal, but what to do in a world where hatred as well 
as murder, lasciviousness as well as adultery. have terribly destructive consequences. 
The morality of the Sermon on the Mount does not stand on its own bottom; it stands 
upon the foundations of reality. The cosmic God rather than the moral God is the 
presupposition of that counsel, but certainly a cosmic God whose laws have been 
apprehended and partly set forth, though incompletely, in the Mosaic laws of 
morality.342 
3-41 Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
342 Ibid., p. 123. 
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So how then does Niebuhr characterise the Christian revolutionary strategy 
that he sees embodied in Jesus? The answer he offers is one that is entirely 
consistent with the by now familiar contours of the theologia crucis, which we 
have been presenting throughout; that is, 'it centers in the principles of 
repentance, faith, forgiveness, and innocence suffering for guilt. It is impossible 
for man to take the kingdom by violence, by self-assertion; he has no means 
adequate to this purpose. But it is possible for him, in repentance, to anticipate 
the judgment, to give up the attempt to preserve or extend the dying system and 
so to hasten its destruction. Yet such repentance is only possible to faith which 
sees deliverance beyond the judgment. ,343 This Niebuhrian rendering, it seems 
to me, is remarkably congruent or consistent with the central thrust of the 
various New Testament authors. 
In reply to the possible charge that he reckons some people might make, 
namely, that in criticising the liberal picture of Jesus, he has swung back 
towards a kind of fundamentalism, Niebuhr is at pains to make the following 
careful distinctions. 'Fundamentalism consisted in the substitution of symbols 
for that which they meant; liberalism, in the substitution of new meanings 
without changing symbols - as in the case of the Kingdom of God which was 
used to mean brotherhood of man. We are interested in what we believe to be 
the old meanings and reject both the new meanings and the deification of such 
symbols as Christ, Bible, cross, virgin birth. ,344 
Niebuhr hastens to his concluding paragraph, a long statement in which he 
encapsulates some of his deepest convictions regarding how God's governing 
action is mediated to us by Jesus, who is the paradigm of what it means to be a 
faithful and responsible social self in the flux of historical life. Niebuhr 
elsewhere, following Calvin34s, speaks of the 'self-denial' or revolutionary 
restraint that is characteristic of such a disposition. Fowler uses the innovative 
suggestion of Niebuhr's son, Richard R., to speak of the responsible self being 
343 Ibid. 
344 Ibid., p. 124. 
345 HRN, Christian Ethics Lectures. op. cit., p. 126 with reference to Calvin's Institutes: Book 
3, Chapter 7, 'The Sum of the Christian Life: Self-Denial.' 
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rendered here as "patient' and "counter-actor" vis-a.-vis the sovereign action of 
God.346 And so, Niebuhr concludes this complex but crucial essay thus: 
To recapture the faith of Jesus is to recapture faith in the God of the creative 
process, the dynamic urge in the moving universe, which brings death and destruction 
to those who will not yield to its universal, faithful working, which heals and forgives 
and makes ever new beginnings possible. Jesus had faith, as the social gospel had faith, 
that "earth shall be fair and all men glad and wise." But Jesus knew what the social 
gospel forgot, that gladness and wisdom are gifts bestowed, not ends for engineers, and 
that they wait upon our willing obedience to the inevitable ways of a power not 
ourselves that makes for a glory which is not human glory. He saw that the strategy of 
the nations and classes who sought rough justice through the assertion of interests led 
to their quick destruction if they were weak, and to their slower but no less certain 
destruction if they were strong, for both the strong and the weak are weak before the 
power that moves in the creation. The only strategy apt in the human situation was for 
him a strategy based on a hope which did not evade death and judgment, but saw 
beyond them, and on a faith which did not deny the destructiveness of the cosmic God 
but included it. On this faith and hope was built, we believe, the social gospel in the 
mind of Jesus, and on it alone, we believe, the only adequate social gospel can be 
built.347 
The prophetic nature of this essay, which, in its own way, and despite 
Niebuhr's occasional asides to the contrary, is remarkably similar to Barth's 
evolving and contemporary theology, anticipates another series of articles 
which Niebuhr wrote during the Second World War. These so-called 'war 
articles' have been the subject of much critical scrutiny and acclaim. Here we 
will mine them for material which is particularly pertinent to our current theme, 
noting their continuity with, but also deepening of, the insights that Niebuhr has 
previously articulated.348 
346 Fowler, op. cit., p. 142 writes: 'In this somewhat archaic usage the term [patient] denotes the 
self as the object or recipient of action upon it. As ''patient'' the self both "endures" and 
"enjoys" God's action as process-structural reality,' 
347 HRN, 'The Social Gospel and the Mind of Jesus: pp. 126-127. 
348 HRN, 'War as the Judgment of God,' The Christian Century 59, 1942, pp. 630-633; 'Is God 
in the War?' The Christian Century 59, 1942, pp. 953-955; 'War as Crucifixion,' The Christian 
Century 60, 1943, pp. 513-515. 
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Niebuhr begins his reflections by once agam asserting the biblically-
infonned monotheistic basis of his own interpretations and welcoming the fact 
that this same presupposition is being shared by many of his contemporaries. 
He notes that it is therefore 'a healthy sign ... when God rather than the self or 
the enemy is seen as the central figure in the great tragedy of war and when the 
question, "What must I doT' is preceded by the question, "What is God doing?" 
To attend to God's action is to be on the way to that constructive understanding 
and constructive human reaction which the prophets initiated and Jesus set forth 
in its fullness. ,349 There may well be much disagreement and uncertainty about 
how the divine intention and action are to be interpreted but 'something has 
been gained as a result of the very general recognition that God is judging the 
nations, the churches and all mankind in this great conflict and crucifixion. ,350 
Niebuhr's own fine line of interpretation is one that he now asks rhetorically, 
and then proceeds to articulate thus, an argument that warrants extensive 
quotation: 
What does it mean to say that this war is a judgment of God on the nations or on all 
of us? It cannot mean simply that it is the action of a Being who, in primitive human 
fashion, executes vengeance. Since Hosea's time that interpretation has been rationally 
impossible. Christians in particular must be convinced by their whole gospel that 
judgment cannot be separated from redemption, that the harshness of God is not 
antagonistic to his love but subordinate to it, that divine "penology" is reconstructive 
and not vindictive in its nature. 
The fundamental Christian assumption about divine justice may be stated in another 
way by saying that it is never merely punishment for sins, as though God were 
concerned simply to restore the balance between men by making those suffer who have 
inflicted suffering, but that it is always primarily punishment of sinners who are to be 
chastened and changed in the character which produced the sinful acts. Therefore war 
cannot be interpreted as hell; if it were hell we could not even be aware that God is 
judging us for we would be without God in war. War as judgment of God is a 
purgatory, not a hell. 
349 HRN, 'War as the Judgment of God,' op. cit., p. 630. 
350 Ibid. 
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Christians cannot interpret God's action in war as the judgment of vengeance for 
another and profounder reason: the pains of war do not descend primarily on the unjust 
but on the innocent. Wars are crucifixions. It is not the mighty, the guides and leaders 
of nations and churches, who suffer most in them. but the humble, little people who 
have had little to do with the framing of great policies. Even the pacifists in jail have 
little reason to think of themselves as the martyrs of war when they reflect on all the 
children, wives and mothers, humble obedient soldiers, peasants on the land, who in 
the tragedy of war are made an offering for sin.m 
Niebuhr ponders the possibility of developing 'a social theory and 
application of the atonement' here, and one could argue that, in effect he is, 
even though his disclaimer to the contrary is rather ambivalent. But what he 
does suggest is that a properly Christian interpretation will discern 'that the 
justice of God is not only a redemptive justice in which suffering is used in the 
service of remaking but it is also vicarious in its method, so that the suffering of 
innocence is used for the remaking of the guilty. One cannot then speak of God 
acting in this war as judge of the nations without understanding that it is 
through the cross of Christ more than through the cross of thieves that he is 
acting upon mankind. ,352 
At least one critic published a response to Niebuhr's article in which he 
raised a number of objections to which Niebuhr was given an opportunity to 
reply. One point worth noting is that Niebuhr's correspondent in this exchange, 
the philosopher, Professor Virgil Aldrich, mixes together insights from both 
Niebuhr's article and an editorial from the editor of The Christian Century, and 
in fact quotes more from the editor than from Niebuhr. Our main interest, 
however, lies in Niebuhr's nuanced and penetrating rejoinder, in which he 
identifies and addresses four main points. 
Firstly, Niebuhr defends the use of the term ''judgment''. Aldrich and others 
are uncomfortable with it because for them it seems to mean "emotionally 
motivated vengeance" of an irrationally and vindictive bent. Niebuhr, however, 
defines it according to his interpretation of its scriptural use, that is, 'the 
351 Ibid., p. 631. 
3S21bid. 
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corrective action of a God who is loyal to his creatures'. 353 Niebuhr says that he 
would be prepared to drop the tenn for some other appropriate symbol, but 
warns that whatever one Aldrich might care to provide will still 'hurt as much' 
as judgment, biblically understood, does. 
Secondly, Niebuhr denies the charge that he is trying to understand the war 
"from God's point of view." Instead, Niebuhr claims that his is a more modest 
interpretive strategy for he 'has been persuaded that if he is to make any sense 
out of his experience and life he must always try to discover the universal in 
every particular and respond to it.' For him, Niebuhr, that universal is the 
'being and action which Jesus called Father' who, as the synoptic gospel writers 
testify, is encountered as acting more in 'objective, natural and historical 
events' than in the internal subjectivity of human feelings or emotions.354 
Thirdly, since we are thus 'placed under the judgment of objective reality' 
more so than merely or primarily looking for God's action within us, we are 
affinning a stance that Niebuhr calls 'radical monotheism' in which we 'meet 
everything that happens with the faith that God is one and universal.' Aldrich, 
and other subjectivists, too easily fall prey to an insidious 'dualism' in which at 
some stages or in some areas, 'there is an actuality in which God is not' thus 
denying, in these contexts at least, that 'a rational, meaningful response' is 
possible. For Niebuhr, on the other hand, to 'look for God's judgment is to 
affirm as radical monotheists that there is no person, no situation, no event in 
which the opportunity to serve God is not present.' Consequently, there will 
likely be a greater sense of rationality and consistency about such responses.355 
For Niebuhr, the notion of sin as hamartia or 'missing the mark' was of great 
significance. For him, therefore, ethics were a means of helping humans 
become better equipped at 'hitting the target' through interpreting and 
responding appropriately to each new challenge or situation. 
3S3 HRN, 'Is God in the War?' op. tit., p. 953. 
3S4 Ibid., p. 954. 
3SS Ibid. 
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Fourthly, despite Aldrich's unease with the notion, Niebuhr affirms the 
conception of 'vicarious suffering' as a fitting way to describe the 'crucifixion' 
of 'simple God-fearing peasants' and other people who suffer in war but who 
do so without any such conscious understanding that their suffering is vicarious. 
The thrust ofNiebuhr's argument is that from the stance of radical monotheism, 
a faith posture in which the world is affirmed as being 'a meaningful process', 
the only adequate way to interpret people's excruciating experiences is that of 
vicarious suffering, for 'whether they do so willingly or unwillingly, the 
innocent suffer for our sins'. Understood aright, such contemporary crosses are 
the painful instruments by which God brings forth 'the fruits of repentance' .356 
This is a rigorously austere interpretation, perhaps too hard for many people 
to stomach,357 but Niebuhr presses his argument along the same sobering lines 
in the third and final 'war article' in The Christian Century. If war is not to be 
understood as 'the survival of the fittest' or as merely 'retributive justice', then 
we seem to be compelled to understand 'the nature of cosmic justice' as in 
some sense to be derived from 'the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. ,358 
As Niebuhr sees it, war is very much like crucifixion in that in 'both events 
there is a strange intermixture of justice and injustice on the side alike of those 
who regard themselves as the upholders of the right and on the side of the 
vanquished.,359 For instance, of the three men who were crucified on Golgotha, 
two were probably insurrectionists in the traditional understanding of that term, 
one of whom acknowledged the partial justice of his punishment, and the third, 
Jesus, who, though not seeking the overthrow of the established order by the 
same means, nonetheless constituted a genuine threat to Roman order and 
Jewish law by his establishment of that mysterious rule called 'the kingdom of 
God'. 'Nor were the crucifiers less mixed in their justice and injustice' be they 
soldiers, priests, judge, citizens or mob. 'They knew not what they did. War is 
3S61bid., pp. 954-955. 
3S7 To this extent it bears quite strong resemblance to some of the First World War writings of 
P. T. Forsyth: see especially his The Justification of God: Lectures for War- Time on a Christian 
Theodicy, London, Duckworth, 1916. 
3SB HRN, 'War as Crucifixion,' op. cit., pp. 513-514. 
3s9lbid., p. 514. 
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like that - apparently indiscriminate in its choice of victims and of victors, 
whether these be thought of as individuals or as communities. ,360 
But a second striking resemblance between war and the crucifixion is that 
the latter becomes the paradigm by which we may learn to abandon our moral 
indifference or cynicism. The cross 'requires men to take their moral decisions 
with greater rather than less seriousness; it demonstrates the sublime character 
of real goodness; it is a revelation, though "in a glass darkly," of the intense 
moral earnestness of a God who will not abandon mankind to self-destruction; 
it confronts us with the tragic consequences of moral failure. It does all this 
because it is sacrifice - the self-sacrifice of Jesus Christ for those whom he 
loves and God's sacrifice of his best-loved Son for the sake of the just and the 
unjust.' God works in, through, and even over-against the mixed and complex 
actions of human beings so that an 'almost infinite capacity for goodness is 
reflected in the dark glass of sinfulness. ,361 
Perhaps then, muses Niebuhr, the analogy between the cross and war is more 
than an analogy. The cross, it seems, reveals the reality of things, founded on 
God's righteousness, which is different from, and superior to, the dubious and 
manifold manifestations of human righteousness. Invoking Paul's characteristic 
hermeneutic in the New Testament, Niebuhr suggests: 'The cross of Jesus 
Christ is the final, convincing demonstration of the fact that the order of the 
universe is not one of retribution in which goodness is rewarded and evil 
punished, but rather an order of graciousness' which means that 'the whole 
effort to assess and judge the goodness and the evil of self and others, and to 
reward or punish accordingly, is mistaken.'362 We are now at the very heart of 
Niebuhr's theologia crucis, and perhaps it is best to let him speak for himself in 
the following three paragraphs in which the cumulative force of his distinctive 
interpretation gathers to a head. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Ibid., pp. 514-515. 
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God's righteousness is his graciousness and his grace is not an addition to his 
justice; hence man's rightness does not lie in a new order of judging justice, but in the 
acceptance of grace and in thankful response to it. The cross does not so much reveal 
that God judges by other standards than men do, but that he does not judge; it does not 
demonstrate that men judge by the wrong standards but that their wrongness lies in 
trying to judge each other, instead of beginning where they can begin - with the 
acceptance of graciousness and response to it. 
If the cross is not only a historical event but a revelation of the order of reality, then 
war is not only like the cross but must be a demonstration of that same order of God. 
How it demonstrates the disorderliness of human righteousness and unrighteousness is 
apparent enough. How it demonstrates the fundamental ungraciousness of both the 
apparently righteous and the apparently unrighteous is perhaps also clear. But that it 
should be the hidden demonstration of divine graciousness is hard for us to understand. 
The cross in ancient history is acceptable to us; the cross in "religious" history, in the 
history of man's relation to a purely spiritual God. is also acceptable; but the cross in 
our present history is a stumbling block and a folly which illustrates human sinfulness. 
but not divine graciousness. 
Yet how the divine grace appears in the crucifixion of war may become somewhat 
clear when the cross of Christ is used to interpret it. Then our attention is directed to 
the death of the guiltless, the gracious, and the suffering of the innocent becomes a call 
to repentance, to a total revolution of our minds and hearts. And such a call to 
repentance - not to sorrow but to spiritual revolution - is an act of grace, a great recall 
from the road to death which we all travel together, the just and the unjust. the victors 
and the vanquished. Interpreted through the cross of Jesus Christ the suffering of the 
innocent is seen not as the suffering of temporal men but of the eternal victim "slain 
from the foundations of the world." If the Son of Man is being crucified in this war 
along with the malefactors - and he is being crucified on many an obscure hill - then 
the graciousness of God. the self-giving love, is more manifest here than in all the 
years ofpeace.363 
However, crucial though the suffering of the innocent and the associated 
principle of vicariousness are, these still only form part of the governance of 
God. Another important aspect of this is what Niebuhr calls "statesmanship": 
363 Ibid .• p. 515. 
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that is 'the ability to use the meanness of men for the common good,.364 This is 
the overarching wisdom that can take the various, flawed, partial and often, 
differing intentions and actions of people, and despite all their potential or even 
real conflict, manage, somehow, to bring forth a more comprehensive good. 
This 'good' may be what none of those involved in any situation may have 
imagined or desired, but it is one for which the 'Master Statesman' has all along 
been working for with wise and tenacious intent.36s 
For Niebuhr, this is the most adequate way of understanding God's 
governing action. We do not know everything about God's ordering and 
providential activities but what we do discern is that the divine intent and action 
is not so much to be identified with, or isolated as, any particular thing or event, 
but rather, as the total or overarching context. Niebuhr calls upon the Scriptures 
to attest to his interpretation: Genesis 45 recounts how Joseph's life story works 
for a greater, though, humanly speaking, unforeseen good, a good that lies in 
God making use of the evil intent and actions of Joseph's brothers. Likewise, 
citing Isaiah 10, a favourite text of Niebuhr's, he shows how God uses the 
savage intent of Assyria to bring about a prophetic renewal within the 
inhabitants of Jerusalem.366 
But of course the supreme paradigm is Jesus Christ who throughout his 
public ministry was the object of misunderstanding, misrepresentation, fear, 
suspicion, hostility, rejection and abuse, as well, it should be noted, of more 
positive responses too. Yet it is especially evident in the events leading up to 
his execution that the main participants or co-actors in this unfolding drama 
thought to do evil towards him - the priests, the mob, the soldiers, Judas, 
Caiaphas, Pilate; as well as, unwittingly, the disciples in their desertion of 
Jesus. 'God did not do good by Judas' betrayal, but yet he did not do it without 
it. God's action was not in any of the events leading to the crucifixion, but in 
364 James Gustafson, class notes for HRN's Christian Ethics Lectures, 1952-53. p. 79, cited by 
Fowler. To See the Kingdom. op. cit., p. 195. 
365 Yetter, class notes for HRN's Christian Ethics Lectures. 1952-53. p. 125 in which Abraham 
Lincoln is identified by Niebuhr as blending into a more constructive harmony. the contentious 
factions involved in the American Civil War. 
366 HRN, 'The Illusions of Power,' The Pulpit 33,1962, pp. 4(100) -7(103} in which he 
intriguingly suggests parallels with the Cold War hostilities between the U.S.A. and Russia. See 
also Yetter, HRN Christian Ethics Lectures. op.cit., p. 126. 
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the context and in the resurrection . . . Unless there was in some sense 
resurrection, we would not say of the crucifixion, God thought to do good.,367 
Woven deep into these reflections are various strands that Niebuhr sees as 
integral to a proper understanding of the appropriate human response to God's 
governing action. First and perhaps foremost, is the idea that the human being is 
a 'patient' upon whom God acts in and through all the factors that constitute the 
divinely ordained powers, or forces, or action-fields in which we find ourselves 
participating. A second idea that is associated with, and consequent upon this, is 
that human beings are thus limited by the various factors or co-actors that 
impinge upon them, whether these be primarily historical, physical, intellectual, 
economic or whatever. This can often be burdensome or frustrating but Niebuhr 
offers an alternative suggestion, namely that limitation 'may be the beginning 
of metanoia; it may force a man from his egocentricity. Self-denial takes place 
where one is being limited. If limitations be accepted the revolution of 
understanding of the self as instrument of God and not as center of existence 
may take place. God, not the self, is the proper centcr of all things. ,368 This idea 
of self-denial is one which we noted earlier, Niebuhr found especially evident 
in Calvin's Institutes, Book 3, Chapter 7, and is a major component of his 
understanding of 'the responsible selr in all its interlocking dimensions, but 
particularly with regard to response to the governing action of God.J69 
Niebuhr characteristically concluded his class lectures on Christian Ethics by 
discussing how self-denial should manifest itself in our restraint of others. The 
following brief outline of his main proposals is as follows: (1) We cannot 
choose whether or not we will restrain others since we all inescapably do so 
anyway as inter-related social selves and inter-acting responsible selves. We are 
both active and passive in our interpersonal interactions. The more pertinent 
question is, 'How should we exercise such restraint of others in response to the 
ongoing governance of God?' (2) Since we are being restrained by God's 
367 Ibid., p. 126. 
368 Ibid., pp. 127-128. 
369 The theme of 'self-denial' is especially important in today's context in which issues of 
globalisation and environmentalism are increasingly to the fore. The mutuality of these themes 
will be taken up in section 4 of chapter five of this thesis which looks at Niebuhr's work from 
an 'ecumenical' perspective. 
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impinging actions, we are thus called to restrain others in accordance with the 
principle of self-denial or self-discipline. (3) We restrain others ever mindful of 
the fact that we live with a mutual and two-fold responsibility to God for our 
neighbour and to our neighbour before God. And (4) self-denying restraint 
serves the ultimate ends of God's transforming intent. We hope, and work and 
pray that those, who at present, may need to be restrained, will yet be conserved 
and redeemed.37o 
6. 'Christo-morphic' Responsibility 
The foregoing exposition and interpretation of Niebuhr's ethics of 
responsibility leaves us with some important questions still to address. One 
such question is about the place of Jesus Christ in the argument thus presented. 
The answer that we can now give is that Jesus Christ is crucial, definitive and 
indispensable to Niebuhr's ethics. For example, 'as Christians', states Niebuhr, 
this time presenting his case in confessional form, 'we become aware that in 
Christian life Jesus Christ is a symbolic form with the aid of which men tell 
each other what life and death, God and man, are like; but even more he is a 
form which they employ as an a priori, an image, a scheme or pattern in the 
mind which gives form and meaning to their experience. ,371 
Specifically, this means that 'Jesus Christ, his Gestalt, his drama, function as 
symbolic forms', thus enabling God, self and neighbour to be apprehended, 
understood and evaluated as 'Christo-morphic" that is, 'Christ-like' ,372 'From 
the recognition of an infant's value and destiny with the aid of images of 
manger and cross of Christ, to the acceptance of death as dying with Christ, to 
the discovery of a quality of existence that like Christ's cannot be conquered by 
death, to the understanding of man's place and responsibility in the cosmos as a 
370 Yetter, pp. 128-132. 
37\ HRN, The Responsible Self, op. cit., p. 154. 
372 Ibid., pp. 154-159. The tenn 'Christo-morphic' appears on p. 155; see also Terrence Owen 
Sherry, Shaped by Christ: The Christo-morphic Hermeneutical Theology of H. Richard 
Niebuhr, Lewiston, Edwin Meller Press, 2003. 
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son of God, the symbolism of the gospel story pervades the Christian 
consciousness in all evaluation, action and suffering. ,373 
In a real sense, then, for Niebuhr, Jesus is the prototypical faithful self, who 
both incarnates and mediates radical monotheism to those other social selves 
who, in rebellious defiance or denial, manifest faithlessness in myriad ways. In 
being this and doing this, he is also the responsible self. As such, as the human 
embodiment of responsibility to God's creative, governing and redeeming 
action in and for the world, Jesus may be described in two distinct, though 
inter-related ways: 'Christ as Paradigm of Responsibility' 374 and also 'Christ as 
Redeemer to Responsible Being' .375 
In his understanding of Jesus Christ as 'paradigm of responsibilty', Niebuhr 
notes that 'he is the responsible man who in all his responses to alteractions did 
what fitted into the divine action. He interpreted every alteraction that he 
encountered as a sign of the action of God, of the universal, omnificent One, 
whom he called Father. He responded to all action upon him as one who 
anticipated the divine answer to his answers. ,376 Our exposition earlier in his 
chapter gave ample evidence of how Niebuhr sees in Jesus the paradigm or 
embodiment of faithful response to God's threefold action. 
Secondly, however, Niebuhr also underscores the significance or status of 
Jesus Christ for Christians in that he 'is also the one who accomplishes in them 
this strange miracle, that he makes them suspicious of their deep suspicion of 
the Detenniner of Destiny. He turns their reasoning around so that they do not 
begin with the premise of God's indifference but of his affinnation of the 
creature, so that the Gestalt which they bring to their experiences of suffering as 
well as of joy, of death as well as of life, is the Gestalt, the symbolic fonn, of 
grace.,377 
373 Ibid .. p. 156. 
374 Ibid., pp. 162-173. 
m Ibid., pp. 174-178. 
376 Ibid., p. 164. 
377 Ibid., pp. 175-176. 
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In typical Niebuhrian fashion, there is a degree of modesty, with more than a 
trace of agnosticism, about just how this redemption from faithlessness, and 
thus, to trusting reconciliation occurs. Niebuhr volunteers the opinion that few 
people 'are satisfied with the theories of atonement current in the churches, 
dependent as these are on questionable images of the ultimate rightness of God, 
or of the sources of human estrangement. ,378 Niebuhr again states his 
preference here for the sort of 'pistological' or 'social existentialist' exposition 
that we analysed in the first two chapters, since he feels it is less remote from, 
and resonates more strongly with, the contemporary context of the Western 
world, especially as this manifests itself so often in a sort of spiritual emptiness 
and meaninglessness, whose void is filled with a plethora of dissipating 
polytheisms and destructive henotheisms. The theologia crucis that we have 
been expounding throughout this thesis thus finds further expression in the 
ethics of responsibility that Christ incarnates and mediates, in a way that is 
dependent on, and congruent with, the radical monotheism that he embodies 
himself and communicates to others. Niebuhr movingly renders this in the 
following 'crucial' paragraph where he makes it clear that it is God in Christ 
who takes responsibility for the redemption and transformation of the human 
plight: 
However adequate or inadequate our theories of at-onement or reconciliation may 
be, the fact remains: the movement beyond resignation to reconciliation is the 
movement inaugurated and maintained in Christians by Jesus Christ. By Jesus Christ 
men have been and are empowered to become sons of God - not as those who are 
saved out of a perishing world but as those who know that the world is being saved. 
That its being saved from destruction involves the burning up of an infinite amount of 
tawdry works, that it involves the healing of a miasmic ocean of disease, the 
resurrection of the dead, the forgiveness of sins, the making good of an infinite number 
of irresponsibilities, that such making good is not done except by suffering servants 
who often do not know the name of Christ though they bear his image - all this 
Christians know. Nevertheless, they move toward their end and all endings as those 
who, knowing defeats, do not believe in defeat. .379 
378 Ibid., p. 176. 
379 Ibid., p. 177. 
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In light of the place of Christ in his own ethics, it is therefore interesting, and 
perhaps somewhat puzzling, to note Niebuhr's criticisms or unease with Barth's 
Christologically-determined, or better, Christocentrically-determined ethics. 
The main charge is that Niebuhr sees Barth's ethics, as well as those of 
Bultmann, as being examples of deontological ethics, with some of the 
attendant difficulties and limitations that he believes belongs to those various 
theories found under the same umbrella.38o However, much of Niebuhr's 
critique loses its force, as Robert Willis has suggested, whenever Barth's 
position is 'properly identified as one embodying an 'act-deontology' in 
distinction from the 'rule-deontology' that Niebuhr seems to assume it to be.38t 
If this is accepted, as I believe should be the case, then Barth's ethics are not 
nearly so foreign to the ethics of response that Niebuhr himself expounded. 
This is largely because 'Barth's identification of the Law as the form of the 
Gospel indicated neither inconsistency nor ambiguity, for the simple reason that 
Barth invests the whole notion of Law with a meaning drawn exclusively from 
the context of grace. The additional fact that devolves from this, that the Law, 
in presenting itself as command, is given the operational aspect of permission, 
seems merely to underline again the importance of keeping to a dynamic rather 
than a static view of Law. In the end, this focuses persistently on the necessity 
(and inevitability) of man's response.,382 
This point is of far reaching significance for my thesis. Throughout its 
course, we have been carrying out, as a kind of background theme, an implicit 
comparison or quiet conversation between Niebuhr and Barth. Niebuhr, as 
stated before, often felt constrained to try and develop his theology and ethics in 
380 Ibid., pp. 66, 131. At this stage we need not rehearse or repeat Niebuhr's critique of 
deontological ethics that we provided in section 1 of this current chapter, suffice it to say that, 
for Niebuhr, deontological notions tend to be much too static, hegemonic and conservatively 
formal. 
381 Robert E. Willis, 'The Concept of Responsibility in the Ethics ofKarl Barth and H. Richard 
Niebuhr,' Scottish Journal o/Theology, 23, 1963, pp. 279-290, p. 279. For more on the 
distinction between act- and rule-deontological theories see William K. Frankena, Ethics, in the 
Foundations of Philosophy Series, Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley, eds. Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp. lSf, 21-25. 
382 Willis, op. cit., p. 290. Space does not permit more than a brief reference to the possibilities 
for constructive correspondence or congruence between Niebuhr's and Bonhoeffer's ethics on 
the use of the concept of 'responsibility', esp. as this is found in the latter's Ethics and Letters 
and Papers from Prison. For more on this see, for example, Larry Rasmussen, 'The Ethics of 
Responsible Action,' in The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed.John W. de 
Gruchy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 206-225. 
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conscious distinction from Barth's position. Whilst agreeing that there are real 
points of divergence or shifts of emphasis between them, part of my argument 
is that both have more in common than Niebuhr seemed prepared to admit. For 
example, in the case of their ethics, as suggested above, Niebuhr's 'meta-ethics' 
of appropriate human response to the three-fold structure of God's creative, 
governing and redemptive action is remarkably congruent with, or at least 
similar to, Barth's notion of obeying the law of God's grace in Jesus Christ, 
especially as this has been helpfully rendered, by John Webster, in terms of 
acting within the 'moral space' of the gospe1.383 Indeed, both Niebuhr and Barth 
might be more helpfully described as supplying important reflections on the 
Christian 'ethos' and the broad principles of 'meta-ethics', rather than the more 
'cut-and-dried' casuistic resolution of specific moral dilemmas that people 
often expect or demand from ethicists.384 
Furthermore, yet crucially, despite some methodological differences in their 
respective theological ethics, both Niebuhr and Barth displayed an uncanny 
similarity of outlook when it came to their published perspectives on nearly alI 
the major issues that demanded a Christian intellectual response in the years of 
their mature careers, roughly the middle third of the twentieth century. Their 
views on such issues as the Church's relation to society; the properly Christian 
response to the exigencies of the Second World War; the West's paranoia in the 
midst of the power struggle of the 'Cold War', and many other questions of 
moral urgency in contemporary society were remarkably similar, and remain as 
resources of wisdom upon which current and subsequent generations may have 
much yet to learn.38s 
383 John Webster, 'The Room of the Gospel: Barth's Moral Ontology,' in Barth's Ethics of 
Reconciliation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 214-230. Webster 
acknowledges that an important source for his own interpretation of Barth here is Charles 
Taylor, esp., C. Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity, Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, pp. 8fT. 
384 For an assessment ofNiebuhr along these lines see, for example, Fowler, To See the 
Kingdom, op. cit., pp. 266-269; Jerry H. Gill, 'Christian Meta-Ethics,' Encounter 29, 1986, pp. 
183-206. 
38S HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' op. cit., pp. 248-251; for Niebuhr's similarity 
to the well known views ofBarth on the Cold War see, for example, HRN, 'The Illusions of 
Power, ' The Pulpit 33, 1962, pp. 4 (100) -7 (103). For an important source of some of Barth's 
ethical and political writings see, for example, Karl Barth, Against the Stream, ed. Ronald 
Gregor Smith, trans. E. M. Delacour and Stanley Godman, London, SCM, 1954. See also David 
Edward Roberts, 'Hopeful Realism: A Theological Ethic of Contemporary Conflict, Reflecting 
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7. Conclusion 
We are now in a position to conclude this analysis of Niebuhr's work from an 
ethical perspective by making a few, succinct observations. We have seen that 
his ethics of responsibility are consistent with the theological underpinning of 
radical monotheism that we considered earlier. In conceptual terms, his 
anthropology of the human being in the theology of chapters one and two, 
designated as the social self or, more specifically, the fa ithlesslfaithful self, here 
finds its ethical counterpart in the descriptive label the responsible self. The 
human being is most adequately thought of as an interpreting, interacting agent, 
who, rather than simply seeking to do what is 'right' in deontological terms, or 
'good' in teleological terms, seeks to do what is 'apt' or 'fitting' in the 'force-
field' of factors that constitute any given context. 
In the Christian ethics that were Niebuhr's chief educational stimulus and 
requirement in his vocation as seminary lecturer, he developed this theory in 
terms of our response to the creative, governing and redeeming action of God. 
Various criticisms have been levelled at Niebuhr's ethics: that they construe 
God's action in overly-deterministic fashion, thus rendering his notion of the 
human being as being too passive, resigned, or even paralysed.386 For some this 
is related to the way in which he places too much emphasis on God's governing 
or ordering action in creation, in proportion to his redemptive actions. 387 For 
others the criticism is made that his ethics remain too much at the level of broad 
principles which are thus insufficiently detailed in casuistic direction;388 and 
that this could be partly overcome by a greater attendance to the question of 
power in social, especially systemic settings.389 
Critically on the Writings ofKarl Barth and H. Richard Niebuhr Concerning the Second World 
War,' Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 2001. 
386 Hoedemaker, op. cit., pp. 159-160; Fowler, op. cit., pp. 261-269; Kliever, op. cit., pp. ISO, 
172. 
387 John D. Barbour, 'Niebuhr versus Niebuhr: The Tragic Nature of History, ' The Christian 
Centu~, 101, 1984,pp. 1096-1099,esp.p. 1099. 
388 Fowler, pp. 266-268; Clinton E. Gardner, 'Responsibility and Moral Direction in the Ethics 
ofH. Richard Niebuhr,' Encounter 40, 1979, pp. 143-168. 
389 Beverly Wildung Harrison, 'H. Richard Niebuhr: Towards a Christian Moral Philosophy,' 
unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Union Theological Seminary, 1974, pp. 301, 304, 312. 
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These criticisms are partially sustainable in that they do identify certain 
areas where Niebuhr's ethics could have been refined or some emphases 
somewhat revised. If a possible point of correction, or at least, supplementation, 
could be applied to his ethics, it might well relate to a point made back in 
section 5 of chapter 2, where it may be recalled that Niebuhr had only a scant 
pneumatology. In ontological terms, he remained unconvinced about the 
identity or ontology of the Holy Spirit as a distinct divine person, co-equal with 
the Father and the Son. Therefore, he was unable or unwilling to undertake an 
exposition of the Christian life in terms of responsibility as inspired and 
sustained by the Holy Spirit. It is in just this area, however, I would suggest, 
that some of the more passive or resigned tendencies in Niebuhr's construal of 
the responsible self might have been assuaged. A more robust pneumatology, 
thus integrated into a fully Trinitarian theology, would have rendered a still 
more satisfactory ethics than he managed to achieve, stimulating as his legacy 
in this latter area is.390 
Despite some weight to their arguments, none of the above critiques, I 
believe, manage to seriously undermine or overthrow Nicbuhr's project. His 
ethics would appear to have an enduring place in the work of contemporary, 
and surely, future practitioners, as is evident in the continuing work that others 
have been inspired or challenged to engage in. In response to his legacy of 
faithful and 'responsible' labour, there is still much for Christian ethicists and 
moral theologians to grapple with, as they too contemplate the imperatives 
inherent in a the%gia crucis.391 Perhaps above all else, Niebuhr's ethics, rather 
390 For noteworthy examples of the kind of theological basis for a properly Christian ethics akin 
to Niebuhr's project, see Nicholas Lash, Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience 
and the Knowledge a/God, London, SCM Press, 1988, esp. pp. 254-285; Rowan WiIliams, 
'Word and Spirit,' in On Christian Theology, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2000, pp. 107-127; 
George Hunsinger, 'The Mediator of Communion: Karl Barth's Doctrine of the Holy Spirit,' in 
Disruptive Grace, op. cit., pp. 148-185. At a more popular level see John V. Taylor, The Go-
Between God: The Holy Spirit and the Christian Mission, London, SCM Press, 1987; A Matter 
a/Life and Death, London, SCM Press, 1987, both of which connect to, and resonate with, 
many features in Niebuhr's ethics. 
391 See, for example, R. Melvin Keiser, Roots 0/ Relational Ethics: Responsibility in Origin and 
Maturity in H. Richard Niebuhr, Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1996; Charles Scriven, The 
Transformation of Culture: Christian Social Ethics After H. Richard Niebuhr, Scottdale, Pa., 
Herald Press, 1988; Glenn H. Stassen, ed., Authentic Tran!lformation: A New Vision of Christ 
and Culture, Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1996; William Werpehowski, American Protestant 
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like Barth's in this regard, draw our attention to the distinct lines of what it 
means to have our lives shaped by God's revelation to Israel, culminating in the 
coming of Jesus, and the entire 'Christ-event', but especially his crucifixion and 
resurrection. The community of those called to follow Jesus Christ thus find 
themselves entering into a new way of life, an ethos of discipleship that 
involves an ongoing, discerning, and above all, faithful response to the 
indicatives of God's three-fold action in and through Christ. 
Ethics and the Legacy of H. Richard Niebuhr. Washington, D. C .. Georgetown University 
Press, 2002. 
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Chapter Four: An Ecclesiological Perspective 
1. Towards a Definition of the Church: A Polar Analysis 
The argument of this thesis is that radical monotheism and responsibility are the 
most distinctive principles in Niebuhr's theology and ethics both of which 
centre on the conviction of the sovereignty of God. Once he had articulated 
these as his leitmotivs, he never strayed from his conviction that Christian faith 
could best be understood in terms of such radical faith in, and response to, the 
living God revealed in Jesus Christ. In this chapter we shall now consider these 
core convictions from an ecclesiological perspective since it was largely in this 
context, as a member of the Church, that Niebuhr sought to demonstrate his 
understanding of the theologia crucis, also designated as 'crucial faith'. 
In some autobiographical reflections near the end of his career, Niebuhr 
wrote that his 'primary concern ... [was] still that of the reformation of the 
church,.392 Whilst other theologians, such as his brother Reinhold, felt 
themselves called more to the task of attempting to directly reform culture, H. 
Richard Niebuhr's vocation seemed to be more clearly to reform the wider 
society primarily by means of a continuous and thorough reformation of the 
Church.393 Only as the Church gained greater clarity about its own mission, 
could it hope to demonstrate the required fidelity to its Lord, and thus provide a 
more authentic and effective witness to the wider world. Niebuhr believed that 
his particular role in this was to provide the kind of theological insights which 
would enable such Church reformation to occur. 
A unique opportunity for Niebuhr to contribute to this reformation process 
came in the mid 1950's when he was asked to act as director of a research 
programme on theological education under the auspices of the American 
Association of Theological Schools. From 1954 to 1956 Niebuhr set aside all 
other scholarly commitments so that he could give his undivided attention to 
392 HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' The Christian Century 77, 1960, p. 250. 
393 Ibid. 
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this important project, a research study which involved visits to, and feed back 
from, over ninety Protestant seminaries in the United States and Canada. The 
major published fruit of these labours was Niebuhr's 1956 book entitled The 
Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry. In it, his long maturing reflections on 
ecc1esiology, and in particular, ecclesiastical education were articulated. In the 
foreward he writes: 
The general reason for the inquiry is to be found, of course, in the conviction that 
"the unexamined life is not worth living" - a principle that has been given a special 
form in the Christian demand for daily and lifelong repentance. Institutions and 
communities no less than individuals are subject to this requirement. It is said that an 
uninspected army deteriorates and this is doubtless true of all human organizations. We 
tend to repeat customary actions unaware that when we do today what we did 
yesterday we actually do something different since in the interval both we and our 
environment have changed; unaware also that we now do without conscious definition 
of purpose and method what was done yesterday with specific ends in view and by 
relatively precise means. Education in general, and not least ecclesiastical education, is 
subject to this constant process of deterioration and hence in need of periodic self-
examination.394 
A major part of what follows in Niebuhr's book is just such a constructive 
critique. in what was. in effect, an attempt to identify some of the ways in 
which the Church misconstrues its calling. As he saw it, '[m]uch confusion and 
uncertainty ... seems to be due to lack of clarity about the community - the 
Church; about its form and matter, its relations and composition. ,395 The 
method by which Niebuhr seeks to define the nature of the Church is what he 
calls "polar analysis". By this he means the effort to 'try to do justice to the 
dynamic character of that social reality. the Church. by defining certain poles 
between which it moves or which it represents. ,396 Niebuhr names six polar 
394 HRN. The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry: Reflections on the Aims of Theological 
Education, in collaboration with D.D. WilIiams and J.M. Gustafson, New York, Harper and 
Bros., 1956, p. viii. 
395 Ibid .• pp. 17-18. 
396 Ibid., p. 19. Indeed the method of 'polar analysis' that Niebuhr specifically labels and 
employs in this book, is one that, in more general terms, he often employs elsewhere. For 
example, one could say that his entire theological programme follows a particular line 
deliberately pursued between the 'poles' of 'objectivism' (Barth) and 'subjectivism' 
(Schleiermacher and Troeltsch) without attempting to make an ultimate choice. For helpful 
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pairs in his analysis and we shall briefly look at each of these in turn, since they 
offer us an important insight into his entire ecclesiology. 
In the first polar pair, Niebuhr asserts that the Church is 'the subjective pole 
of the objective rule of God. ,397 Developing this initial statement a bit more he 
writes: 'Several things are implied in this understanding of the Church: 
negatively, the Church is not the rule or realm of God; positively, there is no 
apprehension of the kingdom except in the Church; conversely, where there is 
apprehension of, and participation in, this Object there the Church exists; and, 
finally, the subject-counterpart of the kingdom is never an individual in 
isolation but one in community, that is, in the Church. ,398 
Elsewhere, though in similar vein, Niebuhr is at great pains to distinguish his 
own understanding of the Church from various, as he sees it, overly subjectivist 
interpretations. Speaking of the reality encountered in the decisive events that 
constitute the Church he says that 'it is the gift to see and to hear, not first of all 
those who look with us and hear with us, but to see and hear what is beyond 
them and us together. It is the vision directed toward the revelation of God in 
Christ, toward the Christ who is not first of all the spirit in the church but the 
Lord it encounters, toward the Word carved on tables of stone and nailed on a 
cross, not echoed within, toward the atonement that is independent of our view 
of it, toward the kingdom and the law that rule and judge us from a throne that 
is lifted high above us. ,399 
Niebuhr calls this the Church's 'Catholic vision' which, for him, means that 
it 'is not mystic for it is directed toward the objective and the independent 
rather than toward the subjective and intemal.,4oo Speaking in the mid 1950's of 
theological trends, he reckons that the 'theology of our predecessors and our 
insights into the logic of this 'polar analysis' though rendered in somewhat different 
terminology, see the section entitled 'The Koinonia Relation: An Exercise in Theological 
Anatomy,' pp. 256-261, in George Hunsinger, 'Baptized into Christ's Death: Kad Barth and the 
Future of Roman Catholic Theology,' in Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl 
Barth, op. cit., pp. 253-278. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Ibid. 
399 HRN, 'The Gift of the Catholic Vision,' Theology Today, 4, 1948, p. 514. 
400 Ibid. 
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theology can both be characterized by reference to the double prepositions that 
each employs. The favorite preposition ofliberal theology is within, of the post-
liberal over against. It was the gift of the earlier movement to understand that 
"the kingdom of God is within you"; of the contemporary one to see that it is 
over against us. So with the word of God, which for the one "is nigh thee, in thy 
mouth and in thy heart" and for the other "is living and active and sharper than 
any two-edged sword, and piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit." The 
gift of the Catholic vision is the gift of objective view.'401 
The second pair of polar terms that Niebuhr uses in his analysis is to 
describe the Church as both 'community' and 'institution' .402 Each of these 
terms says something important, indeed crucial, about the nature of the Church, 
yet neither without the other is adequate, and various distortions are evident 
when one pole predominates. In broad brushstrokes Niebuhr suggests that 'no 
community can exist without some institutions that give it form, boundaries, 
discipline, and the possibilities of expression and common action. On the other 
hand, no institution can long exist without some common mind and drive that 
expresses and defines itself in institutions. ,403 
In the third pair of terms, Niebuhr sees the Church as existing between the 
polar realities of being 'one' and yet also 'many' as in the well known New 
Testament image of being like a human body which has many members. 'It is a 
pluralism moving towards unity and a unity diversifying and specifying 
itself. ,404 It is in such a dialectical 'unity-in-diversity' that the Church exists as 
the Body of which Jesus Christ is the Living Head. 
The fourth polarity that Niebuhr identifies, and one that is similar, in some 
ways to the previous one, is that the Church is both 'local' and 'universal'. 405 
Even in its most modest forms, 'the localized Church implies the universal, but 
the universal no less implies the local; without localization, without becoming 
401 Ibid., pp. 514-515. 
402 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, op. cit., p. 21. Section 1 of chapter five in 
this thesis will address this particular issue in more detail. 
403 Ibid., p. 22. 
404 Ibid., p. 24. 
405 Ibid. 
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concrete in a specific occasion, it does not exist' .406 A parochial concern with 
the often all too predictable patterns of local parish life is just as unhealthy as a 
bland ecumenism that fails to ground itself in the concrete realities of specific 
settings and particular people. 
In a fifth polarity, Niebuhr states that the Church is 'catholic and protestant' 
where these terms do not stand so much for the names of distinct historical 
institutions, but especially, in this instance, for differing principles within 
ecc1esial life. For Niebuhr 'the principle of protest against every tendency to 
confuse the symbol with what it symbolizes and the subject with the object, is a 
constituent element in the being of the community, even apart from the 
institutional organizations. ,407 However this iconoclasm can only really exist 
whenever and wherever it is able to presuppose the incarnation of some reality. 
'Unless the Infinite is represented in finite form, unless the Word becomes flesh 
over and over again, though only as oral preaching, unless the risen Christ 
manifests himself in the visible forms of individual saintliness and communal 
authority there is no human relation to the Infinite and Transcendent. ,408 
The sixth and final polarity which Niebuhr proposes is that of 'Church and 
world.' This is similar to the first polar pair of 'subject and object' in that it is 
not so much a polarity within the Church as it is a polarity in which it 
participates as itself a kind of pole. 'The Church lives and defines itself in 
action vis-a-vis the world. World, however, is not object of Church as God is. 
World, rather, is companion of the Church, a community something like itself 
with which it lives before God. The world is sometimes enemy, sometimes 
partner of Church, often antagonist, always one to be befriended; now it is the 
co-knower, now the one that does not know what Church knows, now the 
knower of what Church does not know. ,409 
Niebuhr's understanding of the nature or being of the Church is thus subtle 
and nuanced. His method of polar analysis attempts to demonstrate something 
406 Ibid. 
0407 Ibid., p. 25. 
0408 Ibid., p. 25. 
409 Ibid., p. 26. 
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of this rich complexity. Simplistic and one-sided notions are just not adequate 
in describing the essence of what the community of Jesus Christ is called to be. 
The continuous interplay of these various factors is part of the dynamic reality 
that is inherent in the life of the Church when it is being true to the laws of its 
own nature. Some words of John V. Taylor, though used in a different setting, 
seem particularly apt as a description of Niebuhr's richly nuanced ecclesiology: 
- 'The blessedness of this inter-related, God-related community might be 
thought of either as wholeness or as harmony. The wholeness was the all-
inclusiveness of the framework of reference; the harmony was the reciprocity of 
all the parts ... the ever-shifting equipoise of a life-system. ,410 Whenever these 
intricate interactions are neglected, ignored, suppressed or otherwise distorted, 
the result is always the faithless falling away of the Church's witness into 
disaster and evil. Some of these distortions or 'defonnations' will be examined 
in greater detail in section 3 of this chapter. 
2. The Purpose of the Church: The Increase of the Love of God 
and Neighbour 
Niebuhr's polar analysis of the nature of the Church has given us ample 
evidence of the variety of purpose, multiplicity of goals and sheer differentiated 
vitality within this community. And yet, as he puts it, '[t]he question is whether 
there is one end beyond the many objectives as there is one Church in the many 
churches. Is there one goal to which all other goals are subordinate, not 
necessarily as means to end, but as proximate objectives that should be sought 
only in relation to a final purpose?,411 A little later in his reflections, Niebuhr 
calls this 'the final unifying consideration that modifies all the special 
strivings. ,412 
410 John V. Taylor, Enough is Enough, London, SCM Press, 1975, p. 42. 
411 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, op. cit., p. 28. 
412 Ibid., p. 29. 
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Niebuhr has been careful to indicate the rich multiplicity that seems to 
belong inescapably to the life of the Church. His intensive interaction with the 
work of Emst Troeltsch, on whom he had done his doctoral dissertation, had 
doubtless given him a profound appreciation for the diversity of ecclesial 
expressions. But lest this diversity became too centrifugal, Niebuhr now offers 
his own attempt at unifying the Church around a central or common purpose. 
This definition of the goal of the Church he states as 'the increase among men 
of the love of God and neighbor. ,413 He immediately notes that these simple 
words of Jesus are interpreted in various ways by different elements within the 
Church, and therefore, that certain shifts of emphasis are inevitable within the 
Christian community as a whole. His conviction, nonetheless, is that if this 
increase of the love of God and neighbour 'is the ultimate objective may it not 
be that many of our confusions and conflicts in churches and seminaries are due 
to failure to keep this goal in view while we are busy in the pursuit of proximate 
ends that are indeed important, but which set us at cross-purposes when 
followed without adequate reference to the final goOd?,414 
According to normative Christian terminology, Jesus' summary statement 'is 
both "law" and "gospel"; it is both the requirement laid on man by the 
Determiner of all things and the gift given, albeit in incompleteness, by the self-
giving of the Beloved.'41s But whilst there is a distinction between the two 
loves, there is no division or separation. Niebuhr tells us why. 'The 
interrelations of self, companion and God are so intricate that no member of this 
triad exists in his true nature without the others, nor can he be known or loved 
without the others. ,416 Spelt out in slightly more explicit detail this means that 
'God's love of self and neighbor, neighbor's love of God and self, selfs love of 
God and neighbor are so closely interrelated that none of the relations exists 
without the others.'417 
413 Ibid., p. 31 Note Niebuhr's American spelling of"neighbor". 
414 Ibid., pp. 31.32. 
415 Ibid., p. 32. 
416 Ibid., p. 34. 
417 Ibid. 
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Many people might assume that they already know what the words love, 
God and neighbour mean. Often, however, the definitions offered for these 
three terms can be so distorted and reductionist in theory, as to be disastrous 
and destructive in practice. Alert to such potential problems, Niebuhr now 
provides us with some illuminating and evocative ideas of what he believes 
each of these key terms indicate or mean. 
For Niebuhr, love means at least four things: rejoicing, gratitude, reverence 
and loyalty. His elucidation of these four features is full of such rich, 
descriptive depth that it is well worth quoting in its entirety. He writes: 
Love is rejoicing over the existence of the beloved one; it is the desire that he be rather 
than not be; it is longing for his presence when he is absent; it is happiness in the 
thought of him; it is profound satisfaction over everything that makes him great and 
glorious. Love is gratitude: it is thankfulness for the existence of the beloved; it is the 
happy acceptance of everything that he gives without the jealous feeling that the self 
ought to be able to do as much; it is gratitude that does not seek equality; it is wonder 
over the other's gift of himself in companionship. Love is reverence: it keeps its 
distance even as it draws near; it does not seek to absorb the other in the self or want to 
be absorbed by it; it rejoices in the otherness of the other; it desires the beloved to be 
what he is and does not seek to fashion him into a replica of the self or to make him a 
means to the self's advancement. As reverence love is and seeks knowledge of the 
other, not by way of curiosity nor for the sake of gaining power but in rejoicing and in 
wonder. In all such love there is an element of that "holy fear" which is not a form of 
flight but rather deep respect for the otherness of the beloved and the profound 
unwillingness to violate his integrity. Love is loyalty; it is the willingness to let the self 
be destroyed rather than that the other cease to be; it is the commitment of the self by 
self-binding will to make the other great. It is loyalty, too, to the other's cause - to his 
loyalty.418 
It is clear that Niebuhr's acute analysis of the meaning and reality of love is 
deeply informed by what the New Testament means by love or agape, 
especially as depicted in Paul's magnificent meditation in 1 Corinthians 13. It 
might not be saying too much to suggest that Niebuhr's description suffers little 
418 Ibid., p. 35. 
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by comparison in tenns of insight and lyricism. One notices too, that much of 
his analysis of the phenomenology of love is closely related to his 'pistology' or 
phenomenology of faith that we carefully considered in the first two chapters.419 
But what of the word God when we speak of the divine reality in relation to 
such love? Here Niebuhr uses a flurry of descriptive labels, for instance, 
making reference to 'the Source and Center of all being, the Determiner of 
destiny, the Universal One - God the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and 
Earth.,420 According to Niebuhr, God is no obvious reality, no 'lovely being 
easily made the object of our affection'. To love any such thing in this or 
similar ways is to fall into the essence of all sin: idolatry, which, as we saw 
earlier in this thesis, is the directing of our love and worship to any object other 
than God himself.421 There is a holiness, transcendence and sheer otherness 
which belongs inescapably to the divine nature. To speak of reconciliation and 
love to God is both a reality and perennial possibility, but Niebuhr seems keen 
here to emphasize the hidden and sometimes, even harrowing aspects of what it 
involves to truly love God. The heavily existentialist strain, seldom far from 
Niebuhr's writings, comes to the fore in the following passage, steeped in the 
spirit of his distinctive theologia crucis. He writes: 
Reconciliation to God is reconciliation to life itself; love to the Creator is love of 
being, rejoicing in existence, in its source, totality and particularity. Love to God is 
more than that, however, great as this demand and promise are. It is loyalty to the idea 
of God when the actuality of God is mystery; it is the affirmation of a universe and the 
devoted will to maintain a universal community at whatever cost to the self. It is the 
patriotism of the universal commonwealth, the kingdom of God, as a commonwealth 
of justice and love, the reality of which is sure to become evident. There is in such love 
of God a will-to-believe as the will-to-be-Ioyal to everything God and his kingdom 
stand for. Love to God is conviction that there is faithfulness at the heart of things: 
419 A further analysis of the inter-relationship of/aith, love and hope in Niebuhr's work will be 
carried out in section 3 of the sixth chapter of this thesis which deals more with matters of 
eschatology. 
420 Ibid., p. 36. 
421 See section 5 of chapter one of this thesis. 
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unity, reason, form and meaning in the plurality of being. It is the accompanying will 
to maintain or assert that unity, form and reason despite all appearances.422 
So far we have considered Niebuhr's meditations on what he means by two 
of the three terms in the triad -love, God and neighbour. We have looked at his 
richly descriptive definitions of love and God as he has presented them to us in 
his distinctive style of phenomenological existentialism. I have suggested that 
there is a kind of the%gia crucis in these reflections, especially when he 
ponders who or what is meant by the word God. However, the interesting, or 
even surprising thing about these reflections, is that so far Niebuhr, as a 
Christian theologian, has made no explicit reference to Jesus Christ. One way of 
assessing this could be to conclude that Niebuhr is proceeding along a line of 
argument which, in its relative abstraction from Christological realities, can 
only lead to misleading and reductionist definitions of what is meant by the 
terms love and God. At this stage one might be prepared to give some room to 
the suspicions of certain kinds of doctrinal orthodoxy, which seek to understand 
every aspect of the life, mission and witness of the Church from the 
confessional standpoint of faith in Jesus Christ. In these approaches, love and 
God are defined with intensive, or even exclusive reference to Jesus Christ; he 
is the one who embodies what both of these realities are, and who thus 
authorises us to describe them in tenns of what he is and does. Niebuhr, 
however, has chosen to follow a different course here. He has so far withheld 
making any explicit reference to Jesus Christ, though much of the content and 
style of his reflections on love and God have been, I am suggesting, suffused 
with christological imagery, especially in terms of a kind of the%gia crucis. 
But as we now turn to consider Niebuhr's treatment of neighbour, the third 
term of the triad which he has used to define the purpose of the Church, we find 
that the christological note becomes more explicit, and that Jesus Christ is 
specifically cited for the first time. In rhetorical fashion, Niebuhr asks: 'Who 
[then] ... is my neighbor, the companion whom I am commanded to love as 
myself or as I have been loved by my most loyal neighbor, the companion 
422 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry. op. cit., pp. 36-37. 
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whose love is also promised me as mine is promised him?,423 The paragraph 
which has been opened by the above quote is long, rich, complex and nuanced; 
but what becomes clear from Niebuhr's cumulative argument, is that the earlier 
rather cryptic reference to 'my most loyal neighbor' in fact applies to Jesus 
Christ. As Niebuhr continues in the same paragraph: 
[My neighbor] is the near one and the far one; the one beside the road I travel here and 
now; the one removed from me by distances in time and space. in convictions and 
loyalties. He is my friend. the one who has shown compassion toward me; and my 
enemy. who fights against me. He is the one in need. in whose hunger. nakedness. 
imprisonment and illness I see or ought to see the universal suffering servant. lie is the 
oppressed one who has not risen in rebellion against my oppression nor rewarded me 
according to my deserts as individual or member of a heedlessly exploiting group. lIe 
is the compassionate one who ministers to my needs: the stranger who takes me in; the 
father and mother. sister and brother. In him the image of the universal redeemer is 
seen as in a glass darkly. Christ is my neighbor. but the Christ in my neighbor is not 
Jesus; it is rather the eternal son of God incarnate in Jesus. revealed in Jesus Christ. 
The neighbor is in past and present and future, yet he is not simply mankind in its 
totality but rather in its articulation, the community of individuals and individuals in 
community. He is Augustine in the Roman Catholic Church and Socrates in Athens. 
and the Russian people. and the unborn generations who will bear the consequences of 
our failures, future persons for whom we are administering the entrusted wealth of 
nature and other greater common gifts. He is man and he is angel and he is animal and 
inorganic being. all that participates in being.'t424 
In a later chapter we shall consider Niebuhr's theology from an ecumenical 
perspective, a feature which we found to be constitutive of radical monotheism 
per se, as expounded and analysed in the earlier chapters where we traced its 
content and contours from an existential, evangelical and also, by means of the 
concept of responsibility, an ethical perspective. What Niebuhr's meditations 
on the identity of the neighbour have done here, is once again to underline how 
absolutely essential this ecumenical, universal or catholic perspective is to a 
proper understanding of God's self-revelation in the reconciling and redeeming 
work of Jesus Christ. The Church is thus that community which centres on 
423 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
424 Ibid .• p. 38. 
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Jesus Christ as the historical being through whom this work is accomplished 
and revealed. Niebuhr, as we saw in chapter two, is too careful a theologian to 
overlook the fact that Jesus Christ does so by being both divine and human. But 
the way in which Niebuhr would have us understand Jesus Christ. is not so 
much initially or primarily through his identity and agency as divine, but rather, 
as the archetypal or Christo-morphic neighbour to whom we are inescapably 
related. In ongoing interaction with this 'most loyal neighbor' we come to 
realise those fundamental truths about ourselves, about the world, and about 
God, that otherwise would continue to escape us or be ruinously misunderstood. 
Why, we might ask, does Niebuhr develop his argument in this way, 
exploring Jesus Christ more from the viewpoint of his humanity, rather than the 
more classically 'Nicean' or 'Chalcedonian' approaches, in which Christ's 
divinity is presupposed or at least given greater emphasis? The reason is, I 
think, more for strategic or pragmatic reasons than for any particular desire on 
Niebuhr's part to deny or defy doctrinal orthodoxy. 
In much of his work, Niebuhr is keen to find ways in which to connect Jesus 
Christ and his community with other communities, indeed with the world at 
large. His reading of church history leads him to believe that more harm than 
good has resulted from Christian exclusiveness. In other words, when the 
Church emphasises or over-emphasises the element of separatism from the 
surrounding society, it is often supposed, though not logically necessary, of 
course, that it is claiming for itself, a kind of righteousness which, properly 
speaking, is Christ's alone. Such self-righteousness, however, religiously or 
otherwise based, was one of the things to which Jesus himself was perhaps most 
opposed, for it tended to blind its adherents to the disastrous consequences 
which almost inevitably follow. As so often with Niebuhr, the intricate 
interaction between theology, ethics and history leads him to explore new ways 
in which to understand, articulate, and hopefully, reform or resolve, old 
dilemmas or perennial problems. In the next section of this chapter, we shall 
develop this point a bit further through the use of the terms deformation and 
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henotheism where the theologia crucis emerges as a painful, but profoundly 
necessary instrument of ecclesial self-critique.425 
3. The Deformation of the Church: Confusing Proximate with 
Ultimate Goals 
Niebuhr has defined the goal of the Church as 'the increase of the love of God 
and neighbor'. But given the multifarious nature of this community, it is hardly 
surprising that Jesus' words are interpreted and applied in various ways. As far 
back as his first book The Social Sources of Denominationalism, Niebuhr had 
shown profound appreciation for the plurality attendant with being the Church. 
However, whilst the manifold nature of the Church is a necessary part of its 
witness within a diverse world, there are also less welcome aspects to this 
diversity. 
Jesus' call for the love of God and neighbour oUght to provide a grand unity 
of purpose for a plural Christian community, but instead, various parts of the 
Church 'usually speak of more proximate contexts and goals and often manifest 
an almost ultimate concern in less ultimate matters. From such confusions of 
the proximate with the ultimate arise some of their external and internal 
conflicts.'426 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Church finds that 'its difficulties 
are increased tremendously by the internal conflict in which it is engaged when 
it substitutes the relative for the absolute. ,427 
What are some of these proximate contexts and goals? Speaking from his 
North American vantage point in the mid 1950's, Niebuhr identifies four main 
ones out of a whole host of possibilities: denominationalism; ecclesiasticism; 
425 For more on the term henotheism, see section 4 of chapter one and section 3 of chapter two. 
426 Ibid., p. 39. 
427 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
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Biblicism and 'Christism' this latter being a Niebuhrian term for an isolated and 
therefore distorted understanding of Jesus Christ.428 
Taking each of these fallacies in turn, we note that the first one to elicit 
Niebuhr's criticism is denominationalism, which, in his first book he described 
as representing 'the moral failure of Christianity. ,429 To be sure, the one Church 
of Jesus Christ has always diversified itself in many ways so as relate 
meaningfully to its particular context. But disaster ensues whenever one finds 
'the confusion ofa branch of the Church with the whole Church' such that the 
denomination is practically considered to be the 'ultimate environment' in 
which life is lived and witness is borne,43o A healthier understanding is one in 
which the Church avoids falling prey either to a petty provincialism or a bland 
unity. 'The confusion between part and whole is not to be avoided by denying 
the reality of the parts but only by the acceptance of diversity and limitation and 
the corollary recognition that all the parts are equally related to the ultimate 
object of the Church.'431 Here we have clear evidence of Niebuhr's long-
established ecumenical sensibility, an aspect of his life and work which we 
shall consider more fully when we look at radical monotheism and 
responsibility from this perspective in the next chapter. 
The second, and perhaps more significant fallacy which Niebuhr identifies 
'is the confusion of Church, considered as a whole or in its essence, with the 
ultimate context' in which the Church is called to be and to witness,432 A 
common tendency is to think of "Church" or "Christianity" as filling the whole 
horizon of one's concern. But there is 'an internal contradiction' in regarding 
work for these 'as the final activity to be considered', The contradiction is that 
here one is involved in a subtle form of subjectivism, where God is no longer 
acknowledged as objective and transcendent, and where Church or Christianity 
are all but equated with the sovereign activity that alone rests with him. To 
428 Ibid., pp. 39-47, esp. p. 46 for the sununary terms used here. 
429 HRN, The Social Sources of Denominationalism, op. cit., p. 25. 
430 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, op. cit., p. 40. 
431 Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
432 Ibid., p. 41. 
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remember Niebuhr's earlier polar analysis, the Church forgets that it is 'the 
subjective pole of the objective rule of God.'433 
In other words, for Niebuhr, a good ecclesiology will strive to affirm and 
clarify the role which God has given to the Church, but in the process of doing 
so will also seek to put the life and work of this community in its proper place. 
The Church's place will thus always be strictly subordinate to God's purposes; 
and its role will be that of servant to Jesus Christ, its Lord and Head. In saying 
this, Niebuhr is reiterating some of the keenest insights of the Reformation, in 
the process making it quite clear that he still regards the Roman Catholic claim 
to ecclesial priority or even hegemony, as a claim from which he has to dissent. 
His views are well expressed when he writes elsewhere: 
As Protestant Catholics we protest both against the absolutizing or deifying of the 
whole Catholic Church of which we are a part and against the claim of a part of that 
whole to exercise power over the whole. But it was a sad day for us when we 
surrendered the name Catholic to that part of the Church which failed in its catholicity, 
and so - as well as in other ways - failed in catholicity ourselves. As Protestant 
Catholic theology our theology will maintain the Catholic vision as embodying a 
continuous protest against the substitution of any finite reality including the Church for 
the sovereign of the Church - a substitution of which not only Romanism has been 
guilty. And as Protestants we will protest in the Church against seizure of power in the 
Church by any part. But the gift of the Catholic vision does not allow us to exclude 
from our companionship those against whom we protest, for they are parts of the 
Catholic Church. It is the gift and duty of Protestant Catholicism to be more Catholic 
than Romanism is, to be in short the movement of Catholic reformation. For 
reformation there must be as long as there is Catholic Christianity.434 
This same line of thOUght also resurfaces in further reflections on what 
Niebuhr calls 'church-centered henotheism' in which the critical gap or 
distinction between God and the community of faith fails to be observed. The 
necessary polarity between divine objectivity and human subjectivity is again 
collapsed or conflated in subtly ruinous ways. As he understands it: 
433 Ibid., p. 19. 
434 HRN, 'The Gift of the Catholic Vision,' op. cit., p. 517. 
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In church-centered faith the community of those who hold common beliefs, practice 
common rites, and submit to a common rule becomes the immediate object of trust and 
the cause of loyalty. The church is so relied upon as source of truth that what the 
church teaches is believed and to be believed because it is the church's teaching; it is 
trusted as the judge of right and wrong and as the guarantor of salvation from 
meaninglessness and death. To have faith in God and to believe the church become one 
and the same thing. To be turned toward God and to be converted to the church 
become almost identical; the way to God is through the church. So the subtle change 
occurs from radical monotheism to henotheism. The community that pointed to the 
faithfulness of the One now points to itself as his representative, but God and church 
have become so identified that often the word "God" seems to mean the collective 
representation of the church. God is almost defined as the one who is encountered in 
the church or the one in whom the church believes. History is reinterpreted so that the 
story of the mighty deeds of God in creation, judgment, and redemption is replaced by 
church history or "holy history," an account of special deeds whereby the special 
community was formed and saved. Rites, instead of being dramatic re-enactments of 
what God has done, is doing, and will do to men, become divine enactments in a closed 
society; the deeds of the church or its priests tend to be identified with the deeds of 
God. The unity of the church, the holiness of the church, and the universality of the 
church are valued not so much because they reflect the unity, holiness, and universal 
dominion of God but as ends to be sought for the sake of the church or as virtues to be 
celebrated because in them the true being of the church comes to appearance. In such 
ecclesiasticism echoes of monotheism continue to be heard. The God to whom 
reference is made in every act of worship and in every proclamation of the church's 
message is still to some extent acknowledged as the principle of being. Yet the 
confusion is there between that objective principle and its image in the church. The 
God of the Christian church has become confused with a Christian God, the One 
beyond all the many with the collective representation of a church that is one 
community among many. 435 
The third major fallacy which Niebuhr sees at work within the life of the 
Church is an overemphasis upon, and thus misunderstanding of, the role of the 
Bible. This is especially so in Protestantism, which has a long disputatious 
history here. Niebuhr's position is that 'the identification of the Scriptures with 
435 HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, op. cit., pp. 58-59. 
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God is an error, a denial of the content of the Scriptures themselves. To give 
final devotion to the book is to deny the final claim of God; to look for the 
mighty deeds of God only in the records of the past is to deny that he is the 
living God; to love the book as the source of strength and of salvation is to 
practice an idolatry that can bring only confusion into life .• 436 Niebuhr's 
position is thus much closer to the classical insights of such Reformers as 
Luther and Calvin. and to the subsequent mainstream Reformation tradition, 
than it is to either a reductionist and thus compromised liberalism, or a 
fundamentalism fixated on the doctrine of verbal inerrancy.437 
James Gustafson has written in his introduction to Niebuhr's posthumously 
published The Responsible Self, that 'Scripture is the unique and indispensable 
but mediate and derived authority for our knowledge of God and our existence 
before him. ,438 These comments may be taken as a fair interpretation of 
Niebuhr's understanding of the authority and role of the Bible within the life 
and work of the Church. 'Without the Bible, as without the Church, Christians 
do not exist and cannot carry on their work; but it is one thing to recognize the 
indispensability of these means, another thing to make means into ends .• 439 
These remarks indicate that for Niebuhr, the authority of both the Bible and the 
Church is more nearly functional or instrumental. Further evidence of these 
convictions is to be found in the following autobiographical reflections which 
he offered near the end of his career; reflections which show how his 
determinative principle of a radically monotheistic reformation was still very 
much to the fore: 
If my Protestantism led me in the past to protest against the spirit of capitalism and of 
nationalism, of communism and technological civilization, it now leads me to protest 
against the deification of Scriptures and the church. In many circles today we have 
substituted for the religion-centered faith of the 19th century a church-centered faith, as 
though the historical and visible church were the representative of God on earth, as 
though the Bible were the only word that God is speaking. I do not see how we can 
436 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, op. cit., pp. 43-44. 
437 For a recent treatment of related themes, see John Webster, Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic 
Sketch, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 2003. 
438 HRN, The Responsible Self, op. cit., p. 25. 
439 HRN. The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, op. cit.. p. 44. 
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witness to the divine sovereignty without being in the church nor how we can 
understand what God is doing and declaring to us in our public and private experiences 
without the dictionary of the Scriptures, but it seems to me that in our new orthodox 
movements we are moving dangerously near to the untenable positions against which 
the Reformation and the 18th century revival had to protest.440 
We come now to the last of the major fallacies which Niebuhr identifies as 
cause for confusion and conflict in the life and work of the Church, and this is 
doubtless the most controversial of the four. 'The most prevalent, the most 
deceptive and perhaps ultimately the most dangerous inconsistency to which 
churches and schools are subject in our time (perhaps in all the Christian 
centuries) arises from the substitution of Christology for theology, of the love 
of Jesus Christ for the love of God and of life in the community of Jesus Christ 
for life in the divine commonwealth. ,441 
Earlier on in this chapter, when we were considering his definition of the 
three key terms love, God and neighbour, we noted that Niebuhr chose a 
particular strategy which involved placing comparatively greater emphasis on 
the humanity of Jesus rather than on his divinity, whilst yet affirming the reality 
of the latter. This is in keeping with Niebuhr's usual christological 
methodology, which we considered in detail in chapter two, written from an 
evangelical perspective. Again, it is important to try and appreciate why 
Niebuhr approaches the subject-matter as he does since a superficial reading of 
his comments could seriously misunderstand, not to say misrepresent, what is, 
in effect, a necessary, though often neglected, doctrinal issue, and one which 
has far-reaching implications for ecclesiology and mission. 
In addressing his christological concerns here in an ecclesiological 
perspective, Niebuhr initially makes appeal to the doctrine of the Trinity, 
though, as elsewhere in his writings, the reference is rather brief and 
undeveloped. As always, the emphasis is strongly on the oneness of God, but 
440 HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' op. cit., p. 250. For a more detailed analysis of 
Niebuhr's use of Scripture see Jeffrey S. Siker, 'H. Richard Niebuhr: Confessing with 
Scripture,' pp. 25-58 in Scripture and Ethics: Twentieth Century Portraits, New York. Oxford 
University Press, 1997. 
441 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, op. cit., p. 44. 
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nonetheless, the triune distinctions of Father, Son and Spirit are affirmed. 
Whether these distinctions are both ontological and functional for Niebuhr, or 
only the latter, will be left aside for the moment, though we did offer an 
assessment of this in the evangelical chapter. The specific point, however, 
which he seeks to make here in terms of ecclesiology is that 'in many churchly 
pronouncements the faith of Christians is stated as if their one God were Jesus 
Christ; as if Christ's ministry of reconciliation to the Creator were of no 
importance; as if the Spirit proceeded only from the Son ..• When this is done 
the faith of Christians is converted into a Christian religion for which Jesus 
Christ in isolation is the one object of devotion and in which his own testimony, 
his very character, his Sonship, his relation to the One with whom he is united, 
are denied. ,442 
It would be difficult to deny that these critical observations about the 
empirical life of the Church are not true. Niebuhr, as we saw elsewhere, calls 
this 'the Unitarianism of the Son,443 since, to all intents and purposes, Jesus 
Christ in isolation has become the God and Saviour of Christians, without any 
adequate reference to the being and action of God the Father and God the Holy 
Spirit. As so often is the case, when such subtle theological distinctions are 
ignored or unrecognised, they can significantly contribute to serious 
ecclesiological problems. 
Historically and theologically we are dealing here with devout yet aberrant forms of 
faith that are unable to illuminate the more profound problems of human existence, 
suffering, guilt and destiny or to answer questions about human history in its 
wholeness. They tend moreover to make of that faith a religion much like all other 
human religions instead of a relation to the Transcendent that goes beyond all our 
religions. This confusion of the proximate with the final introduces many internal 
conflicts into the work of the churches and of theological education. It leads directly to 
the effort to emphasize the uniqueness of the Christian religion, to define it as the 
"true" religion, to recommend it because of its originality, to exaggerate the differences 
between Christian and Jewish faith, to re-erect walls of division that Jesus Christ broke 
442 Ibid., p.45. 
443 HRN, 'The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Unity of the Church,' in Theology, History and 
Culture, op. cit., pp. 50-62, esp. pp. 53·55. 
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down, to exalt the followers of the one who humbled himself, to define the neighbor as 
fellow Christian. That the confusion has not led to greater spiritual disasters than have 
been encountered is doubtless due to the fact that Jesus Christ in his nature and witness 
is a constant corrective of the perversion of his worship.444 
This perennial tendency towards what Niebuhr calls 'Christ-centered 
henotheism' is a theme to which he returns time and time again. His reading of 
many of the varied situations in which the Church is called to be and to witness, 
is that, tragically, this henotheistic confusion about the identity of Jesus Christ 
often leads to disturbing, even destructive consequences. Pursuing this 
christological line of thought, and its distorting impact upon the sort of 
ecc1esiology that almost inescapably goes with it, he writes: 
The significance of Jesus Christ for the Christian church is so great that high 
expressions about his centrality to faith are the rule rather than the exception in the 
language of preaching and of worship. Yet it is one thing for Christians to look forward 
to the day when "every tongue [will] confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of 
God the Father" - to use the words of an ancient liturgical hymn (Phil. 2:11) - and 
another thing for theology as well as popular piety to substitute the Lordship of Christ 
for the Lordship of God. At various times in history and in many areas of piety and 
theology Christianity has been transformed not only into a Christ-cult or a Jesus-cult 
but into a Christ- or Jesus-faith. The person through whom Christians have received 
access to God, the one who so reconciled them to the source of being that they are bold 
to say "Our father who art in heaven," the one who in unique obedience, trust, and 
loyalty lived, died, and rose again as Son of God, is now invested with such absolute 
significance that his relation to the One beyond himself is so slurred over that he 
becomes the center of value and the object of loyalty. The confidence that is expected 
of Christians is confidence in him; the formulation of the confidence in creed and 
theology becomes a set of assertions about Jesus Christ; theology is turned into 
Christology. And with this turn there is also a frequent turn to ecclesiasticism [see the 
previous distortion] insofar as the community that centers in Jesus Christ is set forth 
both as the object of his loyalty and of the Christian's loyalty. To be a Christian now 
means not so much that through the mediation and the pioneering faith of Jesus Christ 
a man has become wholly human, has been called into membership in the society of 
universal being, and has accepted the fact that amidst the totality of existence he is not 
44-4 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, op. cit., pp. 45-46. 
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exempt from the human lot; it means rather that he has become a member of a special 
group, with a special god, a special destiny, and a separate existence.44s 
And so we come to Niebuhr's concluding comments on these various 
deformations of the true nature of the being and well being of the Church. As he 
puts it in the following summary paragraph: 
Denominationalism not the denominations; ecclesiasticism not the churches; 
Biblicism not the Bible; Christism not Jesus Christ; these represent the chief present 
perversions and confusions in Church and theology. There are many other less 
deceptive, cruder substitutions of the proximate for the ultimate. But the ones 
described seem to set the great problems to faith and theology in our time. In them the 
need for a constant process of a radically monotheistic reformation comes to 
appearance.446 
Throughout his writings, Niebuhr provides a sustained critique of the 
Church. This is more nearly prophetic, rather than merely denunciatory, 
because he writes as an 'insider', as one who loves the Church and believes 
passionately in its divinely-appointed and divinely-enabled tife and mission. If 
his is often in large measure a 'negative ecc1esiology,447 it is only because he is 
concerned for the Church to be faithful to the truth of the gospel, the good news 
of God's grace manifest in Jesus Christ, and expressed by him in the New 
Testament in an imperative that is both simple and profound: 'love God and 
love your neighbour.' Niebuhr's prophetic analysis of any 'deformations' in the 
life and witness of the Church is offered as a contribution to, and aspect of, a 
greater task, that of suggesting possible ways in which this community can be 
changed or reformed so as to be more truthful and faithful to the calling of its 
Lord. In the next section of this chapter, we will consider Niebuhr's own 
'positive' proposals for the ongoing 'reformation' of the Church . 
.... , HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, op. tit., pp. 59-60; see also HRN, The 
Responsible Self, op. cit., p. 172 for a similar rendering of this, by now familiar Niebuhrian 
conviction. 
446 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, op. cit., p. 46 . 
.... , The phrase is that of Edward Schillebeeckx, Church: The Human Story of God, New York, 
1990, p. xix and is quoted by John Webster, Barth 's Ethics of Reconciliation, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 166. 
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4. The Reformation of the Church: The Responsible Church as 
'Christo-morphic' Apostle, Pastor and Pioneer 
In his often-quoted autobiographical article published in 1960, Niebuhr reflects 
upon his own life's work. In the process he gives us a clear indication of the 
vital tasks that are both perennial for any Christian theologian and also of 
urgent personal importance for him in the immediate future, thus enabling us to 
appreciate what he sees as the relative weight of emphasis between prophetic 
critique and constructive proposal. 'My primary concern today ... is not to 
protest. It is still that of the reformation of the church. I believe that reformation 
is a permanent movement, that metanoia is the continuous demand made on us 
in historical life. The immediate reformation of the church that I pray for, look 
for and want to work for in the time that may remain to me is its reformation 
not now by separation from the world but by a new entrance into it without 
conformity to it. I believe our separation has gone far enough and that now we 
must find new ways of doing what we were created to do .• 448 
Niebuhr, as ever, describes the contemporary existential situation of selves 
and their societies in powerful and moving language, trapped as these 'social 
selves' are in their various aspects of 'idolatry, disillusionment and emptiness'. 
All of this calls for a response from the Church. and thus prompts Niebuhr to 
offer the outline of an answer in the closing paragraph of his article. 'I do not 
believe that we can meet in our day the need which the church was founded to 
meet by becoming more orthodox or more liberal, more biblical or more 
liturgical. I look for a resymbolization of the message and the life of faith in the 
One God. Our old phrases are worn out; they have become cliches by means of 
which we can neither grasp nor communicate the reality of our existence before 
God. Retranslation is not enough; more precisely, retranslation of traditional 
terms - "Word of God," "redemption," "incarnation," 'justification," "grace," 
"eternal life" - is not possible unless one has direct relations in the immediacy 
448 HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' The Christian Century 77 (1960), p. 250. Note 
that this was also published as 'How My Mind Has Changed,' in How My Mind Has Changed, 
ed., H.E. Fey, Cleveland, Meridian Books, 1961, pp. 69-80. 
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of personal life to the actualities to which people in another time referred to 
with the aid of such symbols. ,449 
Evident in these remarks is Niebuhr's continued wrestling with the 
prevailing options and predominant tendencies in the ecclesiastical context of 
the time. Once again, one notes his willingness to engage with the differing 
approaches found in ecc1esial life in general, and theological practice in 
particular. One notices too, his acknowledgment of the, as he sees it, 
comparative strengths and weaknesses inherent in various approaches, but that 
he is finally unwilling to give exclusive allegiance to any of the existing 
options, thus leaving open some space for his own preferred alternative. 
However, it is just here, in the task of providing more detail to his intriguing 
sketch, that Niebuhr proves to be most frustrating or unsatisfactory. 'I do not 
know how this resymbolization in pregnant words and in symbolic deeds ... 
will come about. I do count on the Holy Spirit and believe that the words and 
deeds will come about. I also believe, with both the prophets and, of all men, 
Karl Marx [a brave affirmation to make at that time in the U.S.A.], that the 
reformation of religion is the fundamental reformation of society. And I believe 
that nothing very important for mankind will happen as a result of our 
"conquest" of space or as a result of the cessation of the cold war unless the 
human spirit is revived within itself.,4so 
If that were all that could be said, then Niebuhr's tentative suggestions for an 
alternative strategy or more satisfactory imagery as regards the reformation or 
'resymbolization' of the church would be devoid of any interest. However, 
some scholars have proposed that Niebuhr himself had already provided some 
rich resources for such a promising new image of a reformed church: that image 
is the one that emerged in his symbol of the human being as 'the responsible 
self, an image based upon a fresh consideration of Jesus Christ as the 
embodiment of 'fitting response' to God's creative, governing and redemptive 
actions. Therefore, it is suggested, as the 'Body of Christ', the Church may be 
said, in some way, to be responsible to God for the world as its consciously 
4-49 HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' op. cit., p. 2S 1. 
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'Christo-morphic community' .451 Interestingly, we can go as far back in 
Niebuhr's corpus as 1946, in order to carry out an exposition and interpretation 
of his earliest, and in some ways, most detailed treatment of this theme.452 
We are already familiar from chapter three, with the logic of Niebuhr's 
ethics of responsibility. We are thus on familiar ground when we find him 
saying that '[t]o be responsible is to be able and required to give account to 
someone for something. The idea of responsibility, with the freedom and 
obligation it implies, has its place in the context of social relations. To be 
responsible is to be a self in the presence of other selves, to whom one is bound 
and to whom one is able to answer freely; responsibility includes stewardship or 
trusteeship over things that belong to the common 1i re of the selves. ,453 
Thus far in our analysis of his work, we have seen that the thrust of 
Niebuhr's argument has been based on an understanding of responsibility as it 
occurs in personal, or better still, interpersonal contexts, where 'social selves' 
may also be described as 'responsible selves'. The human being as a social self 
or responsible self is called, in a Christian context, to be responsible to 'God-in-
Christ and Christ-in-God' for the world that God has placed him or her in, a 
world that, as we have seen before, is the arena of divine creative, governing 
and redemptive action.454 But the concept of responsibility is not simply to be 
confined to the ethics of the personal. It also has relevance to the Church as that 
community whose centre is confessed to be 'God-in-Christ' and which is thus 
called, like Christ himself, to exercise universal responsibility to the One God 
for all that is the object of his faithful, sovereign love. 'Such universal 
responsibility is incompatible with a spiritualism that limits the church's 
concern to immaterial values, with a moralism that does not understand the 
value of the sinner and the sinful nation, with an individualism that makes 
4S1 See, for example, Lonnie D. Kliever, H. Richard Niebuhr. Waco, Texas, Word Books, 1977, 
pp. 151-161; R. Melvin Keiser, Roots of Relational Ethics: Responsibility In Origin and 
Maturity in H. Richard Niebuhr. Atlanta. Scholars Press, 1996. pp. 177-193; Terrence Owen 
Sherry, Shaped by Christ: The Christo-morphic hermeneutical theology of H. Richard Niebuhr. 
Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate University, 1997. 
4S2 HRN, 'The Responsibility of the Church for Society,' In The Gospel. the Church and the 
World, ed. K. S. Latourette, New York, Harper and Bros., 1946, pp. 111-133. 
45l Ibid., p. 114. 
4s4lbid., pp. 117-119. 
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mankind as a whole and its societies of less concern to God than single persons, 
and with any of those particularistic and polytheistic theories of value and 
responsibility which substitute for God-in-Christ some other deity as the source 
of valuable being. ,455 
According to Niebuhr, the Church can be 'irresponsible' in two major ways 
to which he gives the labels 'worldliness' and 'isolationism'. For instance, 
when the Church 'thinks of itself as responsible to society for God rather than 
to God for society' it inevitably finds itself entangled in a swathe of 
compromises and competing concerns for which the word 'idolatry' is an apt 
description, and which results eventually in the manifold misery of fallen and 
faithless existence. In Niebuhr's judgement, this has been the predominant 
characteristic of the church with which he is most familiar, that of the industrial 
West in the twentieth century. As a reaction to the corporate sin of 'worldliness' 
Niebuhr notes that another form of irresponsibility, which he calls 
'isolationism', often occurs. His view is that this is 'the heresy opposite to 
worldliness. It appears when the church seeks to respond to God but does so 
only for itself and thus 'regards the secular societies with which it lives as 
outside the divine concern. ,456 Whilst partially understandable as a reactionary 
response to the too worldly church, Niebuhr nonetheless sees this as a serious 
misreading of the gospel which is meant for every aspect of the entire world.457 
The true measure of the Church's responsibility is not to be found, however, by 
attending to either extreme or by seeking for a compromise position between them but 
rather by attending to the two aspects of Christian responsibility in the right way. The 
relation to God and the relation to society must neither be confused with each other as 
is the case in social religion, nor separated from each other as is the case in Christian 
isolationism; they must be maintained in the unity of responsibility to God for the 
neighbor.4S8 
4S5 Ibid., pp. 119-120. 
4S61bid., p. 124. 
4s'lbid., pp. 120-126. 
4S81bid., p. 126. 
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Niebuhr's proposal is that whilst the 'Church's responsibility to God for 
human societies' doubtless varies due to differing contexts, nonetheless 'it may 
be described in a general fashion by reference to the apostolic, the pastoral and 
the pioneering functions of the Christian community.,459 To each of these three 
aspects: the responsible Church as apostle, pastor and pioneer, we now turn in 
greater detail. 
First, the Church in its apostolic responsibility is called, equipped and sent 
with the task of 'announcing the Gospel to all nations and of making them 
disciples of Christ. The function of the Church as apostolic messenger to 
individuals is clear-cut, but emphasis upon it ought not to lead to the obscuring 
of its mission to social groups. ,460 It would appear, however, that '[t]he Church 
has not yet in its apostolic character made the transition from an individualistic 
to a social period' even though it 'seems the more urgent in our time because 
the unbelief, the fear and sin of man come to exhibition more dramatically in 
the public life than elsewhere. ,461 
Clearly. then, part of this apostolic responsibility will involve 'the prophetic 
function of preaching repentance. The good news about the glory of divine 
goodness is neither rightly proclaimed nor rightly heard if it is not combined 
with the bad news about the great justice which prevails in God's world. ,462 But 
whatever side of the message needs proclaiming at any particular juncture. 
whether grace or judgement, the Church must address not just 'governments' or 
'officials' or the so-called 'mighty', but also 'nations and societies' or what 
Niebuhr calls 'the great mass' of the human community. 'How the Church is to 
carry out this apostolic task in our time is one of the most difficult problems it 
confronts. Its habits and customs, its forms of speech and its methods of 
proclamation come from a time when individuals rather than societies were in 
the center of attention .• 463 Once again, Niebuhr seems to be returning to themes 
that were of perennial concern to him, namely 'language' and 'methods of 
4S91bid. 
460 Ibid., pp. 126-127. 
461 Ibid., p. 127. 
462 Ibid., p. 128. 
463 Ibid. 
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communication', ever in search of ways of sharing the Christian message that 
fit best with changing circumstances and new contexts. 
Second, the Church has a pastoral responsibility in which it 'responds to 
Christ-in-God by being a shepherd of the sheep, a seeker of the lost, the friend 
of publicans and sinners, of the poor and brokenhearted.' Yet a consequence 'of 
its pastoral interest in individuals' has been that 'the Church has found itself 
forced to take an interest in political and economic measures or institutions.' 
This will always be the case in genuine pastoral ministry. 'The Church cannot 
be responsible to God for men without becoming responsible for their societies. 
As the interdependence of men increases in industrial and technological 
civilization the responsibility for dealing with the great networks of 
interrelationships increases. If the individual sheep is to be protected the flock 
must be guarded.'464 However, it should be noted that such pastoral 
responsibility of the Church for society is 'direct as well as indirect' for when 
great humanitarian crises occur it 'cannot be sufficient for the Church to call 
upon the governments of nations to feed the hungry and clothe the naked.' 
Rather, the Church should address such issues and meet such needs directly as 
the community of Christ's care and compassion in the world.46s 
Third, and finally, in its role as social pioneer, Niebuhr says that the 'Church 
is that part of the human community which responds first to God-in-Christ and 
Christ-in-God. It is the sensitive and responsive part in every society and 
mankind as a whole. It is that group which hears the Word of God, which sees 
His judgments, which has the vision of the resurrection. In its relations with 
God it is the pioneer part of society that responds to God on behalf of the whole 
society' a principle that we find in the prophetic remnant within Hebrew 
society, who spoke and lived in such fashion as to call Israel to be 'a light to the 
nations' so that all peoples would eventually be blessed. However, this 'idea of 
representational responsibility is illustrated particularly by Jesus Christ' for 'he 
is the first-born of many brothers not only in resurrection but in rendering 
obedience to God. His obedience was a sort of pioneering and representative 
464 Ibid., p. 129. 
465 Ibid., pp. 129-130. 
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obedience; he obeyed on behalf of men, and so showed what men could do and 
drew forth a divine response in turn toward all the men he represented. He 
discerned the divine mercy and relied upon it as representing men and 
pioneering for them. ,466 
Reiterating a point from earlier in his argument, Niebuhr says that this idea 
of 'pioneering or representational responsibility has been somewhat obscured 
during the long centuries of individualist overemphasis. Its expression in the 
legal terms of traditional theology is strange and often meaningless to modem 
ears.' But now that there is a growing awareness of the fact that we are social 
selves living in increasingly interdependent relations in the 'global village' of 
modernity or post-modernity, we are surely being urged to consider more 
seriously a more appropriate anthropology than simply individualism or 
atomism. 'In this representational sense the Church is that part of human 
society, and that element in each particular society, which moves toward God, 
which as the priest acting for all men worships Him, which believes and trusts 
in Him on behalf of all, which is first to obey Him when it becomes aware of a 
new aspect of His will. ,467 
An especially important aspect of this pioneering or representational 
responsibility is in the realm of ethics where the Church is called to be 'the first 
to repent for the sins of a society' and thus 'repents on behalf of all' taking the 
lead 'in the social act of repentance.' In an era when we see such 'dramatic 
revelations of the evils of nationalism, of racialism and of economic 
imperialism it is the evident responsibility of the Church to repudiate these 
attitudes within itself and to act as the pioneer of society in doing so ... As the 
representative and pioneer of mankind the church meets its social responsibility 
when in its own thinking, organization and action it functions as a world 
society, undivided by race, class and national interests. ,468 A measure of just 
how important this third function of pioneering or representational 
466 Ibid., p. 130. 
467 Ibid., p. 131. Note the similarities to Barth' s notion of the Church in its status or role of 
'provisional representation' in Kart Barth, Church Dogmatics, op. tit., lVII, pp. 643-739; IV/2, 
~. 614-726; IV/3, pp. 681-901. 
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responsibility is in the life of the Church can be found in the closing paragraph 
ofNiebuhr's essay: 
This seems to be the highest form of social responsibility in the Church. It is the 
direct demonstration of love of God and neighbor rather than a repetition of the 
commandment to self and others. It is the radical demonstration of faith. Where this 
responsibility is being exercised there is no longer any question about the reality of the 
Church. In pioneering and representative action of response to God in Christ the 
invisible Church becomes visible and the deed of Christ is reduplicated.469 
This 1946 paper was Niebuhr's first explicit exploration of the concept of 
responsibility, and it is remarkable how consistent its insights are with those 
that we explored in the previous chapter on his ethics. We now bring our 
analysis in this chapter to a close with a final section in which we look at how 
Niebuhr understands and articulates what we will here call the 'spirituality' of 
the Church as a properly responsible 'Christo-morphic' community. 
5. The Spirituality of the Church: 'Participation in the Present 
Passion' 
The main textual resource for our exposition of this theme is a sennon which 
Niebuhr published in 1951 entitled 'Participation in the Present Passion. ,470 In a 
letter to his brother Reinhold, Niebuhr had once spoken of the fact that though 
he, Richard, was best known as a seminary theologian and ethicist, he 
nonetheless still maintained that 'I remain a preacher more than anything 
else.'471 Our research into Niebuhr's corpus leads us to concur with his own 
assessment, for not only was there a good preacher's feel for, and use of, 
469 Ibid., p. 132. 
470 HRN, 'Participation in the Present Passion,' Pulpit Digest 32, 1951, pp. 27-32. 
471 HRN letter to Reinhold Niebuhr, exact date unknown, though approximately late 1930's, and 
cited in Richard Wightman Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography, San Francisco, Harper & 
Row, 1985, p. 183. 
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appropriate and evocative language, even in his more academic writings, but 
the few sermons that have been made available in published form provide 
powerful evidence of the fact that he savoured and excelled in the preacher's 
craft.472 
This was all of a piece with the fact that Niebuhr felt that his primary calling 
was to work within, and for the betterment of, the Church, in its task of 
faithfully witnessing to the love of God incarnate in Jesus Christ. The specific 
occasion for the paper that we will now analyse was Niebuhr being called upon 
to prepare and preach a sermon for World-Wide Communion Sunday at a 
worship service in which the congregation was celebrating the Lord's Supper. 
The two texts that he chooses for his exposition are Isaiah 53:5-6 and Matthew 
25:40, and these provide the scriptural basis for a poignant and penetrating 
meditation upon the 'Christo-morphic' responsibility that comes with our 
corporate belonging to the Church. 
In one sense, what we are being offered here is the nearest thing to a 
'sacramental theology' that Niebuhr gives us anywhere in his writings. But for 
those who hope that Niebuhr will engage in a detailed technical discussion of 
the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, there is evident yet again, his characteristic 
reluctance to pursue the sort of study that some theologians might expect or 
want. 'There have been unfortunate disagreements among Christians about the 
real presence of Christ in the sacrament. They are unfortunate because the 
eternal Christ is real in so many meanings of that word and we cannot catch his 
reality in any of our definitions. We shall not enter into those arguments now, 
but rather remind ourselves of one, of only one, of the ways in which this 
sacrament is a participation in the life of the Christ who is in this present 
moment as we worship here together and as we take communion. ,473 
472 See, for example, as well as the sermon cited above in footnote 469; HRN, 'What Then Must 
We Do?' The Christian Century Pulpit 5,1934, pp. 145-147; HRN, Two Lenten Meditations: 
'Tired Christians' and 'Preparation for Maladjustment,' Yale Divinity News 35, 3, 1939, pp. 3-4; 
HRN, Three Sermons entitled: 'Our Reverent Doubt and the Authority of Christ,' 'The Logic of 
the Cross,' and 'Man's Work and God's' in HRN, Theology, History and Culture, ed., William 
Stacy Johnson. New Haven. Yale University Press, 1996, pp. 192-214. 
47l HRN, 'Participation in the Present Passion.' op. cit., p. 28. 
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Niebuhr's sennon indicates the three time dimensions of the Lord's Supper. 
'When we take communion we participate in the life of the eternal Christ who 
was, and is to be, and is. We remember an event that is past; we anticipate an 
event that is to come; we participate in an event that is now going on. ,474 In the 
evangelical chapter, we looked at the past event of which the Supper is a 
'remembrance'; and in the eschatological chapter yet to come, we will consider 
more fully the future event that Niebuhr says the Supper anticipates; but for the 
purpose of this section of the ecclesiological chapter, we now look more closely 
at those present events that constitute the main thrust and urgency of his 
exposition. In his sennon on the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, we are really 
being given what amounts to Niebuhr's spirituality, one that is fully consonant 
with, indeed an expression of, his distinctive the%gia crucis, what he himself 
calls our 'participation in the present passion.' Since so much of Niebuhr's 
theology, ethics and spirituality all converge and cohere in these reflections, it 
is well worth quoting them extensively. Furthennore, since this document has 
received comparatively little attention in other Niebuhrian scholarship, it is all 
the more important that we allow Niebuhr to speak directly to us. 
'At this moment, under this sun, present with us on our little earth, are 
countless sufferers.,47s The miserable plight of these, often anonymous 
multitudes, is spelt out by Niebuhr with typically poignant sensitivity. 'In our 
unconverted, Christless minds we want to have as little part in this suffering as 
possible. We try to isolate ourselves from it; we say that we cannot stand 
thinking about it. We excuse ourselves by saying that we have had no part in 
causing it and we can do nothing effective to prevent it. We will not participate 
in it beyond its appearance in our own homes, though even there we often try to 
insulate ourselves against it as much as possible. ,476 
'But as we eat this bread and drink of this cup in fellowship with the Christ 
who suffered we know that we actually participate and we will to participate in 
the present passion of our brothers and sisters, even the least of them. In the 
474 Ibid. 
47S Ibid. 
476 Ibid., pp. 28-30. 
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light of our memory of the Christ who suffered for us we look again at these 
men and women on the crosses of the present world and acknowledge, "They 
are being wounded for our transgressions, they are being bruised for our 
iniquities.'" This prompts Niebuhr to offer one of his most thought-provoking 
images in the whole of what I have been designating his theologia crucis: 
The threads of responsibility run back and forth through space and time, from 
person to person in such an intricate pattern that none of us is uninvolved in any cross. 
Were it not for Jesus Christ who suffered under Pontius Pilate, a Christ who suffered 
without sin, we doubtless could not acknowledge that these suffering men and women, 
who are so much like ourselves and among whom we also have been and wilt be 
numbered at some time in our lives, are suffering vicariously for the sins of others. But 
this is evidently not true, that it is only Jesus who is wounded for our transgressions 
and bruised for our iniquities. When we sit at this table with Christ we sit down at the 
common human table where we are surrounded by those who are suffering now for our 
sins and for the sins of the whole world. They are eating bread with us, though it be 
with tears. We are participating with them in their sufferings as we acknowledge that 
they are bearing our crosses.417 
The 'Christo-morphic' theme of Niebuhr's theologia crucis is once again 
evident as the cumulative argument of his meditation gathers momentum. 
'Where is Christ today? Doubtless he is seated at the right hand of God. 
Doubtless he is present in the starving children and men and women of the 
world; doubtless he is being barred from churches, schools, and places of 
recreation because his face is black; doubtless he is being despised and rejected 
of men wherever folk who think they are superior cultures look down upon and 
offend one of the little ones. He is in the child rejected by its parents; he is with 
the prisoner cast out by society; he is with all those who are acquainted with 
grief, whether men call them righteous or wicked. ,478 
And so to the final two paragraphs of Niebuhr's published sennon, where 
the seasoned preacher shows that he knows his craft, bringing just the right 
477 Ibid., p. 30. 
478 Ibid., p. 32. 
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touch of rhetoric and theological acumen together in his witness to the ministry 
of redemption in Christ: 
In all this vicarious suffering for us and in all this present suffering of Christ we 
participate as we eat this bread and drink this cup. We take the sacrament as the bitter 
medicine of repentance, acknowledging our part in the continuous crucifixion. We do 
not know of any way in which we can rid ourselves of our participation in the sin of 
the world and the suffering of Christ for that sin. We cannot decide now that from 
henceforth we will not engage in any action whereby we shall cause others to suffer on 
our behalf, since they suffer because of our well-intentioned specious goodness as well 
as on account of our ill-will. The Lord's Supper in which we take the medicine of 
repentance is not a moralistic homily acted out in dramatic form by means of which we 
are adjured to try a little harder to be good. It is a presentation of reality. This is the 
way things are. This is what we are - the folk for whom Christ died and dies. This is 
what we are called upon to do - to participate in the sufferings of those who suffer for 
us. This is our medicine - we are to be healed by the stripes which we have inflicted. 
We do not know in how many ways and from how many sins we are being healed 
by the sufferings of those who suffer for us. There is one thing, however, of which we 
are aware: that when we refuse to suffer with those who suffer for us we are confirmed 
in our self-centredness, we are established in our isolation from the human family and 
from God. We do know that participation in the sufferings of those who suffer for us 
heals us of our egoism, calls us back from wandering each in his own way and makes 
us members of the one family, where if one member suffers all the members suffer 
with him. The passion of Christ in which we now participate not only shows us some 
of the meaning of human suffering but by making and allowing us to participate in it 
that passion does some of its work of healing upon us. We therefore take this 
sacrament to our comfort; not comfortably, for it is a bitter medicine, but as those who 
are comforted by the ministrations of the Great Physician who is healing all our 
diseases, forgiving all our iniquities, redeeming our lives from destruction. and holding 
before us the supreme promise of lives crowned with loving kindness and tender 
mercy.479 
According to Douglas John Hall '[t]here is more about the suffering of the 
church in the newer Testament's writings than about any other ecclesiastical 
479 Ibid. 
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theme.'48o What Niebuhr offers us, as amply illustrated by the sermon just 
examined, is the shape of the Christian life, a 'Christo-morphic' way of life, 
which, in its substance and style, he calls our 'participation in the present 
passion' of Jesus Christ 'who is the same yesterday, today and forever.' This 
spirituality is inextricably bound to Christ and is found in, and expected of, his 
continuing Body on earth, the Church, whenever it is true to its Lord's calling. 
It is therefore radically different from the many self-indulgent and faddish 
'spiritualities' that have become so prevalent in the modem or 'post-modem' 
West. For Niebuhr, then, as for others, of a similar disposition, 'the the%gia 
crucis leads inevitably to an ecclesia crucis. A gospel which has at its core the 
cross of the Christ (crux sola nostra theologia) must produce a koinonia whose 
life is marked by suffering.'481 Such a spirituality is not exclusively or 
predominantly predisposed to life's dark or negative experiences, but it refuses 
to ignore or suppress the reality of suffering within the greater context of the 
gospel. Perhaps it would be going too far to borrow the words of a Canadian 
poet/novelist turned singer/songwriter, and say that Niebuhr's distinctive 
theologia crucis sounds at times, like the anguished strains of a 'cold and 
broken Hallelujah. ,482 Faith in God does and should evoke human praise, but 
without acknowledgement of the solidarity of suffering, such doxology is not so 
much an expression of an authentic theologia crucis but its cheap caricature, the 
kind of deceptive triumphalism which Niebuhr was ever on his guard against, 
and which Luther called the the%gia gloriae. 
480 Douglas John Hall, God and Human Suffering: An Exercise in the Theology of the Cross, 
Minneapolis, Augsburg, 1986, p. 123. Hall's work is perhaps the closest in substance and style 
to Niebuhr's among contemporary theologians, and, in some ways, makes more explicit the 
motif of theologia crucis that Niebuhr undoubtedly often depicted, but rarely labelled as such. 
In Hall's chapter, 'The Church: Community of Suffering and Hope,' from the above book, there 
is much about the themes of Christ's participation in the human situation and its transformation 
in and through his suffering, a work in which the Church is called to share. Hall cites such New 
Testament references as Matthew 5:3-11; Romans 6:3-4; Romans 8:22 and Colossians 1:24 as 
'crucial' to his argument. 
481 Ibid., pp. 143-144. 
482 The quote is from a song entitled, 'Hallelujah' written by Leonard Cohen, movingly 
recorded in a cover version by the late JeffBuckley on his album Grace, Columbia, New York, 
1994. For other contemporary musical expressions of the theologia crucis, John Bell and the 
Cathedral Singers, The Last Journey: Songs for the Time of GrieVing, GIA Publications, 
Chicago, 1997; Adrian Snell, Seven Words for the 2)" Century, Serious Music UK Ltd, 
Sliedrecht, 2002, in conjunction with the book of the same name edited by Edmund Newell and 
published by Darton, Longrnann and Todd, London, 2002. 
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6. Conclusion 
In drawing our reflections on Niebuhr's ecclesiology to an end, we recall the 
claim that he made in his autobiographical essay to the effect that his 'primary 
concern' was 'the reformation of the church' and this, not so much 'by 
separation from the world but by a new entrance into it without conformity to 
it. ,483 Our analysis in this chapter, has, I believe, borne out the truth of these 
convictions, for Niebuhr was constantly pondering how the Church could best 
be faithful, yet relevant, to the needs, demands and opportunities of each new 
situation in which it found itself. 
In many ways, Niebuhr can justly be caned an exemplary reformer of the 
Church. In his six-fold 'polar analysis' he manages to convey much of the 
essence of the mysterious reality of the nature of this strange 'Christo-centric' 
community, whilst acknowledging that such definitions can never entirely 
capture its meaning. In stating that the purpose of the Church was to accept and 
enact Jesus' indicative and imperative as defined in terms of 'the increase of the 
love of God and neighbour', he clarifies its mission in a simple yet searching 
manner. In identifying some of its deformations or henotheisms, he provides a 
critique that the Church neglects at its peril and to the detriment of its well-
being and true calling; yet his is nonetheless a constructive critique in that he is 
keen to advocate strategies for the renewal and reformation of the Church so 
that it may better become a responsible 'Christo-morphic' community in its 
roles as corporate apostle, pastor and pioneer. In doing so, Niebuhr believes that 
the Church will truly be an ecclesia crucis, a Body of people who consciously 
enter into Christ's ministry with, among and for those who suffer vicariously 
for redemption's sake. This 'participation in the present passion' articulates the 
appropriate spirituality of those who are faithfully in communion with Jesus 
Christ. Such, in brief compass, is Niebuhr's ecclesiology. 
483 HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' op. cit., p. 250. 
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Chapter Five: An Ecumenical Perspective 
1. A Relative Lack of Concern for Church-Union 
The word 'ecumenical' is often taken to mean the aspiration for, or attempt, that 
the unity of the Church of Jesus Christ will be made visible in some sort of 
structural or institutional form. Whilst this is indeed one viable meaning of the 
term, it can also be thought of as being rather reductionist or one-dimensional. 
The Greek word oikoumene, in its biblical and subsequent classic usage in the 
field of theology, actually has a more expansive meaning in that it is intended to 
refer to 'the whole inhabited earth' or 'the One Household of Life'.484 
The structure of this chapter will therefore try to reflect this enlarged 
understanding of the term. Working outwards from the centre of Niebuhr's 
work as already identified in his theologis crucis, we shall interpret it by means 
of a series of concentric, yet expanding circles. The first of these will be an 
analysis of the importance he attached, both practically and theoretically, to the 
task of Church-union between various parts of the Church. The second aspect 
will involve a proposed line of trajectory beyond this in which Niebuhr's work, 
especially through his distinctive approach to faith, called 'radical 
monotheism', will be considered in terms of its potential as a possible 
reconciling resource for the three predominant official monotheisms: Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam. Thirdly, an attempt will be made to ground Niebuhr's 
work in the specifics of a culture that has suffered much from communal 
conflict, namely, my own context in Northern Ireland. I intend to show that 
Niebuhr's work is a useful instrument of analysis that has intriguing and 
promising correspondences with the recent Moving Beyond Sectarianism 
Project in which I was personally involved. In the fourth and final circle, I 
propose to make more explicit the real, though largely implicit, evidences in 
Niebuhr's work, of a larger ecumenism that aligns him with some of the more 
484 See Konrad Raiser, Ecumenism in Transition: A Paradigm Shift in the Ecumenical 
Movement. Geneva, wee Publications, 1996. pp. 84-91; 102ff. 
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promising thinkers on the now increasingly prominent theme of 'globalisation'. 
Niebuhr, I will argue, in his occasional and scattered references to the themes of 
ecology and economics demonstrates the kind of radical responsibility that faith 
surely calls for. 
We turn first of all to Niebuhr's views on, and involvement in, that aspect of 
ecumenism, which, for many people, defines the term without remainder, 
namely, Church-union. Whilst this thesis is primarily concerned with an 
interpretation of Niebuhr's mature theological position of radical monotheism, 
nonetheless, it will be useful here to briefly trace some points of historical 
development with regard to his contributions in efforts to bring about the 
structural unity of the Church. What will emerge is that whilst in the early part 
of his life's work, he was heavily involved in the attempt to bring different 
denominations together to form more inclusive unions, increasingly, with the 
passage of time, this urge and instinct waned somewhat. An exploration of the 
possible reasons for this gradual lack of concern for the work of structural 
Church-unions is worth pondering, since it suggests a subtle change of priorities 
or strategies in his evolving ministry. 
Niebuhr was nurtured in a relatively small denomination called the 
'Evangelical Synod of North America'. According to Jon Diefenthaler, a fellow 
member of this denomination, and the author of the nearest thing that we have 
to a biography of Niebuhr, the Evangelical Synod had its genesis in the so-
called "Prussian Union" imposed by King Frederich Wilhelm Ill, in 1817, upon 
Lutheran and Reformed congregations whose relationship to each other had for 
a long time been marked by mutual abrasion and suspicion. In this instance, 
thankfully, political expediency did somehow manage to turn former 
polemicists into a new church in which a more pragmatic and irenic ethos 
began to prevail. In the 1840's some of these members immigrated to the New 
World where they formed the Deutscher Evangelische Kirchenverein des 
Westens, a name which was to become 'Americanised' to that of the 'German 
Evangelical Synod of North America' in 1866. Further evidence of the 
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denomination's acculturation was that m 1925, the word German was 
dropped.485 
An intriguing confluence of factors served to shape the distinctive ethos of 
this, Niebuhr's, own denomination. Streams from Lutheran, Calvinist and 
Zwinglian sources merged with the more pietistic tendencies of evangelical 
missionaries sent from various European centres, such as Basel. This resulted in 
a type of faith that was arguably more an affair of the "heart" than the "head", 
less inclined to fonnal SUbscription to confessional creeds than were some other 
churches, and exemplified by an emphasis on the experiential and ethical 
aspects of the gospel. With the passage of time, this warm, open and pragmatic 
spirit was to advance the cause of the more progressive elements in the 
denomination who were eager for the 'Synod' to fonn whatever unions it could 
with other small, likeminded church bodies. 'In 1934 it united with the 
Refonned Church in the United States, which then numbered over 600,000 
members. This new organization, known as The Evangelical and Refonned 
Church, merged in 1957 with the Congregational Christian Churches to become 
today's United Church ofChrist.,486 
Niebuhr, who, like his father Gustav and elder brother Reinhold, was 
educated by and ordained into the ministry of the Gennan Evangelical Synod, 
was among the more progressive wing of the denomination. Greatly indebted as 
he was, and was to remain to the warmth of its 'liberal evangelicalism', he was 
nonetheless frustrated with the tendency of many within it to, as he saw it, 
stagnate in a kind of Gennanic backwater. His conviction was that the Synod 
was called to enter more fully into the mainstream of the burgeoning life of 
American culture so as to carry out its mission as effectively as possible. He 
therefore was in the vanguard of those who took certain practical initiatives in 
accelerating its fuller immersion in the life of the environing society, plunging 
it into the pUlsating and pluralistic mix of post-First World War America. As a 
demonstration of this desire he assumed the chainnanship in 1927 of his 
485 Jon Diefenthaler, H, Richard Niebuhr: A Lifetime of Reflections on the Church and World, 
Georgia, Mercer University Press, 1986, p, 2. 
4861b'd 3 1 "p. , 
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denomination's Committee on Relations with Other Churches.487 His goal at 
this time was to unite his own Synod with both the Refonned Church and the 
United Brethren but the hoped-for merger did not materialise at that time due to 
the withdrawal of the United Brethren and Niebuhr's own appetite for working 
at such structural unifications seems to have waned thereafter. 
In his first book, The Social Sources of Denominationalism, Niebuhr had 
criticised the churches for their evident disunity noting that 'the organization 
which is loudest in its praise of brotherhood and most critical of race and class 
discriminations in other spheres is the most disunited group of all, nurturing in 
its own structure that same spirit of division which it condemns in other 
relations. ,488 The book as a whole is a passionate and poignant lament over such 
fragmentation; penetrating in substance, poetic in style, and issuing, in its 
concluding pages, a prophetic plea for the Church to become reunited in an 
ideal inspired by what Niebuhr calls 'the fonnation of a divine society [which] 
presupposes the metaphysics of a Christlike God. Its purpose is the revelation to 
men of their potential childhood to the Father and their possible brotherhood 
with each other. ,489 This is the voice of liberalism, to be sure, but it is not to be 
equated with that of von Hamack with his easy talk of the Fatherhood of God 
and the brotherhood of man. Instead, it is a chastened or modified liberalism, as 
is hinted at by Niebuhr's qualifying words in the above quote, namely, 
'potential' and 'possible'. So already, it seems, by the time of these reflections 
in 1929, and with two years of the frustrating, and even, somewhat 
disillusioning experience of trying to achieve a union of the three 
denominations named earlier on, Niebuhr's thoughts on ecumenicity in the 
fonn of Church-union, give evidence of an idealism being tempered somewhat 
by the agonized cries of a muted and implicit, but nonetheless, emergent or 
embryonic theology of the cross. As he puts it in the book's final paragraph: 
The road to unity which love requires denominations, nations, classes and races to 
take is no easy way. There is no short cut even to the union of the churches. The way to 
487 Ibid., p. 17. 
488 HRN, The Social Sources of Denominationalism, New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1929. 
Reprinted by Peter Smith, Gloucester, Mass., 1987, p. 9. 
489 Ibid., p. 278. 
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the organic, active peace of brotherhood leads through the hearts of peacemakers who 
will knit together, with patience and self-sacrifice, the shorn and tangled fibers of 
human aspirations, faiths, and hopes, who will transcend the fears and dangers of an 
adventure of trust. The road to unity is the road of repentance. It demands a resolute 
turning away from all those loyalties to the lesser values of the self, the denomination, 
and the nation, which deny the inclusiveness of divine love. It requires that Christians 
learn to look upon their separate establishments and exclusive creeds with contrition 
rather than pride. The road to unity is the road of sacrifice which asks of churches as of 
individuals that they lose their lives in order that they may find the fulfilment of their 
better selves. But it is also the road to the eternal values of a Kingdom of God that is 
among US.490 
The note of liberal aspiration evident in the above sentiments was severely 
put to the test by Niebuhr's own involvement in the failed attempts to bring 
about the merger of his own Synod with the other two denominations 
previously mentioned in order to form a new church called the 'United Church 
in America'. Following the collapse of this tripartite venture, Niebuhr took no 
further formal part after 1930 in the continuing discussions which did lead to 
the union of his own Evangelical Synod with the Reformed church in 1934.491 
He was, of course, pleased with the satisfactory nature of this union492 but 
increasingly, his ecumenical convictions were articulated in a way that pointed 
to an important shift of emphasis. Indeed, in his second book, The Kingdom of 
God in America, published in 1937, Niebuhr looked back upon his earlier 
practical priorities and methodological procedures with a self-critical eye. 
Briefly stated, he now believed that his denunciations of the divisions 
represented by denominationalism, whilst still justifiable, were predicated too 
much on the way in which the various streams of the Church were shaped by 
the forces of the environing society in which they were embedded. However, 
what that critique did not sufficiently attend to was the prior, even primordial 
power that was largely responsible for the surge and flow of the Church's river 
itself. Greater attention needed to be given to the initiating action of God's 
490 Ibid., p. 284. For a similar line of thought see HRN, 'What Holds Churches Together?' The 
Christian Century, 43, 1926, pp. 346-348; 'Churches That Might Unite,' The Christian 
Century, 46, 1929, pp. 259-261. 
491 Diefenthaler, op. cit., p. 18. 
492 HRN, 'Now We Are Stronger', The Messenger, 19, 12, 1954, p. 4. 
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grace in Jesus Christ as the sine qua non of that new, transforming and eternal 
life which the 'One Church' was called to embody in and through its diverse 
and often divergent forms.493 Speaking of what he called the necessity of the 
'recovery of faith in the invisible catholic church' he observed that this entailed 
the effort 'to seek unity not on the level of hazy sentimentalism but [in] the 
active intellectual and moral conflict of those who can contend fruitfully 
because they share a common faith. ,494 
Several factors seem to have been at work in Niebuhr's shift of emphasis in 
the priorities of his ecumenical practice. His increasing immersion in, and 
appreciation of, the 'Great Tradition' in the history of theology undoubtedly 
played its part in grounding his future work in the Catholicity of the Church. 
This impulse may well have been reinforced by his move to the Divinity 
Faculty at Yale where his academic contacts and pursuits were immeasurably 
enlarged in scope since he was now part of an internationally renowned, non-
denominational research and teaching establishment. But in addition, one can 
also conjecture, perhaps, that the passage of the years also saw Niebuhr 
attending to the profound crises of national and international affairs such that 
the work of formal Church-union, whilst not unimportant, nonetheless had to be 
placed in the arguably greater and graver context of such pressing problems as 
those thrown up by the Great Depression, the Second World War, the 
subsequent Cold War, and any number of other urgent societal issues. 
An exhaustive analysis of all of Niebuhr's writings in which the ecumenical 
issue of church relations featured would be well beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, a few significant selections from his corpus should enable us to make 
a reasonably informed judgment as to how his ecumenical perspective shifted 
over time. Writing in 1954, on the twentieth anniversary of the successful union 
of the Evangelical Synod and the Reformed Church, Niebuhr continued to 
affirm the search for visible expressions of the One Church of Jesus Christ, but 
took the opportunity to place his own convictions about the priorities and 
493 HRN, The Kingdom of God in America, New York, Harper & Row, Torchbooks, 1937. 
Reprinted by Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, Connecticut, 1988, pp. xix-xxvii. 
494 Ib'd ' 1 ., p. XXVl, 
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strategies involved in the work of Church-union in a different context than 
when he was extensively involved in such practical pursuits in the late 1920's. 
'Our interest in the unity of the church seems to be most constructively directed 
at the present time when it takes into view the opportunities we have to 
contribute to ecumenical organization and spirit. This seems a more significant 
movement at present, not only in its organizational but in its more spiritual and 
intellectual forms, than organic merger movements do. ,495 
Arguably, it was the circumstances of Niebuhr's own particular vocation 
which did most to shape or influence the direction of his perennially-held 
ecumenical impulse. In the three decades [1931-1962] during which he taught 
at Yale, the conviction seemed to grow that his own contribution to the 
ecumenical enterprise should be primarily in the area of theological education. 
A major catalyst here was the project to which he was appointed as director. Its 
task was research into, and the providing of far-reaching recommendations for, 
many of the leading theological educational colleges in North America. As a 
consequence of this work, to which Niebuhr gave undivided attention from 
1954-56, his own insights, long maturing over many years, came to a new pitch 
of clarity and urgency. Whatever differences may indeed prevail between 
churches, denominations or their seminaries, the 'question of the ultimate 
objective of the whole Church' seems to come to a focal point in the attempt to 
identify, and as best possible embody, 'the final unifying consideration that 
modifies all the special strivings,.496 We have already seen in the previous 
chapter, that Niebuhr's proposal is that the churches unify around the purpose 
that Jesus proclaimed: 'the love of God and neighbour'. What we also saw, and 
can further appreciate here, is that Niebuhr understands and expounds this in 
the distinctive idiom of 'radical monotheism', a faith stance that gives great 
prominence to the ecumenical thrust of the Church, or, as he puts it elsewhere, 
'the catholic vision' ofits properly 'ecclesial' existence.497 
495 HRN, 'Now We Are Stronger', The Messenger, 19. 12, 1954. p. 4. 
496 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry. op. cit., pp. 28-29. 
497 HRN, 'The Gift of the Catholic Vision', Theology Today, 4, 1948, pp. 507-521. 
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In one of his last published pieces, The Seminary in the Ecumenical Age, 
Niebuhr pursues this same theme with his customary insight couched, as was 
nearly always the case, in elegant rhetoric.498 His particular emphasis is 
admittedly, here, to focus on the way in which theological education may best 
be pursued and conducted in the now prevailing reality of the 'ecumenical age'. 
But the underlying presuppositions in his lecture are worth unearthing since 
they enable us to appreciate what may be considered his mature position on the 
principles of practical ecumenism. He imaginatively envisages the work of 
Christian ministry as being that of 'building' some great 'world cathedral,499 in 
the setting of 'the oikumene - the inhabited world, the one economy of 
mankind'.soo As such, the ecumenical Church will not settle for any partial or 
provincial ways of existence as the definitive or exhaustive expressions of what 
it is called to be or do. Since the Church lives in, and ministers to, nothing less 
than 'a planetary parish,SOI it is incumbent upon it to seek new and more 
intentional ways of witnessing to Christ in this, now more consciously 
acknowledged, global context. Our ecumenical 'world', in this ecumenical 
'age', therefore makes all the more desirable, or even, necessary, an ecumenical 
'Church' .502 
The imaginative insights of this article are largely in continuity with the 
views that Niebuhr had expounded in two significant earlier pieces.SOl What 
each of them share is the distinctive Niebuhrian way of recasting the issue of 
inter-church ecumenical relations within the larger horizon of 'radical 
monotheism'. Since the Church is called by the one God and Father of Jesus 
Christ to bear witness to his reconciling grace, and further, is called, in its own 
subordinate way, to continue this ministry of reconciliation to the world at 
large, then it is of the very 'being' and 'well-being' of the Church that it seeks 
to organise its internal life and world-oriented mission in such ways as to help, 
498 HRN, 'The Seminary in the Ecumenical Age, Theology Today, 17, 1960, pp. 300-310. 
A footnote (p. 300) states that this was HRN's address at the inauguration of Dr. James I. 
McCord as President of Prince ton Theological Seminary, March 29, 1960. 
499 Ibid., p. 306. 
500 Ibid., p. 307. 
SOl Ibid., p. 300. 
S02 Ibid., p. 307. 
S03 HRN, 'The Gift of the Catholic Vision', (1948) op. cit.; The Purpose of the Church and Its 
Ministry, (1956) op. cit. 
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rather than hinder, this ecumenical or catholic thrust. But Niebuhr, 
characteristically, was more of an 'architect' who provided inspirational 
sketches for how the churches may best approximate to, or converge around 
this vocational task, than he was an 'engineer' who concerned himself on a 
daily basis with the 'nuts and bolts' of putting the various pieces together into a 
working whole. His prophet's eye for the Church's 'catholic vision' was his 
greatest gift to the still separate parts of the 'Body of Christ' and was seemingly 
where most of his abilities and energies lay. This is not to suggest that 
Niebuhr's vision of the Church was an excessively idealist or ethereal one. He 
was critical, for instance, of Brunner on this point, in that he felt that the Swiss 
theologian was too naively idealistic in considering the Church or Ecclesia as 
the spiritual fellowship of those who truly believe in Christ, in distinction or 
separation from those who merely belong to the visible institutional churches in 
some other less spiritually intentional sense.S04 But neither was he content to lay 
too much stress on the more structural or institutional dimension of the Church 
as opposed to its more communal or interpersonal aspect. In the necessary 
polarity between the Church as "community" and "institution", Niebuhr 
maintained that a situation of dialectical realism was the most adequate means 
of describing its esse and bene esse. As he put it: 
[I]t seems clear that no community can exist without some institutions that give it 
form, boundaries, discipline, and the possibilities of expression and common action. 
On the other hand, no institution can long exist without some common mind and drive 
that expresses and defines itself in institutions. The questions whether Church is 
primarily institution or primarily community, or whether one of these is prior, are as 
unanswerable as similar questions about thought and language. There is no thought 
without language and no language without thought, yet thought is not language nor 
language thought. The Church as institution can preserve as well as corrupt the Church 
as community; it can express and define through word and deed the common mind as 
well as thwart the common spirit. The Church as community can enliven but also 
stultify the Church as institution. So it was in the case of the Nazi Christian community 
S04 Emil Brunner, The Misunderstanding of the Church, Lutterworth Press, 1952, London. The 
irony here in the title of his book is that Brunner felt that the prevailing view of the Church was 
a misunderstanding; whereas Niebuhr felt Brunner's interpretation was even more fallacious. 
See HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, p. 21-22. See also the similar line of 
interpretation to Niebuhr's in Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics /V/I, op. cit., p. 669. 
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which twisted the meaning and eventually the forms of common Christian institutions; 
so it is also in the confusions of the Christian with the democratic community.sos 
This sense of finely held balance, a typically Niebuhrian stance, it might be 
said, exemplifies his strategy regarding the work of Church-union. Niebuhr's 
instincts, nurtured in his formative years within the ethos of the Evangelical 
Synod, were to endorse any ecumenical initiatives that would strengthen the 
bonds between churches, and thus approximate more closely to his vision of the 
Church of Jesus Christ in its true catholicity or universality. For him, the 'idea 
of Una Sancta, of One Holy Church, is very persuasive despite relatively rare 
expression,s06 and therefore, as he read it in the mid-1950's, despite many 
painful differences and conflicts still between the churches, 'the movement 
toward participation in the universal Church is the dominant one. ,507 Niebuhr's 
work to assess and redefine a 'catholic vision' for the Protestant seminaries of 
North America in the project which he directed during these years under the 
auspices of the American Association of Theological Schools may thus be seen 
as a major, perhaps, indeed, his main contribution to the 'ecumenical 
movement' within the churches. But, in addition, he was also an active 
participant, by way of theological essays, in the first two assemblies of the 
World Council of Churches in Amsterdam in 1948 and in Evanston in 1954.508 
Yet despite these personal endorsements of, and involvements in, the 
ecumenical movement, Niebuhr could still voice a stringent critique of this self-
same movement. When Charles Clayton Morrison, for instance, inferred that 
the Christian Church itself was the 'revelation of God', Niebuhr warned that 
such thinking was morally 'dangerous' since it mistakenly tended to turn the 
Church into just one more of the world's 'overly self-conscious communities' 
which make 'self-defense' the 'first law of life', and thus, in the process, take 
themselves much too seriously, usurping the place that belongs to God alone.509 
sos HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, p. 22. 
S06 Ibid., p. 16. 
S07 Ibid., p. 17. 
S08 HRN, 'The Disorder of Man in the Church of God', in Man's Disorder and God's Design, 
volume I, The Universal Church in God's Design, New York, 1949, pp. 78-88; 'Who Are the 
Unbelievers and What Do They Believe?', pp. 35-37. 
S09 HRN, Review of What is Christianity? By Charles Clayton Morrison, Journal of Religion 
21, April 1941, pp. 189-192. 
-- .. 
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It seems, therefore, that Niebuhr trod a fine line with regard to the search for 
the structural unity of the Church. Reflecting upon his own change of priorities 
over the course of his life he observed that 'while once my interest had been 
strongly oriented toward the church-union movement, I now displayed little 
concern for that enterprise and looked elsewhere for the reformation of the 
church. ,510 The position being adopted and approved here, therefore, seems to 
be, one of 'convergence': wherever and whenever any church-unions can be 
effected, this should be encouraged and attempted. But any such movements 
towards organic or structural unity are subordinate to, and are meant to serve 
the purposes of, that radical monotheism that Niebuhr believes, forms the 
human expression of what God in Christ has called and enabled the One Church 
to be and become. If the work of Church-union is not undertaken in the 'spirit 
and context,511 of radical monotheism, then it, too, may become one more 
tragic example of that idolatrous form of faith that he called 'henotheism" 
albeit in so-called 'Christian' form. The irony, therefore, is that Christ continues 
to be crucified by the ongoing history of divided and divisive churches in their 
misreading of his intent for the One Church, and, consequently, they perpetuate 
the tragedy of their distorted relationships to each other. 
2. A Reconciling Resource for the Monotheistic 'Religions'? 
In the above section, we have looked at Niebuhr's contribution to the work of 
inter-church relationships, that is, the underlying spirit and structural forms that 
are found in, or desirable for, the One Church of Jesus Christ. However, there 
are many faith communities other than the various churches, often commonly 
referred to as 'religions', though this term is not always descriptively accurate 
or even welcomed by many people. Nonetheless, for want of a better term, we 
intend the label 'religion' as used here, to refer to those historic faith 
510 HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative', The Christian Century, 77, 2 March 1960, p. 
248. 
SII HRN, 'The Seminary in the Ecumenical Age', op. cit., p.310. 
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communities that have monotheism as a basic tenet of their beliefs: namely, 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Some elements of commonality can, in fact, be 
found among these three faiths: their belief in one God (monotheism) who 
governs the world with purposeful intent; a consequent expectation for human 
beings to live by a divinely-given morality; a common ancestry, in some sense, 
from the historic person of Abraham; and sets of scripture which render at least 
some of the same events. 
However, what seems more striking still, are the real or perceived 
differences between these three 'monotheisms', often resulting, tragically, in a 
history of fear, suspicion, hostility and conflict. The situation in many places in 
our contemporary world continues to make clear the difficulties and dangers 
that are attendant with, and sometimes fuelled by, the differences that pertain 
between these faith communities. It is of the utmost urgency, therefore, that 
some sort of constructive ways be found for the adherents of each of these 
monotheisms, to meet, converse and thus relate so as to enable a peaceful, or at 
least tolerable future together. Leaving aside, for the meantime, the even wider 
issue of how the adherents of any other religious faith community, or of no 
explicit religion, may relate to each other, we turn here to consider how the 
three monotheisms might do so in the future. It would be a great gain surely, if 
some means were found by which Judaism, Christianity and Islam could 
replace mutual ignorance, indifference, suspicion or hostility with more positive 
and peaceful alternatives. Few could dispute the necessity and desirability of 
furthering this issue in the dynamics of contemporary global realities. 
Niebuhr never went very far in exploring the issue of inter-faith dialogue or 
relationships, and so we will look in vain within his writings, for the sort of 
explicitly ecumenical effort between the world's three great 'official 
monotheisms' that would seem to be both desirable or necessary in our 
contemporary context. However, in The ResponSible Self, he did demonstrate 
some of the principles that would probably have informed his own approach to 
this subject. 'I cannot think about God's relation to man in the abstract. The 
historical qualification of my relation to him is inescapable. I cannot presume to 
think as a Jew or a Mohammedan would think about God, though I recognize 
212 
that they are thinking about the same God about whom I think. Nor can I 
presume to rise above those specific relations to God in which I have been 
placed so as to think simply and theistically about God. There is no such being, 
or source of being, surely, as a Christian God (though there may be Christian 
idols); but there is a Christian relation to God and I cannot abstract from 
that,.S12 
According to Martin Cook, this is consistent with Niebuhr's self-avowed 
'confessionalist' procedure or methodology as a Christian theologian, but one, 
which, in Niebuhr's case, is still open to the perspectives of representatives 
from other communities or traditions in what Cook labels 'confessional 
noninternalism,.S13 What Cook means by this latter term is to be found 
primarily in Niebuhr's The Meaning of Revelation, where he sought to expound 
a theological methodology that took seriously the 'internal' claims of the 
Christian community'S revelatory event in Jesus, but also kept open a genuine 
dialogue with the distinct perspectives of those who may well interpret such 
events in different ways that are, in principle, understandable from their own 
history, yet which is 'external' to that of the community that confesses God in 
Christ. Cook argues that Niebuhr offers perhaps the most promising theological 
resource for a Christian 'confessionalism' that may yet initiate and sustain a 
meaningful dialogue with representatives of other communities.Sl4 Cook's 
argument does not deal primarily or explicitly with the subject of 'inter-faith' 
relations, whether 'monotheistic' or not, but the thrust of his argument is 
certainly directly applicable to the issue we are exploring here. 
The proposal, or, at least, tentative suggestion to be made in this part of my 
thesis is that Niebuhr's distinctive interpretation on faith in the idiom of 'radical 
monotheism' may be a useful resource for attempting to relate the three 
SI2 HRN, The Responsible Self, op. cit., pp. 44-45. Also worth noting is Niebuhr's remark that 
he believed that 'part of the function of the Christian minister was to universalise Judaism'. We 
may take this to mean, I presume, that the Christian Church ought to try and universalise the 
principle of 'radical monotheism' that lies at the heart ofNiebuhr's interpretation of the Old 
(and New) Testament: see HRN,lntroduction to Theological Studies 1960-61, transcribed by 
Elizabeth Keiser, 31 October 1960. 
m Martin L. Cook, The Open Circle: Confessional Method in Theology, Minneapolis, Fortress 
Press, 1991, p. 77. 
SI4Ibid., esp. pp. 67-85; 108. 
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'official' monotheistic faiths in a more positive and constructive manner. Our 
earlier analysis of the faith structure of the social self, points to the possibility 
of using the same procedure as applied to the historical enactments of Jewish, 
Christian and Islamic believers. Whilst Niebuhr's appellation 'radical 
monotheism' might sound to the contemporary ear as resonating in an 
uncomfortably familiar way with the violent extremes of certain strands of 
radical fundamentalism, Islamic or otherwise, in reality, in Niebuhrian terms, it 
offers, I would argue, both a self-critical principle, and a constructive vision, 
whose potential fruitfulness has yet to be seriously considered or attempted. 
If, as I believe, Niebuhr's concept of human faith as radical monotheism can 
be accepted as basically belonging to the genre of 'prophetic wisdom', then this 
two-fold agenda of self-critique and constructive vision surely becomes a viable 
or plausible interpretation of life. We have already seen how Niebuhr puts this 
principle of radical monotheism to work within the context of Christian faith as 
expressed in theology and embodied in the life of the Church. By this prophetic 
standard, there is much that often passes for true Christian faith but which, in 
reality, is deformed into the various henotheisms of denominationalism, 
'churchism', biblicism or even, as he calls it 'Christism'. But, more positively, 
there is also the ever-present impulse of a reformed catholic Christianity that is 
theocentric in ground and universal in scope due to the mediating presence and 
work of Jesus Christ. 
Yet the logic of Niebuhr's prophetic principle is that radical monotheism 
may also be applicable beyond the arena of Christian theology or the life of the 
Church and those who so participate therein. His fundamental belief is in what 
he calls 'the sovereignty of God' with which he also associates two other basic 
convictions, namely 'the recognition of our human lostness, sinfulness and 
idolatrousness' as well as 'the understanding that trust in the ground of being is 
a miraculous gift. ,515 But the way in which he now reflects upon these 
convictions is interesting in that it begins in confessional mode, speaking, that 
is, an insider of the Christian tradition, but then opens out into an ecumenical 
m HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative', op. cit.. pp. 248-249. 
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orientation that takes proper cognisance of the life and faith of those who may 
belong to different belief communities and thus reason on the basis of quite 
different presuppositions: 
How it is possible to rely on God as inconquerably loving and redeeming, to have 
confidence in him as purposive person working towards the glorification of his 
creation and of himself in his works, to say to the great "It": "Our Father who art in 
heaven" - this remains the miraculous gift. It is the human possibility which has been 
made possible. as has also the enlistment of these unlikely beings, these human 
animals, ourselves, in his cause, the cause of universal creation and universal 
redemption. So far as I could see and can now see that miracle has been wrought 
among us by and through Jesus Christ. I do not have the evidence which allows me to 
say that the miracle of faith in God is worked only by Jesus Christ and that it is never 
given to men outside the sphere of his working. though I may say that where I note its 
presence I posit the presence also of something like Jesus Christ. SJ6 
What Niebuhr seems to be doing here is to put to use his so-called method of 
'confession and demonstration'. He is reasoning on the basis of the revelation 
of God in Jesus Christ. through whom faith and forgiveness are mediated in 
face of the fact of human sin. But to thereby necessarily, and in principle, then 
make the further logical inference that God is only revealed to Christians, or 
that only those who consciously and explicitly acknowledge God's redeeming 
work in Christ can be said to have faith or be saved, is an unwarranted 
extrapolation. It is to fall once more into 'henotheism', that perennial 
temptation which Niebuhr defines as 'the worship of one god who is however 
the god of an ingroup rather than the ground ofa11 being,.s17 It would be a poor 
God who was only responsible for the being and well being of some, for since 
Niebuhr's vision is that of the One God whose cause is that of 'universal 
creation and universal redemption', then anything less than this 'divine cause' 
is at least questionable, and at worst destructively divisive. '1 see our human 
religion now, whether non-Christian or Christian, as one part of our human 
culture which like other parts is subject to a constant process of reformation and 
deformation, of metanoia (repentance) and fall. And in that process the 
St6 Ibid., p. 249. Italics added to original for emphasis. 
m Ibid., p. 250. 
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deification of the principles of religious society is no less dangerous to men, no 
less misleading to their faith, than the deification of national or economlC 
principles. ,S18 
Radical monotheism, as Niebuhr interprets and articulates it, thus offers a 
critique, most wholesomely done, perhaps, as self-critique, which each and any 
religion that aspires to be monotheistic, may put to use in finding evidence of 
any element of henotheism therein. But this is only the obverse of its 'universal 
intent', that constructive ecumenical faith-stance whereby God is acknowledged 
as the one trustworthy value centre who calls human beings to participate in the 
divine mission of universal reconciliation and redemption as their supremely 
worthwhile common cause.Sl9 On this reasoning, any form of Judaism, or 
Christianity, or Islam that is not loyal to the divine intent, which is to be 
interpreted as universally beneficent and responsible, is a betrayal or denial of 
God's reconciling and redeeming work in creation. Yet the way in which this 
universal mission is to be carried out is by means of the interpersonal 
interactions of human faith, that is, trust in and loyalty to, the one God who 
enables such an ethos to prevail at all. 
There is clearly, then, a pressmg need for each of the three 'official' 
monotheisms, to review and repent of, whatever elements of henotheism have 
done or still do lurk within their own distinct communities. Niebuhr's radical 
monotheism, it would appear, offers a resource that could provide a relatively 
unthreatening means of finding some degree of mutual benefit for these so-
called 'religions'. Though offered by Niebuhr as an interpretation of what the 
revelation of God through the mediation of Jesus involves or implies, it does 
not seek to coerce, conquer or subsume the other monotheisms by some prior 
claim to the supposed superiority of Christianity. Rather, and crucially, it offers 
a viable and plausible means whereby a principle of, at least convergence, and 
maybe even reconciliation, having both critical and constructive elements, is 
brought to light as a helpful or healing resource. The cross of Jesus has often 
been viewed by Jews and Muslims with deep suspicion, and when one 
518 Ibid. 
519 We will examine this further in section 2 of chapter 6. 
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considers the often savage history of the Crusades and the Holocaust, not 
without good reason; but with the logic of Niebuhr's interpretive principle of 
radical monotheism, that same cross might also, and better, be seen, as the sign 
and seal of God's suffering love to reconcile and redeem.s2o 
3. Moving Beyond Sectarianism: A Northern Ireland Test Case 
The context in which I live, minister and write is that of Northern Ireland, 
which, at the beginning of this third millennium, is still trying to come to terms 
with, and emerge from, a violent and divisive past. There are, of course, many 
other places where civil unrest and local or international conflict have been, or 
still are, scourges upon the lives of thousands and millions of people. However, 
Northern Ireland has been particularly blighted by a phenomenon known as 
'sectarianism' where rival communities strive for supremacy over the same 
contested space, and where historically, religion and politics have been 
combined to form a particularly virulent type of social 'disease.' The fact that 
nationalist and republican aspirations for a united Ireland have been 
predominantly associated with Roman Catholicism, whereas the desire for most 
Protestants to adhere to their historic British identity as members of the United 
Kingdom, whether expressed in unionist or loyalist terms, has deepened these 
potential or real divisions.521 The further tragedy, of course, is that, in popular 
520 For more on the important subject of 'inter-faith' dialogue and relations, we mention here 
only a few out ofa vast array of material, for example, John Hick and Paul E. Knitter, eds., The 
Myth o/Christian Uniqueness, London, SCM, 1988; Gavin D'Costa, ed., Christian Uniqueness 
Reconsidered: The Myth 0/ a Pluralistic Theology 0/ Religions, Maryknoll, Orbis, 1998; David 
Lochhead, The Dialogical Imperative: A Christian Reflection on Interfaith Encounter, London, 
SCM, 1988; J.A. DiNoia, The Diversity o/Religions: A Christian Perspective, Washington, 
D.C., Catholic University of America Press, 1992; lan Markham, 'Christianity and Other 
Religions,' in Gareth Jones, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Modern Theology, Oxford, 
BlackwelI, pp. 405-417. A detailed analysis ofNiebuhr's work in relation to the now well-
known classifications of 'pluralism, t 'inclusivism' and 'exclusivism' would take us well beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but he is clearly an intriguingly distinct case who would not fit easily 
into such classifications. 
521 Among a plethora of relevant literature see Jonathan Bardon, A History 0/ Ulster, Belfast, 
The Blackstaff Press, 1992; J. Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: A Generation 0/ Violence 
1967-1992, Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 1994; Joseph Liechty, Roots o/Sectarianism in Ireland: 
Chronology and Reflections, Belfast: Inter-Church Meeting, 1993. 
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perception, if not always in actual fact, this divisive history has been between 
two groups of so-called 'Christians', thus bringing their respective church 
traditions into disrepute for many, and allowing many others to, in effect, 
confirm their already lightly or firmly held conviction, that something called 
'faith' or 'religion' or 'Christianity' is the cause of more trouble, hatred and 
conflict than its worth. The cause of the truth of the gospel and the reality of 
God's reconciling and redemptive work have thus been variously condemned or 
questioned or, at the very least, compromised by the sectarian symptoms 
allegedly found in that part of the body politic called the Church or 'the 
churches'. 
In their recently completed six-year research project into the phenomenon of 
sectarianism in Northern Ireland, Joseph Liechty and Cecilia Clegg have 
offered an analysis that is unprecedented in its depth, subtlety and scope.S22 
Their book is the result of an extensive process of research, consultation, 
practical fieldwork, analysis and multi-disciplinary reflection, part of which I 
was involved in myself, both personally, and also representatively, as the 
ordained minister of a local congregation, working in conjunction with other 
nearby parishes, Catholic and Protestant. In the course of the project, Liechty 
and Clegg challenge and subvert some of the more widely held stereotypes 
since 'much thinking about sectarianism is faulty because we take a solely 
personal approach to a problem that is both personal and systemic.,s23 The 
complex nature of this difficult and disturbing phenomenon becomes apparent 
in the following working definition that they present below: 
Sectarianism • .. 
. . . is a system of attitudes, actions, beliefs, and structures 
at personal, communal, and institutional levels 
which always involves religion, and typical1y involves a negative 
mixing of religion and politics 
S22 Joseph Liechty and Cecilia Clegg, Moving Beyond Sectarianism: Religion, Identity and 
Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, Dublin, The Columbia Press, 2001. 
523 Ibid., p. 9. 
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... which arises as a distorted expression of positive, human needs especially 
for belonging, identity, and the free expression of difference 
... and is expressed in destructive patterns of relating: 
hardening the boundaries between groups 
overlooking others 
belittling, dehumanising, or demonising others 
- justifying or collaborating in the domination of others 
physically or verbally intimidating or attacking others . .524 
Liechty and Clegg identify three possible approaches to the phenomenon 
thus defined. The first of these is what they call 'non-sectarianism' in which, 
typically, sectarianism is seen as wrong but where people basically try to avoid 
dealing with either its root causes or destructive symptoms, thus ceding ground 
even further to the negative dynamics of the sectarian system. The second 
approach is what they call 'anti-sectarianism' where people typically name, 
confront, engage and attack sectarianism but, ironically, in so doing, both fail to 
acknowledge their own complicity in the phenomenon, and also, use language 
and strategies which are uncomfortably and self-righteously similar to the very 
thing which they are opposed to in principle. The third and favoured approach 
is what our authors call 'moving-beyond-sectarianism' or MBS for short. 'We 
share with anti-sectarianism the inclination to name and confront sectarianism, 
but observing that no one is entirely innocent in relation to sectarianism, and 
that sectarianism is generally a distortion of something good, we reject the 
strategy of destroying or smashing sectarianism; these risk destroying what is 
good along with its distortion. We opt instead for an approach characterised by 
strategies of transforming, redeeming, healing, and converting sectarian 
distortions. ,525 
Their claim is not that this third way is perfect, or even necessarily superior, 
for doubtless it contains, or will prove to have, possible or real weaknesses, and 
524 Ibid., pp. 102-103. 
m Ibid., p. 26. 
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for this reason they therefore suggest that 'the moving-beyond-sectarianism 
approach is probably better seen as a complement to non- and anti-sectarianism 
rather than as a replacement. Non-sectarianism relies essentially on the merits 
of good manners and a basic civility, and if they are limited in what they can 
accomplish, they are not to be despised; sometimes just getting on with things 
rather than tackling them head on is entirely appropriate. As for anti-
sectarianism, its forthrightness and vigour will often be necessary traits. 
Understood as a complement, however, the moving-beyond-sectarianism 
approach does offer some new insights and strategies for dealing with 
sectarianism. ,526 
On the last page of their study, Liechty and Clegg, among many other 
suggestions and strategies, call for the development of 'a theology of 
reconciliation based on the experiences and needs of the churches and faith 
communities in Northern Ireland - perhaps one or more of the theological 
colleges commissioning such a piece of research. ,527 In their MBS book, the 
authors named above, though too modest to say so, have, in fact, gone some 
way towards providing such a theology of reconciliation, but nonetheless, there 
is still a considerable, and crucial task, yet to be undertaken in this field. Whilst 
it is beyond the scope of my thesis to attempt or articulate such an ambitious 
project, the modest hope that I have for this current section of my dissertation is 
that some central Niebuhrian insights can be seen to illuminate and inform the 
analysis and potential transformation of the phenomenon of sectarianism as 
outlined above. In doing so, it might go some small way to meeting the call for 
the development of a Northern Irish theology of reconciliation, as well as 
providing contextual evidence of the fruitfulness and effectiveness of Niebuhr's 
theologia crucis. 
In a summary statement Niebuhr proposes that '[r]evelation is not the 
development and not the elimination of our natural religion; it is the revolution 
of the religious life.'528 Likewise, he argues that '[r]evelation is not a 
526 Ibid. 
m Ibid., p. 346. 
m HRN, The Meaning of Revelation, London, Collier Macmillan, 1960, p. 138. 
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development of our religious ideas but their continuous conversion. God's self-
disclosure is that pennanent revolution in our religious life by which all 
religious truths are painfully transfonned and all religious behavior transfigured 
by repentance and new faith. ,529 These affinnations are consistent with the 
central thrust of Niebuhr's theology as we have been presenting it throughout 
this thesis. Radical monotheism is that faith-stance or faith-type that involves a 
thorough reassessment of our previously held beliefs and behaviour. In 
particular, and with specific reference to sectarianism, it involves a repentance 
or conversion or transfonnation of our henotheism, in which we trusted in some 
finite value centre and gave loyalty to its social but limited common cause, 
thereby excluding some others from the 'in-group' or 'closed society' so 
defined by this type of faith. One only has to briefly pause to consider the bitter 
and mutually exclusive histories of loyalism and republicanism, or, in their 
milder fonns of unionism or nationalism, to feel the weight of a Niebuhrian 
analysis of the fallenness of such henotheisms or destructive ideologies, as well 
as their potential transformation by the radical monotheism that he articulates 
and advances. 
Niebuhr's work on radical monotheism (HRN) thus has interesting affinities 
with that of Liechty and Clegg (MBS) in which instructive and persuasive 
insights seem to mesh together in helpful ways so that the promise of each is, in 
some ways, reinforced and enhanced. Some of their commonalities may be 
presented here briefly without seeking to override or dismiss their distinctive 
approaches. First, we might note that both HRN and MBS consider their 
respective projects as a complement to existing approaches or methodologies in 
the fields in which they work.s3o Neither feels compelled to aggressively assert 
that theirs is the only or supreme approach. partly. perhaps, because to begin 
with strident dogmatism is to bring yet one more factor into an already charged 
and contested context. Sensitivity but not apology seems to characterise their 
similar strategic approaches. Second, both HRN and MBS see henotheism and 
sectarianism respectively as natural but distorted examples of what is 
529 Ibid., p. 133. 
530 HRN, Christ and Culture. p.190; The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, p.5; The 
Responsible Self, pp. 67-68; Faith on Earth, p. 102; Liechty and Clegg, MBS, p. 26. 
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essentially good and desirable. HRN describes this in tenns of the faithlessness 
of the social self whereby people trust in a false value centre, expressing this in 
misdirected loyalty to the cause of this socially finite in-group. The resulting 
henotheism, be it based on colour, class, creed or other social ideology is 
basically an idolatrous breaking of the first and second commandments from 
the Old Testament Decalogue and the Great Commandment of Jesus. MBS 
describes this in tenns of the human search for identity and belonging, these 
being the natural phenomena which are embodied, expressed and nurtured 
within the particular context in which people live. Sectarianism occurs 
whenever our sense of identity and belonging are predicated upon narrowly 
exclusive and defensive self-understandings, with the consequential destructive 
patterns of relating to others that are associated with the ethos of the community 
in question. Third, both HRN and MBS see the Christian gospel as providing 
both the needed dynamic for repentance of past or existing false faith or 
idolatry, and also the means to undergo a painful but perfectly possible process 
of change, one which may be variously called transfonnation, conversion, 
redemption or reconciliation. HRN and MBS thus indicate, through their 
distinctive, but I believe, convergent approaches, that human idolatry in 
henotheistic or sectarian fonn can both be understood with clarity and empathy, 
yet also become the object of God's redemptive and reconciling action in Jesus 
Christ, a transfonnation of our existential predicament by the evangelical and 
ecumenical realities of his crucifixion, resurrection and ascended intercession. 
Thus we may speak once more of crucial faith, with its double meaning: faith's 
necessary conversion from its false manifestations, and this, fundamentally 
because of the ongoing work of the crucified, yet risen and reigning Christ, so 
that faith may be redirected and enlarged, enabling even 'outsiders' and fonner 
'enemies' to be included and reintegrated into our horizon of concern, 
acceptance and mutual care. 
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4. A Larger Ecumenism: The Ecology of Radical Responsibility 
The fourth and final aspect of this chapter now involves a consideration of the 
widest and most comprehensive meaning of the term 'ecumenical', As was 
noted at the beginning of the current chapter, the Greek word oikoumene is 
perhaps best translated as 'the whole inhabited earth' or 'the one household of 
life', and as such, therefore, calls us to contemplate the place of humanity in 
terms of its interaction with the complex and diverse dynamics of what is 
variously called the 'environment' or the entire surrounding natural order, 
Recent literature has begun to notice, or rediscover, the significant and subtle 
nuances conveyed by the Greek root oikos. implying. as it does, a deep and 
intimate connection between such branches of life and study as 'ecology' and 
'economics' in the one oikoumene or 'household of life' as given and sustained 
by God.531 In the officially ecumenical circles of the World Council of 
Churches this has been part of its own search for 'a vital and coherent theology' 
in the newly appreciated context of 'globalisation', the dynamics of which can 
no longer be denied, and which thus urges upon us all. but especially those of 
us in the 'richer North and West' of the world, to consider how to live more 
responsibly and less rapaciously.532 
Niebuhr died in 1962, some years before this 'paradigm shift' to a new 
global awareness had become a matter of grave and widespread concern. Like 
most of his forebears and contemporaries in the fields of theology and ethics. 
his primary points of emphasis were on divine-human and human-human 
relationships. For instance when he states that 'the complex object of 
theological study always has the three aspects of God in relation to man. of men 
m Konrad Raiser, Ecumenism in Transition, Geneva, wee, 1996, esp. pp. 79-111. 
m Westey Granberg-Michaelson, Redeeming the Creation. the Rio Earth Summit: Challenge to 
the Churches, Geneva, wee Publications, 1992; David Hallman, cd., Ecotheology: Voices 
from South and North, Geneva, wce Publications, 1994. Both of these have been part of the 
wee's recent project entitled: 'Justice. Peace and the Integrity of Creation'. See also Douglas 
John Hall, The Stewardship of Life in the Kingdom of Death, Grand Rapids. Eerdmans. 1985; 
Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1986; The Steward: A 
Biblical Symbol Come of Age, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1990; Dieter T. Hessel, cd., Theology 
for Earth Community: A Field Guide, New York, Orbis Books, 1996; Dieter Hessel and Larry 
Rasmussen, eds., Earth Habitat: Eco-Injustice and the Church 's Response, Minneapolis, 
Fortress Press, 2001. 
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in relation to God, and of men-before-God in relation to each other' we may 
take this as a typical example of where his convictions and interests mainly 
lay.533 Yet in the same book, and elsewhere within his writings, there are hints 
and traces of a much more comprehensive setting for life. The human drama, 
fascinating though it is, takes place on a global or universal stage in which the 
environing creation is the object of God's good intent and is therefore not to be 
neglected, exploited or abused.534 In answer to his echoing of the rhetorical 
question, 'And who is my neighbour?' put to Jesus by an earlier enquirer, 
Niebuhr demonstrates his ecumenical sensibility as follows: 'He is Augustine in 
the Roman Catholic Church and Socrates in Athens, and the Russian people, 
and the unborn generations who will bear the consequences of our failures, 
future persons for whom we are administering the entrusted wealth of nature 
and other greater common gifts. He is man and he is angel and he is animal 
and inorganic being, all that participates in being. ,JJ5 
Niebuhr does not develop the details implicit in this universal vision of the 
global context within which human beings live. Nonetheless, his instinct for, 
and articulation of, the logic inherent in that faith-stance or ethos which he calls 
'radical monotheism' and its corollary 'responsibility', mitigates against the 
perennial tendency of theology and ethics to pay too much or almost exclusive 
attention to 'humankind' at the expense of what might be called 'other-kind'. 
The biblical affirmation is that God's concern is for all creation, and that 
anthropos, whilst indeed the object of God's loving will, cannot live aright 
without some genuine appreciation of its proper relation to the entire environing 
kosmos that is also cherished and sustained by God. Writing in 1960, Niebuhr 
could say that the 'so-called underdeveloped nations - including Russia - do 
not yet know that there is no hope and no glory and no joy in the multiplication 
of our powers over nature, and we have no way of saving them from going 
through the experience which we have passed or are passing.,s36 
533 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, op. cit., p. 125. 
534 David, G. Trickett, 'Toward a Christian Theology of Nature: A Study Based on the Thought 
ofH. Richard Niebuhr,' Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 1982. 
S3S Ibid., p. 38. Italics added for emphasis. 
536 HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' op. cit., p. 250. 
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As has been noted earlier in this thesis, Niebuhr, though concerned primarily 
with the faith dynamics of the social self, nonetheless seeks to place his 
anthropology into a greater context than simply human community per se. 
Indeed, he considers humanism, to be a form of henotheism, in that, although 
an improvement on such narrow and destructive ideologies as sectarianism, 
nationalism or fascism, it still falls short of the truly universal intent that is 
inherent in radical monotheism. 'Genuinely radical monotheism has included 
all that humanism includes and something more. It has affirmed not only all 
mankind but all being. It has involved men not only in battle against the wrongs 
that afflict men but set them into conflict with what is destructive and anarchic 
in all accessible realms of being. Its religion has found holiness in man, but also 
in all nature and in what is beyond nature. It has believed in the salvation of 
men from evil, but also in the liberation of the whole groaning and travailing 
creation. Its science has sought to understand men, yet for it the proper study of 
mankind has been not only man but the infinitely great and the infinitely small 
in the whole realm of being. Its art has reinterpreted man to himself but has also 
re-created for man and reinterpreted to him natural beings and eternal forms 
that have become for him objects of wonder and surprise. ,537 
Niebuhr's vision of the oikumene is, as the above quotes show, attractive and 
suggestive, but for all that, impressionistic in style and rather scant in detail. In 
one sense, he shows a prophetic eye for important issues just beginning to show 
on the horizon, but given the other urgent matters that he felt called to attend to 
in the main decades of his life, his interest in what we are here calling the 
'ecology' of radical responsibility, remained at the level of an artistic or 
architectural sketch. Since then, of course, a complex mix of ecological, 
environmental, economic and ethical issues have come more to the fore, and 
increasingly, would appear to be forcing their way up the agendas of many 
peoples, communities and governments. One contemporary writer puts it thus: 
"The environmental crisis" does not adequately describe what ails us. "Environment" 
means that which surrounds us. It is a world separate from ourselves, outside us. The 
true state of affairs, however, is far more interesting and intimate. The world around us 
S37 HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, op. cit., p. 89. 
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is also within. We are an expression of it; it is an expression of us. We are made of it; 
we eat, drink and breathe it. And someday, when dying day comes, we will each return 
the favor and begin our role as a long, slow meal for millions of little critters. Earth is 
bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. This is not "environment" so much as the holy 
mystery of creation, made for and by all earth's creatures together.m 
Rasmussen, whose reflections these are, asks us to follow him in a fresh 
'consideration of earth's agonies. Thriving, even surviving, now lives with a 
terrifying insight. Earth - all of it - is a community without an exit. Our 
problems - people-to-people and humankind-to-otherkind - are genuinely ours 
all together, for worse and for better. The key terms in this text -
"sustainability," "earth faith," "earth ethics," "the integrity of creation" - all 
assume that the [presently bordered countries of the world] are no longer truly 
bordered at all. Acid rain falls on the just and unjust alike. "Anned struggles for 
profit" leave "collars of waste" upon earth's shores and "currents of debris" 
upon her breast, without worrying over passports and fences. The world, all of 
it, has become game and booty and landfill. ,539 In short, as Daniel Maguire puts 
it, in a quote that stresses the urgency and gravity of the suffocating 
stranglehold that the 'more developed' peoples of the world have put on all of 
earth's community in what is now widely labelled 'globalisation': 'If current 
trends continue, we will not. And that is qualitatively and epochaUy true. If 
religion does not speak to [this], it is an obsolete distraction.'.540 
Rasmussen sets out to try and answer this challenge, describing his book as a 
'work in religious ethics. It argues for a dedication to earth in the manner of the 
sacred and sacramental and couples this with a sense of wonder that is 
protective of all life. Too, the moral yield drawn upon is religiously rooted and 
watered. These pages move within the open circle of ethical monotheism. That 
means Judaism and Christianity principally. But other traditions sing as 
538 Larry L. Rasmussen, Earth Community. Earth Ethics. Geneva, wee Publications, 1996, p. 
xii. It would be hard to overestimate the importance and prescience of Rasmussen's brilliant 
and multi-faceted book which was awarded the prestigious 1997 Grawemeyer Award for the 
best religious book for the preceding year. 
s39lbid. The quoted phrases are from Maya Angelou's poem, 'On the Pulse ofMoming'. 
540 Daniel Maguire, The Moral Core of Judaism and Christianity: Reclaiming the Revolution, 
Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1993, p. 13. Quoted by Rasmussen, op. cit., p. 10. 
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well.,541 He further argues therefore that '[w]hat makes for sustainability -
social, environmental, spiritual and moral sustainability - becomes the question. 
The answer will entail proposals both innovative and realistic. Such proposals 
themselves will, if they would see the light of day, require the imagination and 
tenacity characteristic of religious energy and devotion. ,542 
The point of particular relevance to this thesis is that one of the major 
theologians on whom Rasmussen bases the subsequent unfolding of his work is 
H. Richard Niebuhr, whose radical monotheism, almost provides, one might 
say, the theological and ethical underpinning for the argument that follows. The 
deep resonance with Niebuhr's earlier, if rather undeveloped, reflections about 
the appropriate ethos that it is desirable, even necessary, for us to nurture as we 
face the crucial interdependencies of our shared ecumenical future, is made 
powerfully clear in this extensive passage from Rasmussen: 
Jesus the Jew, in whom Christians see the fullest manifestation of God possible in 
human form, radicalises the notion of neighbor. He insists that the enemy is neighbor 
and that we are to treat all neighbors, including the enemy, with a regard equal to the 
regard we accord ourselves in love. We are to use the same framework of positive 
reference when we consider others as we use for ourselves. This is by now so much the 
pedestrian repetition of moral catechism that we hardly expect anything explosive, or 
even relevant, from it. 
But consider what happens when neighbor-Iove is extended in ways illumined by 
"creation" and "justice" and implied by an ethic of living sustainably in a contracting 
and crowded world. Then neighbor embraces, as H. Richard Niebuhr argued, "all that 
participates in being," organic and inorganic, present, past, and future. Neighbor then 
means a comprehensive responsibility inherited from the ancestors and turned toward 
posterity. In this sense, neighbourly responsibility is infinite in extent, with no 
preordained boundaries. Neighbor means being entrusted with the wealth of nature and 
the treasures of society for the sake of plant, human, and other animal life alike. It 
means responsibility for what neighbor literally means - the nigh farmer or, more 
loosely, the nigh one. But it means accountability to the far one as well, both in time 
541 Rasmussen, op. cit., pp, xii-xiii. 
5421b'd ... 1 "p, Xlll, 
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and space. And it means welfare for the enemy as well as for those for whom we 
willingly sacrifice. As in the parable of the Good Samaritan, class, social standing, 
function in society, address, and purity rules of all kinds have nothing to do with the 
defmition of neighbor. Neighbor is as neighbor-Iove does to whomever or whatever is 
at hand and in need. In a word, the neighbor in a million guises is the articulated form 
of creation to whom justice, as the fullest possible flourishing of creation, is due.543 
Niebuhr can rightly be said to have anticipated this ecumenical sensibility or 
ecological loyalty as far back as mid twentieth century when he articulated his 
vision of radical monotheism and the ethics associated with it as 'the 
affirmation of a universe and the devoted will to maintain universal community 
at whatever cost to the self. It is the patriotism of the universal commonwealth, 
the kingdom of god, as a commonwealth of justice and love, the reality of 
which is sure to become evident. ,544 But, as Niebuhr knows, given his realistic 
reading of human nature and its fallen condition, the 'moral consequences of 
sin - man's inhumanity to man, cruelty to beasts, exploitation of nature, abuse 
of sex, greed, commercial profanation of creation and its beauty - these are no 
less patent. ,545 
Niebuhr, as we have seen throughout this study, was always finely attuned to 
the misery that people brought upon themselves by their various ideologies and 
associated practices. His own judgement was that 'the deification of the 
principles of religious society is no less dangerous' to them 'than the deification 
of national and economic principles.' He was thus at an early stage in his life's 
work, and continually thereafter, concerned 'to protest against the spirit of 
capitalism and of nationalism, of communism and technological civilization' 
each of which in their own way, contrived to exploit, abuse and otherwise 
destroy the finely-balanced and radically interdependent relations and processes 
of the good creation that God has entrusted into our care. The sheer scale of 
543 Ibid., pp. 260-261. The HRN quote therein is from The Purpose of the Church and Its 
Ministry, p. 38. See also the essay by Rasmussen in the section of essays devoted to the 
'neighborology' ofKosuke Koyama in a festschrift dedicated to him, namely Dale T. Irvin and 
Akintunde E. Akinade, eds., The Agitated Mind of God: The Theology of Kosuke Koyama, 
'Oikos and Cross', New York, Orbis, 1996, pp. 212-224. 
544 HRN, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, op. cit., p. 37. 
545 HRN, 'Man the Sinner,' op. cit., p. 279. Italics added to emphasise Niebuhr's ecologically 
ecumenical sensibility. 
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misery that this irresponsible faithlessness visited upon the 'poor' was the worst 
consequence of this, but not to be denied either, was the 'trivialization' and 
'emptiness' that many people in the more 'developed' countries of the world 
experienced as a result of 'living in a great religious void' ,S46 as well as the 
long-term effects of environmental damage and ecological destruction, with 
perhaps untold danger and diminishment for all of earth and its inhabitants. 
But such uneasy forebodings were not all that Niebuhr contributes to this 
issue. In fact, his critique and warnings were based upon an affirmation of, and 
appreciation for, the 'radical responsibility' that Jesus Christ enacted and 
mediates. 'Will of God is present for Jesus in every event from the death of 
sparrows, the shining of sun and descent of rain' these latter being 'signs of 
cosmic generosity. The response to the weather so interpreted leads then also to 
a response to criminals and outcasts, who have not been cast out by the infinite 
Lord. So it is also with carefree birds who deserve no pay for useful work, and 
with flowers that have done no heroic deeds to merit their colourful ribbons and 
brilliant medals.' Can one not say, asks Niebuhr. that these are 'signs of the 
presence of an overflowing creativity, of an infinite artistry, that rejoices in its 
creations, that rejects. because it is all grace, the censorship of human laws, not 
because it falls below the common human standard, but rises far above it?,S47 
5. Conclusion 
The various aspects of Niebuhr's ecumenical work have thus been explored. It 
is evident that there is a consistently 'catholic', or 'inclusive' or 'universal' 
logic inherent in his theology of radical monotheism, upon which his ethics of 
546 HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' op. cit., p. 250. 
547 HRN, The Responsible Self, op. cit., pp. 164-166. We thus reconnect with the various aspects 
ofNiebuhr's Yale Divinity School Christian Ethics Lectures, op. cit., on 'Response to the 
Creative Action of God' as analysed in Chapter Three, Section 4 of this thesis. A re-reading of 
that material in the light of this current environmental or ecological section should now be more 
instructive and illuminating. 
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responsibility were based and developed, a perspective which we have here 
chosen to designate as 'ecumenical'. 
This ecumenical dimension of Niebuhr's work has been analysed in terms of 
four distinct aspects. First, we saw how he initially worked hard at forming 
various denominational church-unions so that the structural oneness of the 
Church could be further embodied. However, over time, his pursuit of this goal 
waned, and he invested more of his hopes and efforts in the more underlying 
and less formal ministry of seeking to lay bear, or contribute to, a deeper. more 
subtle ecumenical reality in which the One Church would converge upon Jesus 
Christ as the incarnation and mediator of radical monotheism. Secondly. we 
suggested that this Niebuhrian understanding of faith might yet be a possible 
resource to help reconcile the world's three 'official' monotheisms: Judaism. 
Christianity and Islam. The 'crucified mind' of radical monotheism's theologia 
crucis provides promising possibilities for each faith tradition to engage in self-
critique and searching dialogue, and so lessen the potential for mutual 
ignorance to either sow the seeds of suspicion, or fuel further animosity and 
conflict. Thirdly, we observed the remarkable parallels between Niebuhr's 
theology and the recent Moving Beyond Sectarianism Project, demonstrating, I 
believe, the mutual compatibility between their key insights, and therefore 
confirming my hunch that Niebuhr' s work on 'henotheism' is a penetrating 
analysis of the phenomenon of sectarianism. Finally, we followed the implicitly 
ecological or environmental orientation of Niebuhr's corpus, and found that 
some of his core concepts are remarkably congruent with the burgeoning 
writings of some of the leading practitioners in this field, and who, indebted to 
the logic of his work. have developed it much further in addressing the 
increasingly urgent needs of our contemporary context. 
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Chapter Six: An Eschatological Perspective 
1. The Coming of Jesus Christ 
Theology has traditionally thought of eschatology as the doctrine of the last 
things (from the Greek word eschata meaning 'the last things'). This has tended 
to mean an interpretation of such subjects as resurrection, judgement, the 
destiny of the human being, heaven and hell, and the nature of eternal life. 
These have arguably been areas which have been badly abused, not least in that 
they have given rise to much unwarranted speculation, tending, thereby, to 
either become overly sentimental, or, at the other extreme, giving rise to many 
forms of destructive and demeaning scare-mongering. ~48 
One of the noteworthy features of Christian theology, or at least mainstream 
Christian theology in recent decades, is that eschatology has been rescued 
somewhat from the unfortunate tendencies of both extremism and isolationism. 
By extremism, we mean the excesses of sentimentalism and scare-mongering as 
mentioned above. By isolationism, we mean that eschatology is less likely than 
in previous eras to be relegated to the status of a few appended thoughts about 
the end-times, normally depicted in terms of eternal life considered in relative 
abstraction from everyday historical life. In contrast to these misguided 
tendencies, recent theologians place much more emphasis on integrating 
eschatology into the overall framework of theology, and the particular doctrinal 
loci therein. The overall effect of this is that these other doctrines, whether 
Christology, anthropology, ecclesiology, ethics or whatever, now have a 
distinctly eschatological content or 'colouring'. ~49 
548 See, for example, Hal Lindsey, The Late Great Planet Earth, London, Marshall Pickering, 
1971. 
549 See David Fergusson, 'Eschatology' in Colin Gunton, editor, The Cambridge Companion to 
Christian Doctrine, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 226- 244; Carl Braaten, 
'The Kingdom of God and the Life Everlasting', in Christian Theology: An Introduction to its 
Traditions and Tasks, London, SPCK, 1983, pp. 274-298; Jurgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: 
On the Ground and Implications of a Christian Eschatology, trans. James W. Leitch, London, 
SCM Press, 1967; The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology, trans. Margaret Kohl, London, 
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It can, of course, be said that every theologian has an eschatology of some 
sort given that the subject matter of faith in the living God revealed in Jesus 
gives rise to Christian hope, however that latter tenn be understood. But in this 
doctrinal area in particular, much depends upon the relative weight of emphasis 
placed upon the internal dynamics in question. It is to such an analysis of 
Niebuhr's understanding of eschatology that we now turn, though it may be 
noted at the outset, as we have found in other areas of his thought, that his 
references to, and reflections upon, this subject will need to be brought to a 
more systematically explicit focus than was the case in his own writings. It 
should also be noted that this chapter will be somewhat shorter than the earlier 
ones, given that we have by now performed an exposition of most of the main 
lines of Niebuhr's thought, thus already touching upon and anticipating, though 
implicitly, much of his eschatologia crucis. sSO 
Both the Niebuhr brothers, Reinhold and Richard (HRN), have often been 
accused by their critics of being unduly pessimistic in their interpretations of 
history. SSI Like any hasty or dismissive judgement, it arguably does not do 
justice to the nuances and complexities of a possible alternative assessment. 
What the accusation does allow us to do, however, is to begin to analyse HRN's 
eschatology by means of the way in which he carefully distinguishes it from 
that of his brother Reinhold. In a paper prepared for 'The Theological 
Discussion Group' in 1949, Niebuhr expressed his appreciation for his brother's 
writings but noted that one of the perplexing things about them was that 
Reinhold's genuinely held Christian beliefs remained largely hidden from view 
when he attempted to interpret the often troubled or even tragic arena of history. 
In terms of what was known as his 'Christian realism', Reinhold seemed to 
make his political realism more explicit and prominent than his Christian 
SCM Press, 1996; Hans Schwarz, Eschatology, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2000; and especially 
the unjustly neglected Adrio Konig, The Eclipse o/Christ in Eschatology: Toward a Christ-
Centered Approach, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1989. 
550 The phrase is used in Douglas John Hall, Confessing the Faith: Volume I. Christian 
Theology in a North American Context, Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1998. p.29. 
SS! John D. Barbour, 'Niebuhr versus Niebuhr: The Tragic Nature of History,' op. cit. 
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faith.552 Referring to this tendency in his brother's viewpoint, Niebuhr writes 
that it is 'pre-Christian eschatology in the sense that the emphasis falls on the 
two ideas that sin and the "demonic" powers now reign and that only in the 
"end" will there be fulfilment. It is Christian eschatology in the sense that the 
first coming of Christ has judged man and the powers so that in faith it is now 
known that they do not have any final dominion and that God will make his 
justice, love, and mercy manifest in the end. It is Christian eschatology in the 
sense that the time of the interval is the time of repentance and faith made 
possible by the coming of Jesus Christ into the flesh. ,553 
Niebuhr continues his analysis, in the process giving us fairly strong clues as 
to what his own perspective is, in relation to, yet distinct from, his brother's. He 
writes: 
Something is implicit here that is not made explicit and which if it were made more 
explicit would, I think, somewhat change the emphasis. What seems to be said is that 
the cross as judgment stands in the very midst of our history, though as forgiveness it 
stands at the end of history so that man in history can live in repentance and in the 
hope of forgiveness. But the resurrection does not explicitly stand in history, though 
the faith which is now in history according to Reinie presupposes the resurrection. It 
seems to me important that all the references to Jesus Christ as having come are 
references to the crucified Christ, to "suffering love" which must "remain suffering 
love in history" and that there are so few references to "triumphant faith" - not 
necessarily the triumphant faith of the Christian but of Jesus Christ.ss4 
Niebuhr, as we have seen throughout this thesis, has a strong affinity with 
just such an interpretation. Indeed, we have been arguing that his is an 
existentially-informed theologia crucis which takes with the utmost seriousness 
the passion of Jesus Christ, as both an event uniquely undergone by him, yet 
also a perpetual and perennial process, in which a suffering humanity also 
participates by incorporation into his being-in-act.sss However, important and, 
m HRN, 'Reinhold Niebuhr's Interpretation of History' in Theology, History and Culture, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1996, pp. 91-101, esp. 97-98. 
5S3 Ibid., p. 98. 
554 Ibid. 
m See, for instance, HRN, 'Participation in the Present Passion,' op.cit. 
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indeed, pervasive as this theme is in Niebuhr's work, there is clearly also 
another related aspect, and that is that the faithfulness of Jesus is vindicated by 
his resurrection by God the Father so demonstrating that God in Christ is the 
basis of an ultimately victorious gospel in which humans can, do and will share. 
Niebuhr's interpretation does indeed often accentuate the crucifying aspects of 
the gospel of the Christ-event, but whilst the notes of celebration and triumph 
are not so often sounded, they are a real, though mostly subdued or implicit part 
of his rendering of the good news of grace. Hence, in pursuing his perceptive 
analysis of his brother's eschatology, and thus paving the way for his own 
distinct nuances, Niebuhr spells out what is 'near the center' of his difficulties 
with, and differences from, Reinhold's stance as follows: 
Jesus, he says, reinterprets the "eschata." Jesus attributed the qualities of the suffering 
servant to his first coming and the qualities of the triumphant Son of Man to a second 
coming. Hence Reinie makes history between the first and second comings an interim 
in which love continues to suffer but in which men partly know the true meaning of 
history and so live in faith and repentance. But it seems to me that the Christian 
reinterpretation of the "eschata" must be distinguished from Jesus' reinterpretation. 
that the resurrection means that Christ has come again and eome with power. that the 
interval between the first and second eomings was very short and that the interval in 
which men now live is not between crucifixion and resurrection but between the 
resurrection of the first fruits and the final resurrection. jj6 
This is probably the most explicit and important eschatological statement 
about the coming of Jesus Christ to be found in Niebuhr's entire corpus. It is 
also remarkably similar to that of Karl Barth, whose own eschatology has often 
been the subject of criticism. William Stacy Johnson, in a recent 
reinterpretation, has drawn attention to the way in which Barth articulates the 
Parousia, namely, the final coming of Christ as having the 'threefold form of 
Resurrection, Pentecost, and Second Coming' .SS7 Granted that Niebuhr's 
terminology is somewhat different in that he calls the incarnation the first form 
of Christ's coming and the resurrection of the crucified Jesus the second, 
SS6 HRN, Reinhold Niebuhr's Interpretation of History, p. 98. Italics mine for emphasis. 
SS7 William Stacy Johnson, The Mystery o/God: Karl Barth and the Postmodern Foundations 
o/Theology, Louisville, Westminster John Knox Press, 1997, p. 124. 
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whereas Barth prefers the terminology given above; nonetheless, the meaning 
and emphasis of both theologians is remarkably similar. Compare, for example, 
the following reflections on eschatology from each in turn. First, Niebuhr, who 
writes: 
The divine rule, the divine action in all things, which now men only dimly perceive 
and understand in their encounter with creative and destructive events, will be clearly 
revealed at last, in the end. What is to become clear in the end, however, is not 
something new. It is now an emergency that is coming. The actuality of the present is 
to become emergent. God whose rule is hidden and whose rule will become manifest is 
ruling now, despite all hiddenness. Realized eschatology is realized theology.558 
In remarkably similar fashion, Barth offers the following reflections in 
response to questions about the meaning of eschatology: 
'I can only give an indication: the "old" and the "new" worlds are indirectly identical, 
the new already present in the old in that its reconciliation in Jesus Christ has already 
taken place. What is still to come is its manifestation (i.e. "apocalyptic" eschatology!) 
- its general, final, universal revelation.' In other words: 'Eternal life is not another, 
second life beyond our present one, but the reverse side of this life, as God sees it, 
which is hidden from us here and now. It is this life in relationship to what God has 
done in Jesus Christ for the whole world and thus also for us. So we wait and hope - in 
respect of our death - to be made manifest with him (Jesus Christ who is raised from 
the dead), in the glory of judgment, and also of the grace of God. That will be the new 
thing: that the veil which now lies over the whole world and thus over our life (tears, 
death, sorrow, crying, grief) will be taken away, and God's counsel (already 
accomplished in Jesus Christ) will stand before our eyes, the object of our deepest 
shame, but also of our joyful thanks and praise. ,559 
Whilst it is not the main purpose of this thesis to conduct a full-blown 
comparison of Niebuhr and Barth, it has nonetheless been an ongoing 
SS8 HRN, The Responsible Self, op. cit., p. 167. Note the similarity to Hall's understanding of 
the eschatological thrust of the theologia crucis, in Douglas John Hall, Lighten our Darkness: 
Towards an Indigenous Theology of the Cross, Lima, Ohio, Academic Renewal Press, 2001, p. 
145, 'The glory, accessible to those who adhere to the cross, is perceived by faith, not by sight. 
To quote Luther, it is always hidden under its opposite.' 
SS9 Quoted in Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His life from letters and autobiographical texts, 
SCM Press, trans. John Bowden, London, 1976, p. 488. 
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subsidiary theme, that we take note of some important points of contrast, or, as 
1 believe more often to be the case, of congruence and convergence, than 
Niebuhr cared to admit. Here again, we note the similarity of their positions, 
this time in the area of eschatology. Niebuhr, indeed, having earlier expressed 
some misgivings about the eschatological aspects of Barth's earlier work, could 
later find himself affirming that 'I believe that Barth has become the legitimate 
heir of the Social Gospel by placing its social understanding of life in a context 
in which it can live. ,560 Niebuhr saw in Barth, similar to his own intellectual 
pilgrimage, 1 would argue, someone who realised that the best instincts of the 
Social Gospel would benefit from being based on a more eschatological rather 
than teleological depiction in that, in the former, the main emphasis is on 'the 
Kingdom which God establishes, has established, and will establish' 
specifically as 'revealed, known and believed through God's act of self-
communication in Jesus Christ. ,561 
2. The Sovereignty of God: An 'Emergent Reality' with 
'Universal Intent' 
As noted before, 'the fundamental certainty' given to Niebuhr, at least as far 
back as the 1930's, 'was that of God's sovereignty.,s62 Every other aspect of his 
work was based upon this: whether it be his existential analysis of faith and its 
various faithless counterfeit forms; his evangelical description of how God 
transforms the human situation through the incarnation and mediation of radical 
monotheism in Jesus Christ; his ethics of 'Christo-morphic' responsibility to 
God's creative, governing and redemptive actions; his lifelong vocation to 
contribute to the reformation of the Church's deformities so that it would 
560 HRN, 'The Kingdom of God and Eschatology in the Social Gospel and in Barthianism,' in 
HRN, Theology, History and Culture, op, cit., p. 122. 
561 Ibid., p.121. For more on how Barth's dialectical theology moved through four distinct, 
though related historical phases, the fIrst two of which were more eschatological and the last 
two more Christocentric, see Bruce McCormack, Karl Barth 's Critically Realistic Dialectical 
Theology: Its Genesis and Development 1909-1936, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997. Niebuhr, in 
contrast to Barth, could never fully approve of the latter's christological 'objectivism', 
562 HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' op. cit., p. 248, 
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participate in Christ's saving mission in a spirituality that sought to overcome 
the world's many sectarian, suspicious and exploitative tendencies with a more 
ecumenical orientation. Woven deep into each of these aspects of Niebuhr's 
work was his distinctive theologia crucis, the crucial faith that Jesus Christ 
embodied and mediates to those who thus 'participate in his passion'. 
In terms of eschatology, this means that 'Christian action' may be described 
as 'response to the divine activity which precedes, accompanies and awaits 
human action in history. ,563 This is Niebuhr on Barth, but it may also be taken 
to accurately convey Niebuhr's own eschatology too, for seldom elsewhere in 
his writings does he speak with such specificity about the subject, and nowhere 
else does he contradict or significantly change his mind. To speak, therefore, of 
the sovereignty or 'Kingdom of God means that God is pre-temporal, super-
temporal, and post-temporal; it means that time is bounded by eternity on every 
side, but it also means that eternity enters into and conditions time and calls for 
the response of the temporal at every moment. ,564 
Clearly then, for Niebuhr, as for Barth, the 'temporal is not eternal but 
eternity is forever ingressing into time. That it is ingressing and what it is in 
character is known through revelation by the Christian, whose life must consist 
of response to the eternal rather than a seeking after it, or of an ascetic denial of 
the temporal.,565 The term 'ingressing' is synonymous with Nieburian language 
from earlier in this thesis when, it may be recalled, in debate with his brother 
Reinhold, he stated that in his, Richard's, more 'eschatological faith'. the 
kingdom of God is an 'emergent' which 'comes inevitably, though whether we 
see it or not, depends on our recognition of its presence and our acceptance of 
563 HRN, 'The Kingdom of God and Eschatology in the Social Gospel and in Barthianism,' op. 
cit., p. 121. 
564 Ibid., pp. 121-122. Note the parallels to Barth's three-fold rendering of God's 'fatherly 
lordship' especially in his' preserving, accompanying and ruling' grace in Karl Barth, Church 
Dogmatics 1l//3, op. cit., pp. 3-288; Kathryn Tanner, 'Creation and Providence,' in The 
Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed., John Webster, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, pp. 111-126; George Hunsinger, 'Mysterium Trinitatis: Karl Barth's Conception of 
Eternity,' in Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, op. cit., pp. 186-209. It 
should be noted, though, that Barth is much more thoroughly Trinitarian and Christocentric than 
Niebuhr. typifying their differing emphases. 
S6S HRN, 'The Kingdom of God and Eschatology in the Social Gospel and in Barthianism,' op. 
cit., p. 122. 
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the only kind of life which will enable us to enter it, the life of repentance and 
faith. ,566 
But crucial to this Niebuhrian interepretation of God's sovereignty as an 
eschatological 'emergency' that becomes 'emergent' in and through time is the 
ecumenical or universal dimension that belongs logically and inescapably to it, 
as noted earlier in our exposition of 'radical monotheism'. The dense and 
intricate interweave of these two perspectives, the eschatological and the 
ecumenical are evident in the following paragraph, one in which many threads 
are brought together: 
The Christian ethos so uniquely exemplified in Christ himself is an ethics of 
universal responsibility. It interprets every particular event as included in universal 
action. It is the ethos of citizenship in a universal society, in which no being that exists 
and no action that takes place is interpretable outside the universal context. It is also 
the ethos of eternal life, in the sense that no act of man in response to action upon him 
does not involve repercussions, reactions, extending onward toward infinity in time as 
11 ' . I 567 we as In SOCla space. 
Integral to Niebuhr's understanding of the sovereignty of God is the belief 
that God is 'inconquerably loving and redeeming', One who as 'purposive 
person working towards the glorification of his creation and of himself in his 
works, enlists us 'in his cause, the cause of universal creation and universal 
redemption. ,568 However, because this is so, 'the promised perfection of the 
community of faith is both a longed for and a feared consummation. ,569 There is 
no smooth or painless progress in any eschat%gia crucis worthy of the name, 
and in Niebuhr's interpretation, it is especially evident that this is so. The 
gospel's consummation is 'longed for as the realization of all that is potential in 
. our creation and redemption, as the deliverance from all deceits, lies, treasons, 
hypocrisies [and other distresses and disappointments] which distort our 
existence. But it is also feared as that which brings to light and eradicates all 
566 HRN, 'A Communication: The Only Way into the Kingdom,' op. cit., p. 447. 
567 HRN, The Responsible Self, op. cit., p. 167. 
568 HRN, 'Reformation: Continuing Imperative,' op. cit., p. 249. 
569 HRN, Faith on Earth,' op. cit., p. 111. 
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that is false in it' and therefore 'includes not only the prospect of infinite effort 
but of great suffering,570 
In the specific terms of Niebuhr's 'pistology', one notes that there may be 
'progress in personal relations of faith; trust experiencing loyalty increases: 
loyalty calls forth loyalty. But such loyalty is accompanied by the dark shadow 
of treason. The more extensive the community of loyalty, the more extensive in 
its effects will be the act of treason which breaks that loyalty. The more men 
trust in one another's loyalty the greater the temptation to deceit or to 
hypocrisy. Great vices are possible only where there are great virtues, since vice 
always feeds on virtue. Hence the possibility of the anti-Christ always appears 
in the future of the community of faith, while its progress is marked by the 
appearance of deceits and treasons that are the counterparts of its faith. ,m The 
recurrent word throughout Niebuhr's reflections here in Faith on Earth is 
restoration: the saving grace of the sovereign God made known in Jesus Christ 
restores, or works toward the consummated renewal, of the broken, misdirected 
and otherwise distorted beings and relations in his beloved yet beleagured 
creation. Niebuhr elsewhere speaks of 'the dark powers, the Cthonian deities .. 
and the Olympian gods' that somehow hold sway over human beings with 
sinful and destructive consequences.572 
Nonetheless, urges Niebuhr, despite the many crises and painfully 
distressing experiences that we both inflict and endure, the faith that Christ 
himself embodied, and mediates to us, discerns that God's reign is an emergent 
reality with 'universal intent' .573 That universal intent, as Niebuhr interprets its 
570 Ibid. 
S7J Ibid. 
S72 HRN, 'Faith in Gods and in God,' in Radical Monotheism and Western Culture with 
Supplementary Essays, op. cit., p. 120. Similarly, Barth speaks of the 'lordless powers' that 
hold people and communities in thrall to evil and against God's goodness, see Karl Barth, The 
Christian Life: Church Dogmatics. J VI4 Lecture Fragments, Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1981, pp. 
213-233. See also Waiter Wink's trilogy, Naming the Powers: The Language of Power in the 
New Testament, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1984; Unmasking the Powers: The Invisible 
Powers that Determine Human Existence, Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1986; Engaging the 
Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination, Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 
1992. The biblical basis for these perspectives includes Romans 8:38; 1 Corinthians 15:24; 
Elhesians 6:12; Colossians 1:16 etc. 
S The phrase 'universal intent' is from HRN, The Responsible Self, op. cit., p. 175. It is one 
that he appropriated from the work of Michael Polanyi. See, for instance, Michael Polanyi, 
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disclosure in the entire 'Christ-event', is that God's will and work is 'universal 
redemption'. Niebuhr never directly addresses or attempts to answer the 
question of , universal ism' but he does at times indicate the expansiveness of his 
hope, and the futility, not to say sheer folly, of trying to be too dogmatic or 
specific about who is included or excluded from the scope of God's grace or the 
community of faith. What he does say, however, is intriguing in its penetrating 
subtlety and sensitivity to the complexities of the human spirit, and is in direct 
continuity with insights we gleaned from him in chapter one: 
We cannot, particularly when we see how interpersonal faith is and how much a person 
exists by trust and loyalty, distribute faith and faithlessness by individuals. Every 
person, so far as he is a self, participates in the life of faith and is a subject of 
redemption, thus belonging to the Catholic church more or less actively. Every person, 
so far as he participates in the anxiety, distrust and disloyalty of the world - that is to 
say every person - is outside the community of faith. The line between church and 
world runs through every soul, not between souls. Neither is the distinction between 
visible and invisible church as idealism makes it, that is between the actual and the 
ideal church, a tenable one. For the church in which we believe, on which we count as 
the supporting, interpreting community of faith, is actual, interpersonal reality, not a 
form, but an action, trust and loyalty, experienced over and over again.m 
For Niebuhr, God's sovereignty has a distinctly eschatological thrust. He 
interprets God's presence as 'Christo-morphic', eliciting our faithful response 
to the creative, governing and redeeming actions of God, in ways that transcend 
present human understanding, but which are nonetheless trusted to be the 
expression of God's loving wisdom. In the history of Israel, but supremely in 
Jesus Christ, we learn to discern God's presence and action as both gracious 
and tenacious, often going 'against the grain' of human desires and deeds, in 
order to bring about something that the divine mind knows to be ultimately 
more needful, 'the production of novelty', something which we saw particularly 
Personal Knowledge: Toward a Post-critical Philosophy, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1951; Drusilla Scott, Michael Po/anyi, London, SPCK, 1996. 
574 HRN, Faith on Earth, op. cit., p. 117. There are again remarkable affinities with Barth who 
was famous for his relative indifference to obsessive questions about who was reckoned to be in 
the Church or not, see Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth:His Life/rom Letters and Autobiographical 
Texts, op. cit., pp. 445-446. Note also the similarity of Niebuhr's exposition to the 'event-like' 
character of faith's response to grace. Hunsinger calls this motif 'actualism', see George 
Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, op, cit., pp. 30-32. 
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in our analysis of Niebuhr's interpretation of human response to the governing 
action of God.575 In this eschatologia crucis, Niebuhr believes that '[o]ur 
shabby work, our faithless cutting of corners, our efforts to get by, these will 
but furnish fuel for the world's Gehennas where all the trash we men produce 
and accumulate must be destroyed if there is to be any glory. Yet even our best 
work cannot endure unless the transcendent power in being that presides over 
and works in all our working includes what we do in its deed, a deed not of 
final destruction but of final recreation. Not of enslavement to futility but of 
liberation to action, not of death dealing but of life-giving. ,576 
3. Faith, Love and Hope 
The foregoing analysis of Niebuhr's eschatology, has revealed an eschatologia 
crucis in which God's sovereignty may be described as 'an emergent reality 
with universal intent'. Put otherwise, it depicts God's creative, governing and 
redeeming actions as revealed decisively in Jesus Christ as a specific event in 
time and space, but also continually reiterated throughout history in a process 
that is 'Christo-morphic'. By grace, through faith, people are called to 
'participate in this present passion' in communion with each other and the 
living Christ. In particular, their lives will therefore be marked by what are 
often called the 'three theological virtues', and it is with Niebuhr's reflections 
on this subject, that we complete our analysis of his eschatology,S77 
Niebuhr's initial point is that 'faith, hope and love' are not so much 'virtues' 
as the tradition has often designated them, as 'gifts' or 'relations' since they are 
not primarily 'achievements or products of training', This is consistent with 
Niebuhr's perennial reference to the sovereign objectivity of divine action 
575 See Chapter 3, Section 5 where Niebuhr calls this the 'end' or 'purpose' of divine 
government. God's eschatological purpose or universal intent brings forth new beginnings when 
human history gets stuck or threatens to destroy or diminish itself. 
576 HRN, 'Man's Work and God's,' in HRN, Theology, History and Culture, op. cit., p. 214. 
577 HRN, 'Reflections on Faith, Hope and Love,' unpublished typed manuscript, not clearly 
dated; also reprinted in The Journa/ of Religious Ethics 2, 1974, pp. 151.156. 
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relative to dependent humanity. 'The gifts which we call theological virtues in 
this general sense are not given as states of character but as relations to other 
beings and particularly as relations to God. ,578 
'Love,' for example, 'is given with the gift of the lovely, the love-attracting; 
it is called forth by the gift of God himself as the supremely and wholly 
desirable good; by the gift of the neighbor, as the one beloved by God, as 
lovely, and as loving the selC579 'Faith,' in familiar Niebuhrian refrain, 'as trust 
is given with the self-disclosure to a person of God as the faithful One, who not 
only can be trusted but invites and attracts trust; faith as loyalty or faithfulness 
is given with the revelation of the supremely challenging cause, the cause of the 
kingdom of God or the cause of Christ. ,580 And more pertinent to our 
eschatological analysis here, we note Niebuhr's initially rather terse observation 
that '[h]ope is given with the gift of a promise or with the gift of a future. ,581 
It is Niebuhr's conviction that these relations or so-called 'theological 
virtues' 'cannot be reduced to one of the three, as often seems to be suggested.' 
Since each has its 'distinctive character' none of them 'can be in action without 
the others.'582 He proposes, in fact, that they 'are as interconnected as are their 
bases in the creaturely constitution of the self as being devoted to value [love], 
as covenanting being [faith] and as being in time [hope].'583 
However, it is hope which we are particularly required to dwell upon in this 
chapter, Niebuhr making the interesting observation that, as he understands it, 
this is 'the peculiarly human theological virtue. ,584 He states that 'hope is 
related to faith and love' in that 'it is the expectation of the manifestation of 
God's love and of his faithfulness, that is of his redemption of the promises 
made to life.' As such, 'its great symbol or focussing point is the coming of 
Jesus Christ in power.' Included in this sense of expectation is the hope that 
S78 HRN, 'Reflections of Faith, Hope and Love,' unpublished typescript, p. 1. 
s79lbid. 
S80 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
S81Ibid., p. 2. 
s82lbid. 
s83Ibid., p. 3. The words [love], [faith] and [hope] added by myself for added clarity. 
s84 lbid. 
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God in Christ will forgive those who are unfaithful; perfect the selfs own 
ambivalent and perverted nature; and usher in the 'Kingdom of God' in which 
the relations between self, companions and God will flourish 
unconditionally.585 
However, as well as involving a sense of expectation, hope is also 'the 
exercise of faith and love in the temporal dimension. Hope is the form which 
faith assumes in relation to the future. It is trust in God with respect to the 
future. In hope man now trusts God as one who will surely do in the future what 
he has promised in the past. It is love of the companion appearing in the fonn of 
the expectation of divine love to be bestowed on him. Thus the love of Christ 
(and so of every companion now revalued as in Christ) appears in the form of 
hope for him. In a sense hope is the form which the love of God takes on the 
part of man in time who loves the God who is not yet manifest, the God who is 
the Father of Jesus Christ, God who is love. ,586 
Furthermore, suggests Niebuhr, now with a different time perspective in 
mind, hope 'is the means by which future faith and love (of which God, 
companion and self are subjects and objects) are brought into the present.' In 
other words, 'the more trusting the hope or the more hopeful the trust, the more 
it is possible now to respond to God and companions with anticipations of the 
love and faith that shall be. Hope makes for anticipated attainment of faith and 
love, as when the hopeful heir of immeasurable wealth is lavishly generous on a 
meagre allowance.' Yet is not only through anticipated attainment, but also 
through 'preparation' that 'hope is the means for drawing the future into the 
present, as when the child prepares to become a man by accepting disciplines 
and by pre-enacting the role which it will play. ,S87 But there is one more time 
dimension to consider, one which demonstrates Niebuhr's pastoral sensitivity to 
the failures, hurts and tragic losses that people suffer, as much as it does his 
keen insight into the scope of the hope that belongs to the gospel. In a fitting 
conclusion to his reflections he writes: 
585 Ibid. 
586 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
587 Ibid. p. 4. 
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Finally, hope is the attitude which faith and love take toward the past. It is the 
expectation that the faith and love of God will redeem, restore, recreate the past - the 
personal and the human past. It is the expectation that whatever there was of love of 
God and his cause, of faithfulness among men will be resurrected, while all hatred and 
betrayal and mistrust will be destroyed. It says, "Behold all things will become new, 
including the past."S88 
George Hunsinger has argued that in the "generous orthodoxy" that typifies 
'postliberal theology', there is, generally speaking, the combination of 'a high 
Christology with an open soteriology. ,589 In chapter two, we pondered how best 
to classify Niebuhr's Christology, and suggested it was at least an example of a 
"middle Christology", if not quite belonging to the "high" conceptions of Barth 
or von Balthasar. But with regard to Hunsinger's notion of an 'open 
soteriology', it would seem that Niebuhr's eschatology, suggestive rather than 
substantive, as it is, can indeed be described in some such manner. The logic of 
God's sovereignty, as interpreted by the motif of radical monotheism, leads us 
to surmise that Niebuhr believed that the divine is present in creative, governing 
and redeeming actions which have 'universal intent' so that we may hope that it 
will yet be the case that all will ultimately be reconciled, restored and glorified 
by the eschatologia crucis of Jesus Christ.590 
58Slbid. 
589 George Hunsinger, 'Postliberal theology,' in Kevin 1. Vanhoozer, ed., The Cambridge 
Companion to Postmodern Theology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 56. 
590 See also the notion of 'holy silence' or 'reverent agnosticism' in an open soteriology in 
George Hunsinger, 'Hellfrre and Damnation: Four Ancient and Modem Views,' in Disruptive 
Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, op. cit., pp. 226-249. 
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4. Conclusion 
Whilst Niebuhr did not develop an exhaustive and detailed eschatology, our 
analysis has shown that his work does have a distinctive eschatological 
orientation. We have designated this as an eschatologia crucis since his 
perspective is greatly informed by the 'cruciform' logic of his radical 
monotheism, which we earlier examined in chapters one and two, and found to 
be a particularly powerful presentation of the theologia crucis. God has come to 
redeem his creation, especially the human creature, in and through the 'Christ-
event' and now we live in the time between the 'first-fruits' of Christ's 
resurrection, and our promised resurrection to eternal life too. 
Niebuhr's fundamental conviction of the sovereignty of God is decisively 
enacted and revealed in this 'Christo-morphic' ingression or incursion into 
history, such that it is both a specific event and also a constantly reiterated 
process in which people may participate. Niebuhr's preferred terminology for 
this is that Christ is and reveals God's sovereignty as an 'emergent reality with 
universal intent'. In more traditional doctrinal language, we may say that 
Niebuhr's eschatology is neither predominantly 'realised' (already) nor 
'futurist' (not yet), but holds these two in a 'polar' or dialectical' tension that is 
characteristic of so much of his work, and is therefore perhaps best described as 
an example of an 'inaugurated' eschatology, an admittedly very broad category 
with many variations within it. Responding to God's grace in Jesus Christ, we 
live by faith, love, and not least, hope, looking forward to the perfection of all 
that God has promised to restore or recreate through faithful, suffering love as 
demonstrated by the cross.S91 
591 In addition to the exposition of this theme as already expounded in chapters 2 and 3, see the 
additional relevant material in HRN, The Meaning of Revelation, op. cit., pp. 101-139. 
245 
Summary Conclusion 
The title chosen for this thesis was 'Crucial Faith: The Theology and Ethics of 
H. Richard Niebuhr'. The foregoing argument has, I believe, demonstrated that 
Niebuhr does articulate just such a theologia crucis, and, moreover, does so in a 
way that is distinct, even unique. Furthermore, his theology of the cross, in 
terms of both its form and content, is also, I submit, plausible, even persuasive. 
Our analysis of Niebuhr's work attempted to 'crystallise out' the theologia 
crucis that tended to remain 'in solution' throughout his corpus. My abiding 
conviction is that this is not to impose something alien upon his broad-ranging 
reflections; nor is it a contrived attempt to co-opt his writings for another 
agenda contrary to his own intentions; rather, it is the testing of an hypothesis, 
namely, that Niebuhr's largely, implicit, though real theologia crucis, is worth 
the trouble of being brought into more explicit focus as an ongoing resource for 
the Christian tradition, and others too, to consider and to act upon. 
The various loci or perspectives by means of which we have interpreted the 
focal point of Niebuhr's theologia crucis yields the following six-fold 
summation. It is (1) existentialist in style; (2) evangelical in content; (3) ethical 
in approach; (4) ecclesiological in context; (5) ecumenical in scope and (6) 
eschatological in orientation. In slightly more detail, this six-fold summation 
allows the following conclusions to be drawn: 
(1) It is existentialist in terms of style. Niebuhr's interests are largely 
anthropological, and so he engages in penetrating descriptions of the 
phenomenology of social selfhood. Here, notions of trust and loyalty are 
considered as the most prominent aspects of faith; and belief, which he 
considers to be faith as propositional knowledge, has an admittedly 
subordinate, though, nonetheless, real role in his reflections. In doing so, 
he depicts the manifold manifestations of sin, particularly identified in 
terms of human faithlessness, as exposed by the revelation of God in 
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Jesus Christ. Here we have Niebuhr's theologia crucis as an initially 
critical anthropological principle 
(2) It is evangelical in tenns of content. Niebuhr's work tends towards a 
relatively greater weight of emphasis on matters of soteriology. He is 
especially concerned with analysing the transfonnation or conversion of 
faith through the gift of salvation established by God in Christ. If he is 
rather less involved in furthering ontological considerations of either 
divine or human personae, this is perhaps due to his conviction that 
theology's reflection on the gospel is knowledge of a personal, practical, 
and experiential nature. Doctrinally speaking, he is at pains to make sure 
that the conceptual never becomes too theoretical or speculative. Here 
we have Niebuhr's theologia crucis in its central role as a constructive 
anthropological principle. 
(3) It is ethical in tenns of approach. Since the good news of God's 
creating, governing and saving action has, as its central focus, the 
transfonnation of human beings, much attention is necessarily given to 
interpreting our appropriate responses to the divine intentions and 
actions. The gospel's indicative as demonstrated in Christ, therefore, 
involves certain imperatives as part of the 'Christo-morphic' ethos or 
morality that Jesus embodied and inspires. Here we have Niebuhr's 
theologia crucis as a nuanced imperative or vocational principle. 
(4) It is ecc/esiological in tenns of context. Niebuhr lives and writes as a 
member of the Church, for it is in the context of this community that 
God's grace is specifically known and consciously embraced. Well 
aware of its unity-in-diversity, as well as the irony and tragedy of its 
perennial faithlessness, Niebuhr is devoted to the Church, convinced 
that his primary life's work is to contribute to its refonnation so that it 
may participate in Christ's present passion in being responsible to God 
for his beloved world. Here we have Niebuhr's ecc/esia crucis. 
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(5) It is ecumenical in terms of scope. Niebuhr's portrayal of God as the 
'the One beyond the many, in whom the many are one,S92 illustrates two 
of the twin pillars in his theology of radical monotheism, namely, unity 
and universality. Since Niebuhr evinces such a catholic or inclusive 
sensibility throughout, he is ever warning against the dangers inherent 
in, or consequent upon, any tendencies towards defensiveness, 
exclusiveness, separatism or parochialism. To his mind, such communal 
practices are based upon false and faithless ideological premises, and 
the idolatries or henotheisms that attend them only lead to further 
isolation, exploitation, division and destruction. Here we have Niebuhr's 
theologia crucis as both a constructive and critical ecumenical 
principle. 
(6) It is eschatological in terms of orientation. Since Niebuhr's theology 
takes both unity and universality with the utmost seriousness, the 
persistent and unmistakable pulse of an eschatological thrust is detected 
throughout. Interpreting God's supreme cause as universal creation, 
governance and redemption, Niebuhr follows the eschatological 
trajectory of the divine intent as definitively disclosed by the 'Christ-
event'. Jesus not only incarnates and mediates faith in God's 
sovereignty, he also acts as the paradigm of that gracious rule in history, 
'an emergent reality with universal intent' working to bring forth new 
life and to renew hope, in the face of life's unfulfilling aspects and its 
nihilisms. Here we have Niebuhr's eschatologia crucis. 
A mind as subtle and searching as Niebuhr's, evident in the descriptive 
depth and diverse nature of his writings, both published and unpublished, 
admits of no neat or easy classification. Whether to call Niebuhr's approach 
'confessionalist' or 'foundationalist'; 'neo-orthodox', 'post-liberal' or 'neo-
liberal'; 'existentialist' or 'evangelical', or any other number of possible labels, 
is somewhat fruitless and beside the point. Indeed, much of Niebuhr's appeal, 
and no small part of his value, is that he transcends the too-simple categories by 
592 HRN, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, op. cit., p. 16. 
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which great thinkers and their legacies often become diminished, distorted or 
misrepresented by lesser, more prosaic, minds. 
If an appropriate overarching description of his life's work is to be 
attempted, perhaps none fits better than his own appellation of 'Christian moral 
philosophy', where each word contributes something essential to his project as 
a whole.593 It is 'Christian' because its theocentric understanding of life is 
defined by the revelation of God to humanity in Jesus Christ, calling for the 
confession and demonstration of the truth and meaning of this decisive event. It 
is 'moral' because the indicative of God's sovereign grace in Christ leads to an 
ethos or ethics, in which human praxis or agency is transformed by responding 
in ways that fit the imperatives of divine action. And it is 'philosophy' because 
it is a search for, love of, and sharing abroad, that seasoned wisdom which 
serves the end of understanding and enhancing our existence: what he once 
called 'the never-ending pilgrim's progress of the reasoning Christian heart .• 594 
I chose as my thesis title: 'Crucial Faith: The Theology and Ethics of H. 
Richard Niebuhr' because of my hunch that his Christian moral philosophy has, 
throughout its diverse interests and perspectives, a coherent or implicitly 
systematic thrust. I believe that the various loci through which my argument has 
moved, justifies this hunch to the extent that it presents Niebuhr's distinctive, 
even unique theo!ogia crucis as being at least plausible, or better still, 
persuasive. Like any theology, it is not without its weaknesses and 
inadequacies, indeed, Niebuhr both welcomed constructive criticisms of his 
work, and saw his as only one contribution to the mutual and supplementary 
efforts of many practitioners in the same field. If it is not in every respect a 
sufficient exposition of the orthodox Trinitarian gospel, it is nonetheless a 
worthy contribution to a genre perhaps best described as a prophetic wisdom of 
the cross. As such it offers a discerning interpretation of the indicatives and 
imperatives of divine grace to which humans are called to respond in faithful 
'Christo-morphic' discipleship. 
593 HRN, The Responsible Self, op. cit., pp. 42-46. 
594 HRN, The Meaning of Revelation, op. cit., p. 100. 
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Hans Frei said of any and every theological work that the 'proof of the 
pudding is in the eating, not in any printed recipe. ,595 I submit that Niebuhr's 
theologia crucis as an ethos of the cross meets the requirements of this 
pragmatic test, for as 'crucial faith' it necessarily participates in the passion of 
Jesus Christ crucified, and as 'crucial faith ' it trusts that his resurrection is the 
pledge of our salvation. It seeks, therefore, to be loyal, in spite of the enormity 
of sin and suffering, to the supreme cause of God's Coming Kingdom where 
communion is perfected in the joy of consummation. 
595 Hans Frei, Types ojChristian Theology, op. cit., p. 146. 
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